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WEINSTEIN ON NATO'S DISARMAMENT POLICY, FRAGMENTATION

DW171218 Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 17 Dec 79 p 10 DW

[Commentary by Adelbert Weinstein: "A Hard Core and Two Side Groups"]

[Text] Brussels, 16 Dec--The Alliance has gotten away once again. But there is no reason to feel content. The crisis of the Alliance has not been overcome with the decision to close the arms gap. The same forces that almost enforced its split at the winter conference will continue to threaten its existence at the spring conference in May 1980. The final communique, therefore, ought to be considered only as a cosmetic correction of the strategic reality. Nothing has been decided in the military field. The political problems also continue to exist.

If an inventory of NATO's inner situation were made, one would arrive at the following diagnosis of NATO following the turbulent December weeks: The Alliance has a core consisting of the United States, England and the Federal Republic. France--although as before in haughty strategic isolation--can be added to the center of the Alliance as a dependable ally. The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Norway have become Atlantic border states. The inclination to dissolve the Alliance has become stronger than the will to integrate. Italy is playing a special part. When the going got tough in Brussels, the Italian delegation came dangerously close to having an attack of political weakness. But then there was no need for it to collapse. The other small states eventually considered the danger of isolation in the Alliance greater than their domestic political consequences. So the limited flexibility of the Belgians facilitated Italian steadfastness.

Turkey, Greece and Portugal form another border group. The Turks are no longer the military bastion on the southeastern flank. They are an Atlantic area state whose strategic significance lies only in the fact that it does not belong to the Soviet sphere of influence. The Turkish presence in NATO, moreover, has the advantage that its Atlantic ties make a direct military clash with Greece unlikely. What applies to Ankara also applies to Athens. Greece is not particularly interesting militarily. Its geopolitical position makes it attractive. Portugal also is important for NATO only as a strategic zone. As a military factor the country has no significance.

It is hard for such a fragile alliance body to stand its ground. After 30 years the Alliance is farther than ever from the ideal outlined by the first Atlantic commander in chief, General Eisenhower. He wanted to have an integrated alliance: A NATO that ought to become a bloc of resistance due to its entity formed of efficiency and will. The vision of the general remained fictitious: At present we have an Alliance of a classic character where national egotisms over and over again gain the upper hand over the interests of the supranational community. Moreover, the "constitution" NATO has given itself almost asks for tensions. The Alliance was created as a military alliance: 14 states felt threatened by the expansionist pressure of the Soviet Union. The military strength of America protected the Alliance for almost 20 years. Then the military pact was "extended" to become a political alliance. The so-called Harmel Plan established next to the pillar of defense also the pillar of arms control with regard to detente policy. So-called confidence building measures suggesting arms limitation were supposed to produce security together with military activity.

In the whirl of the beginning of detente policy the Alliance did not notice that the signals of Reykjavik, which were discussed euphemistically at the end of the sixties after the Atlantic spring conference in Iceland, reflected the wrong tones. An Alliance that has been created as a military instrument, does not work as an instrument of disarmament, as Henry Kissinger said in his memoirs. In convincing formulations for former secretary of state proves that a classical alliance cannot bridge contradictions such as armament and disarmament politically, psychologically and military-technically. Naturally Kissinger is not against disarmament. Yet he is against the linkage of strategic elements that rule each other out. So far it has only been the Soviets who had the advantage from the construction of a NATO which is to comprehend itself as a military defense community and as a political organism for curbing armament. In the era of psychostrategy the Kremlin is utilizing the border-crossing communication facilities and uses NATO's arms control policy as a lever to unhinge the military policy of the Alliance. Had the Soviets begun a few weeks earlier with their continuous verbal fire against the closure of the arms gap by the Atlantic Alliance they might have had the success they sought in Brussels already now. They will have learned from this experience. The peaceful basic attitude of most NATO countries gives the Kremlin a real chance to achieve in May through intensive work on the Scandinavian and Dutch publics what it failed to achieve in December.

For as the government statement of the Federal Republic on the NATO decision says, the policy of the Alliance is now predominantly aimed at "creating security through balance on as low a level of armament as possible." The decision on the closure of the military arms gap--to which the Belgians and Dutch raised considerable reservations and which the Norwegians and Danes continue to watch with distrust--remains a lip service, in contract. This lip service was possible because technically all preconditions are lacking for producing the necessary new weapons quickly. As Foreign Minister Genscher said, the eighties may well become the decade of disarmament; albeit a unilateral disarmament. For there are reports of experts which state that

the Pershing-2 missiles and the Cruise missiles will not be ready to turn over to the troops before 1987. The Soviets will further arm up to then. In the meantime the West will not only have no counterweapons with which it could neutralize the political and military pressure exerted on Europe by the SS-20 missiles, the East will then increase its lead. How should strategic parity be attained through negotiations in view of such a disproportion in the potentials of forces? And what about the balance between the United States and the Soviet Union?

Even if the Americans were to begin enthusiastically to catch up in the field of the strategic weapons systems, it remains an unanswered question whether they will technically make up for the time lost. These problems were also realized in Brussels. The U.S. secretary of defense pleaded with the partners to become stronger militarily as the Americans, too, can then become stronger the answer as to what alternative NATO would otherwise be heading for has long been provided by U.S. strategic analysts in a forecast on the inner-Atlantic development. The alternative to an Alliance policy which for 30 years has been relying on U.S. military superiority can, in the event of a slide into military weakness, solely be the neutralization of Europe or what is being called Finlandization in a more simple way. Kissinger is not the only warner. A strategic school is forming which is offsetting the calculated optimism of the past decade with realistic pessimism.

CSO: 3103

SWISS AND ITALIAN PAPERS DISCUSS USSR WARNING TO NORDICS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 27 Nov 79 p 6

[Article by Lauri Karen: "Komissarov Interpreted in Central Europe, Mention of Euro-Missiles an Ominous Warning"]

[Text] The warning, this time about Euro-missiles, given to Norway and Denmark through the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Agreement in the traditional Soviet manner has aroused international attention.

The prestigious Swiss newspaper NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG on Monday commented on SUOMEN KUVALEHTI's publication of Yuri Komissarov's opinions, in which "for the first time in many years" the military clause of the YYA Agreement was mentioned.

In an extensive view presented by its Copenhagen correspondent the newspaper labels as "ominous" the manner in which the Soviet Union calls attention to the possibilities of pressure reminiscent of the 1961 diplomatic crisis in attempting to make Norway and Denmark vacillate even more in the question of modernizing NATO's missile system.

NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG does not directly connect Komissarov's article with the 1961 transfer, which was caused by a fear that Norway would change its military base policy. It has since been confirmed in a certain American study, among other things, that the diplomatic crisis abated when the Norwegian government gave the assurance that it will not change its military base policy.

The Swiss newspaper refers to the 1961 crisis indirectly as a background for current developments. NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG states that by having the unofficial "Komissarov bring attention to a possible repetition of pressure the Soviet Union is also risking Norway's and Denmark's position in the Nordic balance.

Italian Paper Believes in New Proposal

The Italian newspaper CORRIERE DELLA SERA has concluded from sources within that country's Communist Party that the Soviet Union may admit that it has gone a bit too far in causing the West to become provoked as a result of the SS 20-missiles and the Backfire bomber.

According to the newspaper a delegation of the Italian Communist Party, which held discussions on the Euro-missiles in Bucharest, expects that President Leonid Brezhnev may soon present a new proposal, in which he would offer to withdraw the SS 20-missiles from the Ukraine into Belorussia or deeper into Soviet territory.

The SS 20, which is exceptionally accurate and in which there are three nuclear warheads, is, however, able to cover all of Western Europe even from behind the Urals because of its range of 5,000 kilometers. A defense against it is currently nearly impossible.

The Research Institute of International Strategy operating in London believes that 140 SS 20-missiles have already been deployed. According to the institute only 140 more are needed in order to make the 590 older and more unwieldy SS 4 and SS 5-missiles unnecessary.

The present production rate of the SS 20 is 50 per year.

10576

CSO: 3107

NORDIC, FRG PAPERS DISCUSS USSR WARNING ON TNF MODERNIZATION

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Nov 79 p 8,

[Article by Erkki Pennanen and Matti Klemola: "Sweden Evaluates Yuri Komissarov's Article: Cruise Missile Does Not Threaten Nordic Equilibrium"]

[Text] In Sweden there is no desire to join in the Soviet warning that NATO's new Euro-strategy with its new missiles would threaten the present balance and stable situation in the Nordic area.

Concern for the Nordic area bordering on the Soviet Union was revealed last week in an article written by the pen name Yuri Komissarov, which the news agency APN has in addition to Finland distributed in other Nordic countries also.

According to Komissarov NATO's current Euro-strategy is a real threat to that stability and peace which the governments of the Nordic countries have declared to promote. The possibility that American Cruise missiles would fly through the airspace of such countries as Sweden and Finland would make the question of the right and obligation of these countries to defend their territorial inviolability an especially timely issue.

Komissarov's warning has aroused attention in all the Nordic countries, but there has been a definite attempt to play down its justification and significance. It is seen as a part of the campaign of diplomatic pressure being initiated by Moscow, whose purpose is to get NATO to postpone its decision to deploy new medium-range missiles in Europe.

Foreign Ministry Allays Tensions

On Monday evening the Swedish Foreign Ministry hurried to make an assurance in an unofficial form that Sweden does not see any reason to join in this concern that a missile decision will mean a threat to Nordic equilibrium.

In the Foreign Ministry it is said that note has already been taken of the fact that nuclear weapons are being deployed closer and closer to Sweden's borders. The Swedes are referring to Soviet submarines equipped with missiles in the Baltic Sea.

NATO's possible Cruise missiles are a new step in this direction. According to the Foreign Ministry the Cruise missiles can, however, be easily guided to travel in a desired path and thus could easily avoid Swedish airspace, states the Foreign Ministry in an attempt to pacify the situation.

"Clarification With a Beneficial Effect"

On Tuesday the conservative newspaper SVENSKA DAGBLADET hurried to congratulate the Foreign Ministry "for creating a clarity with a beneficial effect" in an issue in which Sweden cannot agree with the Soviet Union. In the opinion of the newspaper Sweden also has no cause to issue any warnings to Norway and Denmark about possible approval of the NATO missile decision.

Unofficially, however, the Swedish Foreign Ministry is not adopting quite such an unconcerned attitude toward the possible effects of the NATO missile decision on the Nordic area also. In Stockholm it is considered important to avoid transfers which would of themselves unnecessarily dramatize the danger of this development.

The Communists have presented an official inquiry to Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten as to whether the government intends to present a protest to NATO as a result of its new armament program.

Denmark Proposes Postponement

Over the weekend Denmark's Social Democratic minority government announced that it will propose that NATO postpone the decision to deploy new missiles by 6 months at its meeting in December. During this time the Soviet Union would back down from increasing the number of SS 20-missiles and the so-called Backfire bomber in Europe, which has caused concern in NATO spheres.

This decision came about as a result of pressure from Social Democrats and the leftwing as well as dozens of well-known citizens. Rightwing quarters have criticized the government for giving in because of panic and wavering with respect to NATO credibility.

In Norway Odvar Nordli's Labor Party government has become involved in a similar situation and has delayed the making of a final decision. In a response sent to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev last week Nordli emphasized that Norway held to the limits it has imposed upon itself as a member of NATO.

Nordli stated that Norway will continue to carry out this policy of restraint. However, in the letter regret was expressed that this policy has not resulted in a reduction of military armaments in areas near Norway. This was a cautious declaration of concern concerning the growth of Soviet power on the Kol'skiy Peninsula and in Nordic waters.

Finland Being Finlandicized in West Germany

Bonn (Matti Klemola). Even though the West German press has not reacted to Yuri Komissarov's article except for the Monday issue of the prestigious FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, it is expected that Finland will receive negative comments in the Federal Republic of Germany when the propaganda war between NATO and the Soviet Union escalates.

Finland has appeared frequently in the columns of West German newspapers throughout the whole fall. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE and the Springer Corporation's WELT AM SONNTAG have used the term "Finlandization" in depicting the fate of Western Europe, NATO, and the Federal Republic of Germany if for some reason or other the decision to deploy medium-range nuclear missiles or Euro-weapons is rejected at the December meeting in Brussels.

In the news item on Monday FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE satisfied itself with just giving an account of the main points in Komissarov's article, but an evaluation of the news (as well as a short reference to Finland's position in the lead article) and a reference to the 1961 diplomatic crisis were signs of that stress which the newspaper wanted to give to the news: in this newspaper, which is one of Europe's most prestigious and trusted newspapers, three columns on the front page are a sign of special continued reporting.

Such continued reporting is made possible by the fact that the newspaper has a correspondent in Stockholm who is exceptionally diligent in reporting on events in Finland.

Pen name Yuri Komissarov's reference to the northwest corner of the Soviet Union as a target area for Euro-weapons and the reminder of the obligation of the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union made in the same breath have made certain West German newsmen to reflect on what the Soviets could mean by the statements according to which Moscow cannot consider NATO's arming with new nuclear weapons to be "passive".

10576

CSO: 3107

CDU MILITARY EXPERT WOERNER SPEAKS AT BUNDESTAG DEBATE

DW141318 Cologne Westdeutscher Rundfunk Network in German 1048 GMT 14 Dec 79
DW

[Speech by Dr Manfred Woerner, CDU/CSU opposition spokesman, at the Bonn Bundestag debate on 14 December--live]

[Text] Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, the CDU/CSU welcomes and backs the decisions made by the Atlantic Alliance in Brussels. [applause] This applies not only to the arms gap closure. We also emphatically support the disarmament and arms control proposals. These decisions have confirmed our consistent attitude.

With these decisions the Atlantic Alliance counters, first, the growing political and military threat posed by the stepped-up Soviet armament which we in the West have by no means provoked. The Soviet Union does not need its new medium-range weapons, the missiles and bombers, neither for its own security nor for its defense. [applause]

Second, with these decisions the Atlantic Alliance stabilizes peace in Europe by demonstrating its determination to restore the balance of forces. Without such a balance there will be no lasting peace; everybody should be aware of that. [applause]

Third, with these decisions the Atlantic Alliance opens up the chance of promising arms control negotiations.

The CDU/CSU very emphatically appeals to the Soviet leaders to take our desire for disarmament seriously and not to reject the hand extended. Let us use this chance and let us make the future of the people of this continent a bit safer and a bit more peaceful [applause] ladies and gentlemen, the German people, all German people want peace and freedom, nothing but peace and freedom and nothing more ardently than peace and freedom. [applause] We Germans want it not only for our people, we want it equally passionately

for all peoples of this earth, including and above all for the Russian people who suffered so strongly in the last war. There is no greater challenge and there is no more important task for those responsible of all nations than to spare mankind the scourge of a new war. [applause]

There is nobody here in the Bundestag, to whichever party he may belong, who would not prefer disarmament to rearmament, [applause] who would not prefer nonviolence to violence. It is with good reason that the renunciation of the use of force is one of the decisive political and moral foundations of the policy of all democratic parties of this parliament of the FRG, and the renunciation of aggressive war is anchored in our constitution.

But everybody should and must know that we Germans in the FRG permit no one to put us under political or military pressure. We remain determined and able to protect the freedom and independence of our people with all our might. [applause] Therefore, we advocate with equal determination a strong deterrent defense in the scope of the Western Defense Alliance as well as its dual concept of defense and detente.

The Brussels decisions adopted by NATO are both a signal of resolve and an indication of detente readiness. Failing the resolute attitude of our American ally they would not have been possible. We, therefore, express our sincere gratitude to U.S. President Carter and the whole of the American people for the firmness and spirit of sacrifice they have demonstrated toward the Alliance and in particular toward Europe. [applause]

This is by no means a matter of course and it is all the more significant since owing to events in Iran at the present time and the will power and the strength of nerves of the President and the Americans are being put to a worldwide test. This resolve, ladies and gentlemen, could be an example to many in Europe who criticize the Americans so very easily and without much ado on every suitable or unsuitable occasion. [applause]

Yet, it is not enough to express one's gratitude with nice words. Words are important, but sometimes also cheap. What is decisive are deeds. The gratitude toward the Americans in the view of the CDU/CSU can have but one expression, the expression of our imperturbable and visible solidarity with our American friends, above all in difficult situations and not only in sunny times. [applause]

To us Germans there can be freedom, security and--referring to what is of immediate interest--the supply of raw materials and crude oil with the United States only, not without them and even less against them. [applause] Therefore, our place is side by side with the Americans. This was the basic realization of Adenauer's policy, this was and remains the basic realization of the policy of the CDU/CSU, this is our gauge of the foreign and security policies. [applause]

Talking about solidarity, we mean by it not only financial and military solidarity. We primarily mean by it political and moral support. This means quite practically that nobody ought to prevaricate that it is the

Americans who wanted these modern weapons according to the motto: Let them get dirty hands. What is correct is that they are and remain U.S. weapons under U.S. control. But the whole of the Alliance, every individual state, bears the responsibility just as these weapons protect every state of the Alliance. This is what we understand by the moral burden-sharing which is as important as the financial burden-sharing in the Alliance. [applause]

Solidarity, however, means something else too. In Brussels--the foreign minister knows it and certainly also the chancellor--the speech of U.S. Secretary of Defense Brown was termed the strongest warning a U.S. Secretary of Defense ever gave to his European partners. Secretary Brown insofar unheard frankness criticized nonadherence by some European states to the solemn commitment to increase defense expenditures.

That criticism doubtlessly was also aimed at the Federal Government. We believe that it remains a grave political error and a fatal signal made in the wrong direction not to have adhered to the commitment of the 3 percent increase. [applause]

I am saying here in the name of the CDU/CSU that this cannot be repeated again. We ought to take Harold Brown's warning seriously. He said that the Americans will view their services for NATO by the efforts made by the Europeans for the Alliance. We Europeans can depend on the Americans, but only as long as the Americans can rely on the Europeans, ladies and gentlemen.

Increasing the nuclear deterrence capability is not all, one must not neglect the conventional defensive strength. We must become serious about the long-term defense program. We will be asked in 1, 2 or 3 years not about the words we said today, but about our action tomorrow.

After that slight word of criticism that must be taken seriously, a word of praise: We appreciate it that the Federal Government, despite the known difficulties in its own camp, steered a firm course with regard to the decision to close the arms gap. We sincerely hope and wish--and I say that without any trace of polemics--that the basis of opinion in the SPD will prevail in the years to come, regardless of who may be ruling in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Ladies and gentlemen, nobody ought to fool himself about the fact that with this decision NATO has taken an important hurdle, but the further way will be even more difficult. It is paved with obstacles. It can be seen even now that the Soviet Union will try everything to call the decision into question in the years to come. Every hesitation in the Western camp will encourage it to do so. It is, therefore, most important to implement the decisions in all their parts, implement them energetically, clearly and unswervingly. The more united NATO remains and the more cohesion it shows, the more promising will be the negotiations with the Soviet Union. [applause]

I say it even more plainly: Everybody who opposes these decisions now must know that in doing this he will prevent disarmament, ladies and gentlemen. [applause]

One more thing. The Soviet leaders and also Mr Honecker must know that we here in the Federal Republic of Germany cannot be intimidated or threatened. Nobody should hope he could drive a wedge between us here in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, those who experienced how in some of our neighbor states the basis for shaping an opinion among the people has slipped away from the governments will know that all of us will have to face a truly state political task, a task we must face if we do not want to experience the same. If the formula of the democrats' community will make sense anywhere, it will be here where the peace, freedom and security of our people are at stake. [applause]

The Federal Government, therefore, can continue to count on the strong and united support of the CDU/CSU if and as long as it steers a firm course. This is neither the place nor the time to comment on individual points of the disarmament aspects. We will certainly do that in the foreign policy and defense committees. But for now we of the CDU/CSU want to have disarmament with security, that means with the aim of parity, of similar strength on both sides. Every SS-20 the Soviet Union produces and stations will complicate disarmament.

We ask the Soviet Union once more from here to discontinue the production and stationing of its medium-range missiles and of the backfire bomber. It can in practice demonstrate its will for peace that way. [applause]

A second matter is that the CDU/CSU considers confidence-building measures for the avoidance of surprise attacks as more and more urgently necessary.

A third thing is that the more balanced the forces are on the strategic level between the two superpowers, the more important it will be to have a balanced strength also in the European region. Such a balance is impossible as long as the Western parts of the Soviet Union remain excluded. The Western areas of the Soviet Union must, therefore, be included in the arms control negotiations. Also for this reason we of the CDU/CSU supported from the very beginning the French disarmament initiative. [applause]

Let me say one more word to those compatriots who are asking themselves and us full of concern: Is not a new arms race round being opened here? They ought to know that we are taking that concern seriously. None of us has made this decision lightly. Nobody from our ranks wished to have these arms or even pressed for them. And even now all of us would like it more if these arms were neither produced nor stationed.

But none of us can ignore the fact that the Soviet Union has been producing these terrible new arms for years and putting them into position against us. While we are discussing matters here, every week a new launching site for these missiles is being built in the Soviet Union, every year 50 back-fire bombers are being produced.

Not we in Germany, we Europeans, or we in the West are turning up the arms spiral, but we would be irresponsible if we looked on without doing anything since every one of these Soviet missiles and bombers increases the danger for peace and for the security of the people in Europe. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen a realization that is slowly beginning to get lost and that we must voice again and represent again among our people--all of us--is the historic knowledge that a military power that is imbalanced will be used some day. Yielding and weakness, be it out of the best idealistic or pacifist ideology, do not prevent war, they create it. [applause]

There is hardly a historian who doubts that World War II could have been avoided if the Western powers that time had taken these lessons into consideration. Some 35 years of European postwar history show, however, that a balance safeguards peace. We do not want anything more, but not anything less either, namely balance.

We can and we must learn another thing also from history: disarmament negotiations have a chance to succeed only if nobody is superior to the other. That has been demonstrated by the current negotiations in Vienna where we have been negotiating for 7 years without any tangible results. Last but not least this is the case because we hold the position of the inferior.

Nobody ought to foster any illusions with regard to the difficulty of achieving a result and scoring a success in the forthcoming negotiations with the Soviet Union on these arms. But everyone of our people must know that such negotiations would certainly be doomed to failure if we stood there emptyhanded and just give mere speeches, while the Soviet Union is further increasing its military power day by day.

Next to military balance there must be the will to mitigate political tensions. The West, all of us in this parliament, have this will. We demonstrated it over and over again not merely with words but with action, and often with one-sided concessions made in advance. The Soviet leaders know that too. It is now up to them how matters will develop and whether there will be disarmament. We are and we will remain prepared to do it. We threaten nobody, but we have the right and the duty vis-a-vis the citizens to see after their security. There will be no peace and no freedom at all without security for our people and for all other people. [applause]

COMMENTATOR CRITICALLY REVIEWS BRUSSELS NATO DECISION

DW171448 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 15-16 Dec 79 p 4 DW

[Article by Dieter Schroder: "Arms Gap Closure With Limited Value"]

[Text] The balance of terror, namely, the certainty that each side has enough nuclear weapons to destroy the other respectively, was considered for a long time the mollifying guarantee for peace in the nuclear age. Once the premises of the safeguarding of peace by the amassing of nuclear means of destruction had been accepted, a rationally comprehensible method was inherent in the madness of this arms race. But for several years now increasing doubts have been voiced as to whether there really is a method to this madness or whether it is not just a madness which is bound to lead to mankind's destruction some day.

The fear that the nuclear arms spiral might get out of control cannot simply be dismissed. The equation with the balance of terror no longer pans out. So far the hopes banked on the treaties of arms limitation have not worked out. Granted, some specific weapons systems were banned and others limited, yet the politicians are just running after the military people and the technicians who discover new "gaps" and develop new weapons. The qualitative arms race continues, and the concept of "parity" introduced in arms limitation since the Soviet Union caught up means that a tendency toward expansion is discernible in figures and systems because "parity" can be established only when the lead of one participant in the arms race has been eliminated by the other.

This development is being accelerated through the constant sophistication of the nuclear weapons, their great target accuracy. Kissinger's naive question as to how big the overkill capacity really would have to be definitely could be posed 10 years ago; today it is outdated. It dates back to an era when nuclear war was considered inconceivable. Today, however, it has become conceivable thanks to the sophisticated arms technology. What matters is not the overkill capability in retaliation but the first-strike capability for eliminating the enemy's nuclear weapons. But thereby the predictability of strategies and enemy intentions become more difficult, as does arms limitation at the same time.

By their decision on the closure of the arms gap the ministers yielded to the compulsions of the arms race: the resistance to it is dictated by the fear and the doubt as to whether more security has thus been gained. Under the NATO calculation the reckoning for Europe's security no longer holds. So far this security depended on the U.S. superiority in intercontinental nuclear weapons and on the readiness to use them for Europe's defense, too. Since parity has been existing in this field between the superpowers, doubts about this readiness have arisen and modern medium-range missiles, against which NATO has nothing equivalent to put up, create a clear predominance for the Soviet Union.

NATO's wish to put up corresponding weapons against the Soviets for political and military reasons and to make up for lost ground in the "Eurostrategic" field is thus understandable. The credibility of the American security guarantee and thus of deterrence must be maintained. The NATO strategy of the "flexible response" seems to be the case again after this decision. The alliance is no longer naked in the Eurostrategic field: the west would have weapons to put against a threat by the Soviets with their medium-range missiles which can reach Soviet territory.

The NATO decision, however, was also dictated by other considerations. Similar to the arms program that was announced the same day by President Carter, it is supposed to convince the SALT adversaries in the Senate that the United States must not suffer disadvantages in the arms limitation deal with the Soviet Union. That explains the timing as well as certain gaps in thinking through the NATO decisions. The questions have been insufficiently answered as to how great the imbalance really is in Europe, whether it can be eliminated this way, and whether the strategic principles of NATO's thinking are still correct. The "flexible response" strategy starts out from the assumption that the Soviets will attack with their superior conventional armed forces and that they must be kept in uncertainty about whether and in which way NATO will react with nuclear arms. The unpredictability of escalation is supposed to have a deterrent effect.

But is that strategy game still correct? Would a war in Europe not look completely different because of the refined arms technology and the balanced forces? Does one not reckon that the Soviets with a first nuclear strike will try to eliminate all nuclear arms of NATO in Europe in order to send out their conventional troops later on to conquer Europe in as good shape as possible? No Eurostrategic balance would help against that because it cannot exist at all for geographic reasons; only credible deterrence through the American security guarantee could help. If the Americans, as Kissinger maintains, would hesitate to use their intercontinental missiles for the defense of Europe, they would also hesitate to give launching orders for the medium-range missiles aimed at Soviet targets because they would have to count on a devastating strike of the Soviets aimed at the United States. So it would still be possible to blackmail Europe. The problem at the moment is not the danger of decoupling Europe strategically from America, but the credibility of deterrence as such. The NATO decision, therefore, ought to have been preceded by a discussion on a new and credible strategic doctrine.

It is certainly correct that NATO had to do something. The rearmament of the Soviet Union with SS-20 missiles exerted the pressure on the alliance to make a move. But its decision is of limited military and political value. Its actual significance is the fact that it is a pawn in arms control negotiations. That significance, however, has been decreased through the rifts that have become visible in the alliance. In so far it is regrettable that Belgium and the Netherlands tried to oppose Bonn's condition that the new arms ought to be stationed on the territories of others as well. The Soviets hope now to achieve their aim to prevent the implementation of the NATO decision without making a concession in return. The broad disarmament offers of NATO will not make an end to the domestic political discussion in some member countries. Moscow's warnings against a nuclear "preponderance" of the federal republic already demonstrate where it expects to achieve some propagandistic effect.

Even as a pawn of disarmament the NATO decision remains ticklish. It introduces incomparable things into the equation. The Pershing-2 is not a counter-piece to the SS-20. That weapon will threaten Europe even if it is stationed behind the Urals, but then it would not be introduced by the Soviets into negotiations as a Eurostrategic weapon. The Soviets have so far nothing to match the Cruise missiles. According to the law of "parity," they will try to obtain it prior to negotiations. The negotiations NATO wants to have with the Soviet Union as quickly as possible therefore will neither take place quickly nor make quick headway.

CSO: 3103

PAPER VIEWS HONECKERS'S REACTION TO NATO DECISIONS

DW171404 Bonn DIE WELT in German 15 Dec 79 p 6 DW

[Commentary signed KEM.: "Continue Talking"]

[Text] SED Chief Honecker reacted with the announcement of higher military expenditures to NATO's decision to close the arms gap. Simultaneously his speech reflected the basic tenor of Soviet double strategy; and it sounds remarkably similar to the political doctrine of the western alliance: "Promote the detente process through decisive action and work toward concrete disarmament measures." Before luncheon Andrey Gromyko said that differently. So even the top echelon wants to continue the talks. Honecker defended (against whom?) his announced visit to the federal republic and the meeting with Schmidt in almost the original western version: "All this is normal and leaves no room for speculation." The citizens of the GDR who are used to suffering will continue to speculate on where the general secretary wants to get the breath from to extend export production to make "foreign currency gains." More exports to the west, less imports from the west and a higher military budget: he who is well-versed senses trouble for the supply situation of the GDR citizens which is meager anyway.

CSO: 3103

PEACE COMMITTEE, FOREIGN MINISTER APPEAL TO NATO ON TNF

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 27 Nov 79 p 6

[Article by Lauri Karen: "Those Outside of NATO Oppose Euro-Weapons"]

[Text] The meeting of the peace committee of countries not belonging to NATO, which concluded in Helsinki, is demanding urgent actions to assemble all forces to oppose the deployment of Euro-weapons in Western Europe. In the communique approved at the conclusion of the meeting it was stated that there is no country in Europe which would not be affected by these new weapons of mass destruction.

On Monday representatives of the peace committees released a communique as well as an appeal to the governments of NATO members to Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen. Foreign Minister Vayrynen, who also sent greetings to the meeting considered the work of these citizens' organizations to be very significant in a threatening situation.

The decision on Euro-weapons will be made at a meeting of NATO on 12 December 1979. In the appeal to be sent to the governments of NATO members prior to this meeting it states that Europe needs cooperation and negotiations for the promotion of disarmament instead of an arms race.

The participants at this meeting stated in a communique that they place value on the new Soviet peace initiative presented by President Leonid Brezhnev last month in Berlin.

Delegations from Austria, Switzerland, Ireland, Sweden, Spain, Cyprus, Malta, West Gerlin, and Finland took part in the work of the meeting. The participants stated that the representatives of their country's peace committees will initiate an extensive campaign to sway public opinion and to get their governments to understand the threat Euro-weapons will bring to all of Europe.

10576

CSO: 3107

PAPER WEIGHS USSR ARMAMENTS INITIATIVE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 27 Nov 79 p 2

[Editorial: "What Did Gromyko Mean?"]

[Text] NATO intends to make its decision on Euro-weapons in the 3rd week of December. In general, it is thought that the decision will be conditional: Pershing-2 and Cruise missiles will be developed, but they will only be deployed if NATO and the Warsaw Pact cannot reach an agreement on the reduction of medium-range missiles.

In a press conference in Bonn last week Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko stated, however, that if NATO decides on the production and deployment of new missiles in West Europe, the Soviet Union will no longer be ready to negotiate.

The Euro-missiles are connected with the SALT-2 agreement, which the United States Senate has not yet ratified. Many, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, among others, consider that the SALT-Agreement "would neutralize" the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States. The consequence of this would be that West Europe could no longer rely on the United States for the protection of its nuclear umbrella. Therefore, it is demanded that there should also be a balance of nuclear and conventional weapons in Europe. The Pershing-2 and the Cruise missile would represent a counterweight to the Soviet Union's TU-22 M bombers and to the mobile medium-range SS-20 missiles.

According to the Soviet concept the TU-22 M and the SS-20 are only new versions and not new weapons, which would be a prerequisite for Euro-missiles. On the other hand, Moscow considers that Euro-missiles would essentially change the prevailing situation. They could be used for a first strike in the place of intercontinental missiles, which would water down the SALT Agreement. Moreover, the proliferation of nuclear weapons into more hands will change the situation.

Chancellor Schmidt has already explained that Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement to the press does not mean a preclusion of negotiations even before they begin. Hopefully this interpretation is correct. If there can be no

negotiations on Euro-missiles, the consequences can be incalculable. Moscow has hinted at "the deployment of corresponding weapons just as close to the United States", which would mean the deployment of nuclear weapons in Cuba. Medium-range missiles deployed in West Europe, whose potential objects are in the Soviet Union, can mean serious problems for neutral countries also, even Finland.

10576

CSO: 3107

USSR'S 'KOMISSAROV' WARNS FINLAND OF NATO TNF IMPLICATIONS

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 23 Nov 79 pp 42-26

[Article by Yuri Komissarov: "NATO's Euro-Strategy and Northern Europe"]

[Text] "The possibility of the use of Cruise missiles can drag other states, whom this issue does not concern, into the conflict.

"It is clear that the possible flight of American Cruise missiles over the airspace of such countries as Sweden and Finland would give special urgency to the question that the parties waging war should not be allowed to use the territory of countries not participating in the conflict and also the question of the rights and obligations of the latter to defend the inviolability of their territory.

"In this connection it is appropriate to recall the fact that there are certain obligations to which Finland and the Soviet Union bound themselves in accordance with the articles of the 1948 Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid Agreement," writes Yuri Komissarov.

The pen name represents a rather well-known Soviet view. Sub-titles are the editor's.

Unlike many other areas of the world Northern Europe has experienced a relative stability and peace during the post-war decades. However, it is just as evident that the development of Northern Europe's political and military strategic situation, to a great degree, has depended and in the future will depend even more on what is happening in other parts of Europe and how the situation in Europe and the whole world develops. Even with all its individual traits the area is still only a part of Europe and a part of the policy carried out there, perhaps even a significant part of the major policies of Europe. For such reason each significant turn in European policy has had and will continue to have a direct effect on the peace of the northern part of the continent also.

The Nordic countries did not succeed in staying aside in the 1930's when Hitler's fascism ignited the war in Europe, which eventually developed into World War II. The Cold War, which the imperialist states of the West

initiated at the end of the 1940's, also affected the situation in Northern Europe so that a portion of it became included in the military preparations of NATO against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. And, on the other hand, when positive changes began to take place in Europe in the 1970's, the conditions for changing Northern Europe into a zone of lasting peace, guaranteed security, and broad cooperation seemed to become more probable and something to be considered.

All this, the close tie between Europe and the peace of its northern section, comes even forcibly to mind now that we are faced with the question of what path Europe will take -- detente, mutual trust, and peaceful cooperation or the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction as well as serious escalation of the political and military situations.

"It Is Clear That in Such a Situation..."

At first glance one could assume that NATO's strategic Euro-missiles do not have a direct effect on the Nordic countries: indeed, according to the official announcement it is a matter of a new type of American nuclear missile to be deployed in England, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Holland. The Scandinavian countries belonging to NATO for their part intend to confirm the fact that their policy, according to which nuclear weapons will not be located on their territory during peacetime, remains unchanged. Finland and Sweden, on the other hand, have not joined and do not intend to join either one of the opposing military-political factions.

Thus, nothing seems to threaten the stability of peaceful conditions in Northern Europe or the Nordic balance, as is often said here. But is this really the case?

Representatives of the official and political life of the Nordic countries have stated many times that the continuing worldwide arms race is a serious danger to the future even in this part of Europe. In a well-known speech in Stockholm in May 1978 Finnish President Urho Kekkonen emphasized that Northern Europe will not be able to succeed in staying aside from a strategy which is based on the use of nuclear missiles in Europe. He stated that even such countries and groupings of countries which until now have been able to stay outside of strategic spheres will easily become a part of the spheres included in the strategic calculations of the superpowers and in addition to this they will be affected by the appearance of new factors of uncertainty even in Nordic security policy resulting in new military equipment.

A year later Kekkonen stated in Hamburg: "...a new armaments spiral, of which there are signs particularly in Europe, could threaten the continuation of the security policy situation in the Nordic area," in a speech presented in November 1978, Swedish Foreign Minister Hans Blix, for his part, emphasized that the preservation of a general balance of power in Europe and between the superpowers is a decisive condition for the local equilibrium of the Nordic countries.

The particular danger which the Euro-strategy plans of the Pentagon and NATO would present to the peace of Europe and also of its northern part is contained in the fact that the deployment of approximately 600 Cruise missiles and Pershing-2 missiles in Western Europe would change the strategic situation in Europe and would disturb the established power relationships in that part of the world.

An attempt is being made to create a military superiority for NATO with respect to the Warsaw Pact by developing new American medium-range weapons systems intended for strategic purposes and by situating them in Europe along the borders of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It is clear that in such a situation the Soviet Union and its allies would be forced to take corresponding countermeasures to guarantee their security and to restore the shaken balance of power.

"Necessary Actions for the Purpose of Defense"

The results of this kind of development are not difficult to see in advance. The NATO countries and all of Western Europe, which would be saturated with Euro-strategic weapons, could scarcely feel more secure. Rather to the contrary. The escalation of military antagonism and the aggravation of the political situation in Europe would inevitably increase the danger of war and reduce the present level of security painstakingly achieved.

In the West and in Scandinavian countries, among other places, people have talked and written much about the fact that the Soviet Union has reinforced and is continuing to reinforce its security in the Kol'skiy Peninsula and in the area of the Baltic Sea, for example. There has been speculation about naval bases, estimates have been presented with respect to Soviet operative-tactical weapons, among other things, and Soviet missiles, which NATO in its classification has given the name SS-20. And in 1978 a fuss was raised about a few Soviet submarines equipped with nuclear missiles which had appeared "unexpectedly" in the Baltic Sea (the submarines had been in the area for 2 years before a fuss was raised).

The Soviet Union is accomplishing necessary measures for the purpose of defense also in the northwest portions of the country bordering on Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea. In strictly adhering to our military policy the Soviet Union is not, however, striving to achieve a military superiority here anymore than in any other area and is not threatening or intends to threaten any state or group of states. All the military action here are purely of a defense nature and are not aimed at the countries in question as is acknowledged in the Nordic countries themselves, including the countries belonging to NATO.

These measures are connected with the threat presented by the USA and NATO so that they should be examined in a broader connection, in light of the strategic power relationships of two alliances. Sometime ago the Norwegian newspaper DAGBLADET in referring to information from the International

Strategic Research Institute in London stated that a balance of military power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which includes the new Soviet SS-20 missiles, now prevails in Europe.

"Strength of Nuclear Strike Has Even Been Reduced"

The Soviet Union is renewing various medium-range missiles which have been in the armament system for several years already. This is in answer to the fact that NATO weapons systems, which are aimed at Soviet territory, have been deployed in Western Europe and in the seas bordering it.

However -- and in my opinion this is of considerable significance to the situation in Northern Europe also -- the number of medium-range missile launching sites situated in the European part of the Soviet Union has not been increased by even one missile or one aircraft in the last 10 years. Their number as well as the strength of their nuclear strike have even been reduced. Thus we have a situation in which NATO has according to its own official information two times as many operative-tactical weapons units in Europe than the counterparts, including the American Pershing-1 missiles, whose warhead capacity is 400 kilotons. (The capacity of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was approximately 13 kilotons.)

In a foreign policy statement issued on 15 March 1978 the Swedish government emphasized that one of the most important conditions for preserving the stable situation currently prevailing in Northern Europe is that restraint in the presence of the superpowers and their participation in the affairs of Northern Europe continued and that the superpowers take our particular conditions into consideration in questions which are connected with the development of new weapons systems in Northern Europe or its proximity as well as in military actions which could possibly disrupt the balance of other areas.

It is difficult to be of a different opinion regarding such an attitude toward security problems in Northern Europe. This reflects a desire to keep this area outside of the effects of international conflicts and tensions even in the future. However, such views are apparently of no concern to the USA, which intends to deploy new nuclear weapons in Western Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany, among other places, thus in an area in direct proximity to Sweden and other Nordic countries.

In protecting its borders the Soviet Union cannot, of course, help but take into consideration that the deployment of new American nuclear missile systems capable of reaching the Soviet Union on Western European territory would along with current long-range weapons increase the threat to the northwest portion of the Soviet Union.

"There Are Certain Obligations"

Mention should be made of yet another point of view of NATO's Euro-strategic plans, which is directly connected with the stability and security of the situation in Northern Europe.

Of the 572 new missiles which the USA intends to deploy in Western Europe and aim at bases located in the northwest portion of the Soviet Union, 454 are Cruise missiles which are launched from launching pads located on land and whose range is 2,600 kilometers. Finnish President Urho Kekkonen meant these very Cruise missiles and their particular traits (the ability to fly at a height of a few dozen kilometers in the event of such a necessity) when a year and a half ago he warned that these missiles, unlike the previous intercontinent missiles, can use the airspace of neutral countries and countries not participating in the conflict. The possibility of the use of Cruise missiles could draw countries which a conflict does not concern into the conflict. In this connection Kekkonen justifiably raised the question: what would such a situation mean for Sweden and Finland, for example?

It seems to us that it is not difficult to find an answer to this question. It is clear that the possible flight of American Cruise missiles in the airspace of such countries as Sweden and Finland would give particular urgency to the question that parties waging a war cannot permit the use of the territory of nonparticipating countries and also the question of the right and obligation of the latter to defend the inviolability of their territory.

Generally recognized international regulations and the legislation of the states concerned precisely determines how countries are to act in such an event in order to protect their sovereignty and territorial inviolability.

In this connection it is also appropriate to recall the fact that there are certain obligations to which Finland and the Soviet Union are bound according to the military-political articles of the 1948 Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid Agreement in the event that Finland or the Soviet Union becomes the object of military aggression through Finnish territory. Already in 1965 when plans for the nuclear armament of West Germany and the development of so-called multicenter nuclear forces were being deliberated in NATO, President Urho Kekkonen particularly emphasized the fact that Finland must carefully follow military developments in Europe while taking into consideration the stipulations of 1948 Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid Agreement in watching out for its national interests.

Who Determines a Crisis Situation

In general, it can be said that the Pentagon's and NATO's current Euro-strategy with all its directions is a real threat to that peace and stability to which the peoples of Northern Europe are striving and which the governments of the Nordic countries have announced a desire to promote. The strategy in question is becoming ever more aggressive, is giving less and less consideration to the national interests of Western European countries, and is ever more clearly aimed at the chief goal of the USA, about which U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown spoke openly sometime ago, that is, ensuring the military superiority of NATO by the middle of the 1980's.

In these plans more and more attention is being given to the northeast portion of the Atlantic and the Arctic area as well as Norway, Denmark, and Iceland, which make up NATO's northern section. During numerous military exercises the areas of these countries are being prepared on an ever larger scale as future areas of military operations, command and cooperative actions are being developed and airfields are being renovated for the purpose of transferring U.S. troops to Europe in so-called crisis situations, storage facilities for ammunition are being constructed and heavy armaments are being assembled. The question arises: who determines a "crisis situation" and how is it done? What part in this matter is given to the governments and parliaments of West European NATO countries? How does this fit in with the announced policy of the Norwegian and Danish governments, according to which foreign military bases or armed forces may not be located on their territories during peacetime?

Also of concern are statements by certain NATO politicians and generals, according to which the policy of Norway and Denmark which determines the rejection of military bases and nuclear weapons has become "obsolete" and "does not correspond with the present military and strategic situation". Indeed, the English General John Sharp, who was responsible for the Northern European military command of NATO a couple years ago, announced that Norway's present policy "makes the tasks of NATO significantly more difficult in its northern section". At the same time he stated that he is certain that by the middle of the 1980's we will experience several "sensational events", which will change the concept of NATO's northern wing as a peaceful corner of Europe.

In this situation it is understandable that the Soviet Union must consider how U.S. and NATO Euro-strategy will be interpreted when it is applied in practice in Northern Europe. It is, indeed, a question of an escalation of military activity, an attempt to disrupt the established balance, and to disturb the peace in an area which borders directly on Soviet territory.

Our country has always been and continues to be of the opinion that the correct means for guaranteeing the security of Northern Europe is not to seek a policy of alliance. The most important thing is to jointly seek and find solutions which will correspond with the objective interests of the people and will serve peace.

Brezhnev's Proposals Directly Concern Northern Europe

The Soviet Union's new peace initiative and proposals concerning military detente in Europe, which CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and Supreme Soviet Chairman Leonid Brezhnev recently proposed during his visit to the GDR. Also directly concern Northern Europe. The proposals also contain the statement that the Soviet Union is prepared to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear weapons located in the western portion of the country inasmuch as NATO does not increase its nuclear potential in Western Europe.

It is a question of both a quantitative reduction of Soviet nuclear weapons as well as a reduction of the effectiveness of their nuclear strike. The Soviet Union has again confirmed that there are no such weapons or military problems which the Soviet Union would want to keep outside of the sphere of regulation assuming that other countries will also adopt the same attitude.

Also the new Soviet statement that it will never use nuclear weapons against such states which are not building or procuring nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territory is addressed directly to the Nordic countries, which support the preservation of an area free from nuclear weapons. Soviet proposals for expanding measures to increase European confidence in accordance with the resolution of the CSCE have aroused considerable interest in the Nordic countries.

As Leonid Brezhnev stated, the Soviet Union is ready to examine even other concepts which are aimed at reducing the danger of war in Europe and strengthening confidence between states. The countries of Northern Europe, including the Northern European members of NATO, can, without a doubt, speak their own minds in the question concerning the fate of all Europe.

No Negotiable Solutions Should Be Neglected

When the question of the deployment of American medium-range nuclear weapons on the territory of Western Europe was brought up 22 years ago at the December meeting of the NATO council in Paris, Norway and Denmark were among those NATO countries which were the first to oppose the acceleration of these plans and supported negotiations with the Soviet Union. Norwegian Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen announced in Paris in December 1957 that in the opinion of the Norwegian government the making of a decision concerning medium-range missiles should be postponed and negotiations should be conducted with the Soviet Union: "We must be careful not to create the impression that we are afraid of political negotiations with the Eastern Alliance...we must always be prepared to revise our views, to understand the point of view of the other party, and to oppose when and where it is justified. We must be fully aware of the fact that each party considers its security to be vitally important." Many Western European representatives at that time supported this healthy view.

We would hope that those who are now determining NATO policy will not reject the opportunity offered by the Soviet Union to agree on real military detente and the securing of a peaceful future for Europe and will not attempt to revive the Cold War and a policy dictated by power instead of promoting honest agreements and mutual trust.

In this connection one cannot but join in Finnish President Urho Kekkonen's opinion, which is contained in a statement given to the news agency Novost (APN) on 31 October 1979: In a situation in which Europe is on the threshold of a new arms race and disarmament negotiations have come to a standstill, everyone should recognize their responsibility for the future of mankind.

With good reason Urho Kekkonen emphasized that no opportunity for the accomplishment of negotiated solutions can be neglected. (APN)

FOREIGN MINISTRY'S KORHONEN DEFENDS UKK'S N-ARMS FREE ZONE

Helsinki SUOMEN KIVALEHTI in Finnish 23 Nov 79 pp 52-55

[Article by Juhani Aromaki: "Road Diplomacy of Madrid CSCE Meeting Has Begun, Finland Opens Up the Way"]

[Text] In the opinion of Assistant Foreign Minister Keijo Korhonen the proposal made by Finland at the UN can be said to be "a task taken on by Finland itself". According to the Finnish proposal Europe should acquire a separate disarmament program. This will also be brought up in Madrid on 11 November 1980 at the meeting of the CSCE, which will begin after the presidential elections in the United States.

Recently Finland presented a proposal at the United Nations to achieve a European disarmament program. Possibilities for promoting this program, which were presented by Assistant State Secretary Keijo Korhonen, are now being explained by means of bilateral negotiations between governments prior to the Madrid CSCE meeting.

"Now that Finland has taken such an initiative which has not been recognized before it should be so comprehensive that no one would be compelled to give an immediate negative response," states Keijo Korhonen in explaining the background.

The host city for the next CSCE meeting will be Madrid. Diplomacy is presently in a state of animation so that the meeting beginning on 11 November 1980 would also be rich in content. The preparatory meetings will begin in the middle of September.

After the Helsinki and Belgrade meetings, the Madrid meeting will be held at a high level since 35 CSCE-countries will possibly be sending their foreign ministers.

When President Urho Kekkonen in Spain's capital city of Madrid for the first time last year, the discussions between the previous and forthcoming CSCE hosts naturally also concern this area.

At that time the President saw that "nothing could now be done to accomplish any great results, but we could gradually enter into concrete actions for accomplishing CSCE concepts".

The President added half seriously: "Hopefully, I am not too badly wrong."

He considered that procedures other than the ones used previously will have to be applied in the preparations for the Madrid meeting of the CSCE: the main idea was that preparations for the 1980 meeting should be made bilaterally between governments.

President Urho Kekkonen described the proposal itself as a test balloon and stated that he was waiting for reactions. In the political discussions of the state visit the Finns as well as the Spaniards were of the opinion that the preparations for the Madrid meeting should be better than those for the follow-up meeting in Belgrade.

The idea behind the President's proposal was that in making preparations for the meeting in Madrid the political prestige of the governments of various states should play a part. By this procedure political results could be achieved or at least the Madrid meeting would not become involved in unrealistic ideas.

Since this meeting a year has passed, during which much has happened.

The Spanish hosts of the next meeting have willingly made several visits to Helsinki where there is knowledge and experience of even the technical arrangements for a large meeting. August was the last time the official Spanish delegation was in Helsinki.

Questions concerning the content of the meeting are, of course, the most important. It seems that the central theme of the meeting will be disarmament, about which the leaders of the superpowers have recently made significant proposals and initiatives.

On 19 October 1979 Assistant State Secretary Keijo Korhonen of the Foreign Ministry spoke at the United Nations, possibly the most conspicuous forum, even though a large portion of the member states of the UN becomes offended if too much time is given to European issues.

However, Finland considers that the UN can "grant a few minutes even to Europe". The Assistant Secretary's speech was a totality of those proposals to which "no one needs to say no".

Finland considers that now would be the time to create a separate European disarmament program. These questions have usually been discussed only on a worldwide level, but now Finland considers that an agreement in Europe, between 35 CSCE states, would be a big step toward limiting the arms race and strengthening detente.

"Finland has accepted this obligation. In the future, we will naturally make contacts on a bilateral basis with the governments concerned. This refers to the preparations for the meeting in Madrid," states Keijo Korhonen.

Finland's foreign policy leadership has taken an important foreign policy step. The proposal from Helsinki could be described as an opening for equal discussions, a clarification work, which will offer all parties an alternative to be considered for promoting a policy of peace.

"Small, Neutral Countries Such as Finland to Benefit the Most from CSCE"

[Question] Europe seems to be on the threshold of a new arms race. This arms race includes conventional as well as nuclear weapons. In connection with this moderate arms race there has been developed types of weapons which can be called the new generation nuclear weapons. Along with this new strategic doctrines have been adopted, which are built on the possibility of limited nuclear warfare. You stated so recently in a committee meeting of the UN General Assembly in the United States. How have these new concepts of the generals changed the threat of war, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, attempts to make disarmament more effective?

[Answer] Disarmament is an inseparable part of politics. Disarmament is today a political necessity for the superpowers. On the other hand, there is much talk about disarmament which is not aimed at disarmament, but at other goals.

One can only hope that the threat of war will not increase. However, we seem to be faced with a new arms race, we are approaching it, and in some respects we are already there. However, this need not necessarily change the basic situation in Europe.

However, this arms race cycle may lead to difficulties in supervision. The situation now has been somewhat insane since even though there are many war-heads we have, however, been able to politically control them.

This new spiral would worsen the situation and make control and the so-called crisis management policy more difficult. Because of this balance of terror, Europe has lived through the longest period without war of this century.

If nuclear weapons become more accurate, smaller in size and easier to transport, and also "cleaner" with respect to combustion and other effects, the question arises as to whether someone could now more easily consider the possibility of a limited nuclear war.

If this should happen -- nuclear weapons have never been successfully used in a limited manner -- we would be in a much worse situation than now. Now in a situation of a so-called balance of terror such military plans are mere theory. They have not been tried.

The so-called nuclear weapons taboo is connected with this. It is feared that as military technology develops this taboo will be ignored. Let us just assume that someone could consider the possibility of winning a local war in some developing country by using nuclear weapons. Such a course of events would increase risks in Europe also.

This is an imaginary scenario, but it is something to be feared. If someone should succeed in such a possible goal, it would also fundamentally change military analysis throughout the whole world.

[Question] In Finland's opinion new methods of approach are now needed for resolving questions of arms supervision in Europe. How can concrete progress be made?

[Answer] There is no simple formula. The most important thing is that we must negotiate, negotiate, and always negotiate. It is, perhaps useless, but we have no other means. Maintaining the process of disarmament discussions is already a victory. The proposal concerning measures arousing so-called military confidence was the illegitimate child of the CSCE. The idea happened to come up during some phase of the conference.

One method of approaching this problem is to develop European disarmament and arms supervision problems on the basis of the resolution of the CSCE. It, indeed, includes aspirations which are aimed at reducing military confrontation and promoting disarmament.

The stands taken on disarmament and its analysis have been conducted only as a worldwide question. In Finland's opinion a new approach would also be to consider the question on an area-wide basis. Indeed, in Europe there are more independent states in a corresponding area than anywhere else. And this area is also affected by large military alliances.

In the third place, Europeans already have a proposal for making the Nordic area into a nuclear-free zone. This area is a large and significant European area.

[Question] When you stated in the UN that the CSCE has significantly promoted the accomplishment of the principles and goals of the UN in Europe and considered the CSCE to be an important factor in the future stabilization of the situation in Europe, what did you mean?

[Answer] This contract for negotiations is in itself of value. However, one thing that I dislike is the idea that the CSCE should resolve all problems. Thus a counterreaction is created since many expectations are not immediately fulfilled.

We can compare the CSCE to history. There has been nothing like it in Europe before. Perhaps, the process is still not permanent, but it is in our interests to make it permanent.

It does, however, seem that gradually not one of the 35 CSCE-states will be able to afford to withdraw from it. Each state is, naturally, promoting its own interests, and the CSCE gives more to some and in some issues, perhaps less. Small, neutral countries such as Finland stand to benefit the most from it. The expectations of all states are different, but the common interest of all of them is a continuation of this era without war in Europe.

[Question] The language of diplomacy is not always understandable to the man on the street: In your opinion important initiatives and proposals have recently been made and their premise is to promote the question of European disarmament within the framework of the whole area. These proposals could also accelerate several such disarmament aspirations which are connected with certain parts of Europe. What does this statement of yours contain?

[Answer] In the next 4 years -- hopefully in a shorter time -- there will be a discussion of the so-called Euro-weapons. They will, apparently, also become a part of SALT-3 and will be included in the AVF-negotiations in Vienna, which for the time being have come to a standstill.

By proposals and initiatives I mean the initiatives taken by French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing last year and the proposals made a little later by member countries of the Warsaw Pact. The purpose of these proposals is to initiate arms supervision negotiations for all of Europe, in which all the CSCE-countries would participate. Both proposals deal with measures for bringing about confidence.

Later Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev announced his readiness to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear missiles situated in the western portion of the Soviet Union. Finland hopes that this offer will result in serious negotiations.

We also hope that the announcement of unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops and weapons from the GDR will accelerate the negotiations in Vienna on the reduction of armed forces in Central Europe.

I am not out selling President Kekkonen's idea but I am pointing out that the President proposed a separate Nordic arms supervision arrangement in May 1978 and renewed this proposal last May. Indeed, the purpose of this proposal is to develop the idea of a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

[Question] Why are our Nordic neighbors not really warming up to the President's proposal?

[Answer] It is my understanding that everyone is placing considerable value on Finland's aspiration to maintain the present situation. If we look at a map of Northern Europe, we see a broad area in which there are no nuclear weapons. There are different concepts of how we should maintain the benefits resulting from the current situation.

Pressures have arisen because of the development of weapons, but it would be incorrect to make one-sided accusations. We cannot accuse the Americans for the fact that they are always the first to invent new gadgets.

Everyone knows that it is a question of such important and sensitive problems that one does not speak lightly of them. From the point of view of the Finnish government the idea is not dead, but it will also not attempt to stubbornly promote it.

It is important that President Kekkonen's goal is not to change anything. The Norwegians have been afraid that they will lose their so-called option. The President's idea is an established idea.

[Question] When you say that a total program, in which questions concerning participation as well as the content of a program will be approached by new means, is now needed in European disarmament, do you consider that by this approach it will be possible to find new incentives for the more or less stagnated disarmament negotiations?

[Answer] If we look back, we remember that Finland presented a number of loose proposals even before the CSCE meeting in Helsinki, which after much work and hard negotiations made up the content of the conference itself. In Finland's opinion a separate European disarmament program is now needed.

[Question] Does what you say now before the CSCE meeting in Madrid have the same objectives as those outlined at the beginning of the CSCE?

[Answer] This analogy has been pushed too far. In such matters it is not possible to use a cookie mold. With respect to weight Finland is a small country. If it makes an initiative, it must make certain that of the reactions to the proposal as many as possible should result in promoting the matter.

If we think about the opposite extreme that the presentation of proposals as a small country is impossible, first there is shock, then laughter. If we take an initiative which has not been recognized before it must be so broad and deliberated in such a way that no one is compelled to give an immediate negative response.

I would use the expression "clearing house". Finland has taken issues which are common to everyone into consideration in its proposal. It is not a matter of indifference to Finland what is being done or not being done in Europe. For this reason, Finland must itself act.

Finland's proposal can be characterized as a task Finland itself has taken on. This task presupposes that Finland will make contact on a bilateral basis with the countries concerned. These contacts are a part of the preparations for the meeting in Madrid.

Finland must be included and must be of assistance if the situation permits. There have now been small opportunities. However, we must prevent the incorrect impression that we are the saviors or pathfinders of the world -- Finland has no potential for this. Finns should not appear in the world as know-it-all types, who with their mouths and heads always believe that they know better than anyone else how an issue should be resolved.

Finland has sometimes also been called the mediator. A task of mediation is only such a measure which is requested by the parties concerned.

[Question] Finland has been especially interested in the agreement to prohibit chemical weapons, with respect to which a joint initiative is soon expected from the Soviet Union and the United States. What concrete measures have been taken in this special area?

[Answer] Finland has without a doubt played a visible role. Experts talk about real pioneer work so that the tax money directed to this project has not gone to waste. In addition to arms supervision, the procedure can also be used for measuring environmental pollution.

The question we are dealing with here is a research project concerning chemical agents which has been in effect since 1972. The purpose of the research is to create at a national level an inspection ability with respect to chemical weapons, which, if needed, could be applied to international use.

Such a scientific, nonpolitical clarification work, in our opinion, is well adapted to a neutral country such as Finland, which for its part is striving to bring an end to the arms race.

This Finnish research encompasses many dimensions with respect to content as well as possible use. This inspection ability can be applied to three types of supervision activities, namely observations concerning the destruction of depositories for weapons, restraints from making weapons, and the alleged use of weapons.

It could be applied to national as well as international supervision activities. It can also be used in connection with research conducted by the international organs concerned. It could, for its part, reduce the doubts presented by developing countries with respect to the adequacy of their own national inspection ability.

10576
CSO: 3107

NATO CHIDED FOR NEGLECTING CIVIL DEFENSE

DW171204 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 17 Dec 79 p 2 DW

[Article by Carl A. Ehrhardt: "Gaps in the NATO Concept"]

[Text] The foreign ministers of the 15 NATO countries in an 18-point final communique announced verbosely Friday what they wanted to tell their own public, or signal to the East, as the result of the conferences of last week in Brussels. Nevertheless, much remained unsaid, unclarified and also unconsidered.

The anxieties caused by the direct and indirect antidetente actions of the Soviet Union and some of its allies in areas of unrest are mentioned, to be sure. What remained unmentioned, however, was the urgent reference by the Alliance's primary institution to the threat to the supply routes for material imports outside the NATO treaty zone. Not a word in the communique concerning the need for preparation in the event of a crisis the mutual assistance available for the Alliance instruments.

It would be all the more incomprehensible to the people in the Alliance that nuclear threat and deterrence so prominently command the center of attention, whereas not a word can be found about the necessity to do more for civil protection. People in NATO trust too much in the war-preventing effect of deterrence, the balance of terror. Therefore, as far as they are concerned, civil protection hardly seems to be a topic, also for fear of the costs and of unrest among the people. Yet the more minor the precautions are for the protection of their own civilian population and its supply for survival, the less convincing and effective can be the threat of deterrence. This is known in the NATO staffs just as well as it is known in Moscow. The Soviet Union, after all, is spending 10 times more on civil protection than the United States. The latter's expenditures for that purpose, however, are many times greater than those in the most densely populated area in Central Europe, which becomes even more vulnerable to the new weapons systems.

CSO: 3103

PLO STEPS UP ACTIVITIES IN SCANDINAVIA

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 24 Nov 79 p 3

[Article: "Upgrading of PLO in Scandinavia"]

[Text] In Scandinavia a step-by-step rehabilitation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is being heralded. In the opinion of Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ullsten, whose state secretary Blix recently met with PLO leader Arafat in Algiers, the organization is "the most representative spokesman" for Palestine. A similar view was also advanced by Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Frydenlund, who spoke of expanded contacts with the PLO, provided that the latter are prepared to assume a constructive role in the Mideast peace negotiations. However, both Stockholm and Oslo insist that under no circumstances may Israel's existence, along with its right to secure borders, be called into question. At the same time, however, there is a desire in the northern European capitals for the recognition of the "legitimate national rights" of the Palestinians, rights which, in Ullsten's view, also include the founding of their own state.

The Swedish minister of foreign affairs replied in these terms to questioning in parliament by the opposition Social Democrats, who favor closer ties with the PLO. Although Ullsten gave no information as to his government's future steps, he argued emphatically for an amendment of Resolutions 242 and 338 of the United Nations Security Council to include recognition of the "legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people." The role of the PLO as emphasized in this context does not, however, permit the drawing of any conclusions about "what we think of the political goals and methods of this organization," according to the Swedish minister of foreign affairs. In any event, the criticism leveled by Ullsten on the same occasion was directed exclusively against Israel. He harshly condemned the latter's settlement policy, deeming it contrary both to international law and to the fourth Geneva Convention. He also declared Israel's attempts to control water resources on the West Bank to be incompatible with the avowed goal of granting autonomy to the Palestinians who have settled there. Norway, on the other hand, which furnishes a major part of the United Nations peacekeeping forces in southern Lebanon, continues to reproach the Israeli government in the first instance with making the United Nations' task in the area more difficult through its support of the Christian militias.

Daud Kaloti, the PLO representative for Scandinavia residing in Stockholm is at present preparing, in reference to the "barbaric crimes and aggressions of the Zionist Israelis," a conference to demonstrate "solidarity with the Palestinian people." Meanwhile, the well-known Al-Fatah terrorist, Kamal el-Nimri, has just ended a "successful visit" to Denmark and Sweden. Although el-Nimri, labeled a "murderer" by the Copenhagen newspapers, was granted a visa "accidentally" by the Danish Embassy in Beirut because there had apparently been a confusion of names, he was still able to enter the country unhindered, at the invitation of the Danish leftist socialists, and even managed to present himself to his supporters in the restaurant of the Folketing [Danish parliament]. As if this were not enough, the Swedish Embassy in Copenhagen then granted him a 3-day residence permit to visit the university town of Lund, where el-Nimri allowed himself to be celebrated as a hero by Swedish supporters of the PLO and by "unofficial representatives" of the "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine." The gradual rehabilitation of the PLO, as judged by a Danish newspaper in connection with explicit criticism of its own as well as of the Swedish government, is evidently taking place on the most questionable levels.

9413

CSO: 3103

NORWAY, UK TO SHARE NEW NORTH SEA OILFIELD

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 4 Dec 79 p 15

[Report by W. A.: "New Source of Petroleum Bubbling in North Sea--Start of Production in Norwegian-British Border Area--Further Explorations"]

[Text] Stockholm, 2 December--In the rough wintry North Sea the starting signal has been sounded for exploiting a new source of petroleum. Located in the border area between Norway and Great Britain, the field to be tapped, bearing the name of Statfjord, exceeds the previously customary dimensions in more than one respect. Exploitation is proceeding from a depth of 145 meters, and the loading is being done with the help of a buoy which is among the biggest of its kind in the world. Moreover Statfjord is among those five offshore areas where one suspects the existence of the most sizable exploitable oil and gas reserves anywhere in the world's oceans.

Consequently both bordering countries of course were careful to demarcate the boundary as painstakingly as possible. Although Oslo and London want to handle the exploitation flexibly, the respective shares of the reserves were fixed to four decimals. Norway was allotted 88.8847 percent, Great Britain 11.1153 percent. The huge field lies farther north in the North Sea than any other area where reserves have been discovered so far. However, the Norwegian parliament in the meantime has also given its approval to conducting experimental drilling north of the 62d parallel, where now in the very near future applicants are to be allotted the first 3 of a total of 26 blocs.

In the meantime, following preliminary work of about 6 years, a start is to be made in Statfjord with the so-called A-platform, whose drilling tower from the bottom of the ocean to the top measures no less than 266 meters. The B-platform is being installed at present, while no decision has yet been made concerning the construction of a third drilling island. Owing to the uncertainties in the Arab world, the value of the North Sea oil has risen enormously, and with it the international corporations' readiness to invest. However, precisely in the North Sea, installation costs are particularly high--amounting in the case of the Statfjord A-project alone to 7.5 billion Norwegian kroner, or about double the original estimate. A

little more than half of this sum--about 4 billion kroner--had to be spent for the drilling island. On the other hand, almost 60 percent of the worth of the orders accrued to the benefit of the Norwegian economy itself. In addition, the domestic industry was thus enabled to gather the kind of experience which is also likely to prove worthwhile as a result of an already begun transfer of technology.

By and large, the Norwegian part of the Statfjord field has been tapped by the Mobil affiliate Mobil Exploration Norway, with the state-owned Statoil the biggest domestic participant. According to data of the Central Statistical Office in Oslo, the proven exploitable reserves in the sector of the Statoil/Mobil group amount to 300 million tons of petroleum and 51 billion cubic meters of natural gas, with experts estimating them to be even greater. Of course, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance has also done some calculating. Without revealing how it arrived at the results, it says that it anticipates Norway to receive a gross income of 580 billion kroner until 2015.

As is known, the gods will not grant success without labor. Thus, over and above the financial investment, one can fathom the extent of the effort by the fact alone that about 1,400 people were employed in the final phase of the manufacture of the drilling island. Not least among the technical achievements is the installation of a huge loading buoy, which is connected with the platform by a pipe at a depth of 145 meters and has a capacity of 60,000 barrels an hour. The petroleum drilled in Statfjord is to be taken ashore in tankers. As for the natural gas, it is planned to channel it into a pipeline network and to pipe it (no decision has been made on this as yet) to either Great Britain or the Continent.

8790

CSO: 3103

FOREIGN OBSERVERS IMPRESSED BY MANEUVERS, NEW DEFENSE CONCEPT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 27 Nov 79 p 13

[Report by "Ko.": "Good Cooperation Between Soldiers and Civilian Population --Praise for Austria's New Area Defense Concept--Positive Foreign Assessment of Maneuvers"]

[Text] Vienna, 26 November--The biggest maneuvers of the Federal Army in the history of the republic, concluded this weekend with an infantry parade in Amstetten, have caused a lot of praise, and in part even surprise and amazement, among domestic and foreign observers. Both main aims of this major maneuver, in which 32,000 soldiers took part, were reached. The new "area defense concept" of the Austrian Army--also called the "Spannocchi doctrine" after its creator, the chief of the army, General Spannocchi--in the judgment of the experts has stood the first great test. Secondly, neutral Austria demonstrated to other countries, but also to its own population, that its military defense readiness and capacity is quite a bit greater than had been assumed in many parts.

Foreign military experts (25 countries sent military observers to the Austrian maneuvers) primarily have stressed three positive factors--great discipline, readiness for action and stamina of the soldiers fighting under extreme weather conditions--it being noted above all that two-thirds of the troops participating in the maneuvers consisted of militia--that is, reserve soldiers. A great impression was made by the good cooperation between soldiers and civilians, a factor of material and psychological significance for the functioning of area defense. Several foreign military people, including a Swiss and a Soviet general, said they were impressed with the new Austrian defense concept. This maneuver was to show that this area defense, contrary to what quite a few critics had assumed, does not aim at a kind of guerrilla warfare but consists in sophisticated cooperation between fortified "key zones" (being defended conventionally) and a great number of "fighter commandos" which, taking advantage of their knowledge of the terrain, are to confront the enemy in all parts of Austria with mobile guerrilla warfare.

So far the Austrian Federal Army often has not been taken seriously. According to army chief Spannocchi, only a change in this attitude, only awareness

by a potential enemy that he will have to pay a big price for traversing Austria can cause the small neutral country to hope to be left in peace in the case of a conflict. In his opinion, the maneuver contributed a fair amount to this. According to the military commentator of the respected Vienna daily DIE PRESSE, Georg Posanner, the real achievement of the exercise was the creation of a "new feeling of defense." He writes that with its good morale and discipline the forces taking part in the exercise "scored a victory in the fourth dimension by winning over the civilian population."

The maneuvers also clearly revealed the sore points of the Austrian Federal Army. These range from failings in training and certain shortcomings in leadership primarily among the militia to completely inadequate armament of the Austrian Army in antiaircraft and antitank defense. The ban against equipping the Austrian Federal Army with missiles, anchored in the State Treaty, represents a serious handicap for these sectors of defense. Several Austrian attempts to bring about a change in this State Treaty provision have so far invariably been rejected in Moscow. After the experience of these maneuvers, a new move toward the Soviets will perhaps succeed. Reportedly the other signatory countries of the Austrian State Treaty are prepared to suspend the ban against arming the Austrian Army with missiles at least in certain sectors. Federal Chancellor Kreisky, however, has never let it be doubted that the armament problem is not important enough for Austria to shake the State Treaty in the event that one of the signatory powers did not want any change to be made in this provision of the treaty.

8790

CSO: 3103

SPD'S HUGO BRANDT DISCUSSES LEFTWING'S RELATIONS WITH SCHMIDT

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 3 Dec 79 pp 26-29

[Interview with SPD Bundestag Deputy Hugo Brandt about his party and its relationship with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt by Klaus Wirtgen and Olaf Petersen of DER SPIEGEL: "'We Are Not the Chancellor's Company'"]

[Text] Hugo Brandt has been a member of the Bundestag since 1969. He is one of the few leftwingers among the SPD Bundestag deputies who with their factual knowledge and quiet industriousness have even gained the respect of the right-wing party workers gathered around Egon Franke. Nor have his gifts remained a secret to Helmut Schmidt: now 49, Brandt, who made an impression with a "moving speech" (SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG) about the Traube bugging case in 1977, has recently been among the most serious candidates to succeed Hans-Juergen Wischnewski as minister of state in the Office of the Chancellor. Chairman of the Committee for Internal Affairs and specializing in legal policy, Brandt, except for the likeminded Alfred Emmerlich, was the only member of the SPD's leftwing in the Bundestag to be delegated to the Berlin party congress also by the votes of the rightwing.

SPIEGEL: Mr Brandt, in VORWAERTS recently, you drew up a very critical balance sheet of the 10 years of the SPD-FDP coalition. You miss today what was essential in 1969--"a policy of reforms to overcome a sense of resignation." Do you intend to ring in the second part of the euphoria of reform before the party congress?

Brandt: No, not a euphoria of reform, to be sure. First of all, all of us who came to Bonn in 1969 have learned that we had the wrong idea about reforms, that a much, much longer term is needed to implement whatever really turns out to deserve being called reform. And, in the process, of course a lot of the impetus that exists at first is lost, which means that at the very least the reform aims have to be put in order and clarified.

SPIEGEL: Does that, then, leave any time at all for reforms?

Brandt: Oh, I think it does. It really always starts over again. For example, I believe that at the party congress a question such as disarmament receives a new quality, also as far as the objective is concerned, because many people in the party are no longer prepared in the long run to put up with such a policy not achieving any tangible successes. There is no longer a willingness in the long run to go along with the madness of spending billions for armament on the one hand and neglecting on the other hand a great many things that need to be done in the world.

This, for instance, is also true of environmental policy. There, without a doubt, the old idea has been taken up again that man can live only in his natural environment and that we are ruining ourselves worldwide. Such insights lend a new political impetus.

SPIEGEL: Is this not a case of a frustrated intellectual like the former teacher Brandt from Grolsheim once more deploring the injustice of the world, or is the dissatisfaction actually more widespread?

Brandt: I am neither an intellectual nor frustrated. No, I have a feeling based on many conversations out there with friends in the local organizations, especially also with workers and employees, that they want to know just what they really must lend their political support to. You see, things have become shaky in that I have been told quite often that, while it is certainly important for us, and not others, to be in power...

SPIEGEL: ...The chancellor is seeing to that, isn't he?...

Brandt: ...I am also told that it is important to make it clear for what purpose one is in power.

SPIEGEL: You mean this is not clear any longer?

Brandt: It isn't. For more than 100 years the SPD—rightly so, certainly--has aimed at the unleashing of the forces of production. I believe that in the future prominence must be given to taming these forces of production.

SPIEGEL: Can a Federal Chancellor Schmidt too share in supporting such a new program?

Brandt: Yes. Though not openly, Helmut Schmidt has already stated his support for such an orientation. Whether he is the one who himself formulates such a policy--that I have some doubt about.

SPIEGEL: Many comrades think that Schmidt's politics are guided too pragmatically by whatever exists. Yet the chancellor can cite good reasons for this, starting with the worldwide economic difficulties and uncertainties.

Brandt: For a start, we ought to keep two things separate here. One is what the government can do under certain given constraints in a certain situation and at a certain time; the other is what the parties can do--that is, always think a little ahead. This, I realize full well, can lead to conflicts between those who have the responsibility to govern and those who want to formulate new aims or think over old ones--for example, whether progress really only means more and more and better and better.

SPIEGEL: As far as Schmidt is concerned, progress can be gaged by the fact that the FRG has weathered the economic crises better than most other countries. And evidently the population acknowledges this.

Brandt: No doubt this is right, but it is not enough. The weakness of Helmut Schmidt's position, in my opinion, is the following comparison: We have less inflation, fewer unemployed than elsewhere, and people are better off than elsewhere...

SPIEGEL: ...Which is true...

Brandt: ...Of course, and the people appreciate this; otherwise they would not have so much confidence in him. But there is nothing in this that indicates anything about how people feel, about their yearning for something to develop as well. People ask what the future holds. Surely we will not skid from one crisis situation into another but also must come up with reforms to avoid crises.

We often deplore the fact that, for instance, so very few people, relatively speaking, attend our meetings, in complete contrast, for example to 1969...

SPIEGEL: ..There are full houses when Schmidt is there...

Brandt: ..Of course, top stars always attract big crowds. The same is true in show business. But those who work in the field, conducting individual conversations, those people realize that a lot of people are not there who used to come. And if one then makes an attempt to find out why, there are many, many alibis, from the weather to the television program.

SPIEGEL: Perhaps it is enough for people to know that the chancellor will see to things?

Brandt: This is not so, at least as far as the young people are concerned. It seems to me that their longing from being able to reach new shores, for being able to change something, is unfulfilled. The incrustation within society, the complete incrustation of the interpretation of the Basic Law concerning basic rights, for example--the fact that people feel restricted in all spheres and that actually we are padding the walls with our politics so that it does not hurt so much when one hits them, rather than also sometimes make the attempt to move the walls--that, I think, is being felt by many people, especially the young. This, at best, leads to disinterest in politics and, at worst, in rejection of politics and politicians.

On the other hand, I notice a huge social commitment precisely among the young. There are no channels for this commitment. No ways are being pointed out, because no clear aims are being set. With nothing but pragmatic politics--important though this is--I can satisfy someone, but I cannot arouse anyone's enthusiasm.

SPIEGEL: Is this impassiveness also the result of the control that has originated with Schmidt in the past few years?

Brandt: I am sure there is something to that, though control does not mean that he issues orders. Everyone knows that Schmidt is irreplaceable, at least at present. Everyone knows that he is one of the best chancellors we have ever had, perhaps the best. And everyone knows that he is also sensitive. The party does a great deal to support him because it knows that it needs him. But...

SPIEGEL: ...It does not love him...

Brandt: ...Looking at it from the point of view of arousing people's enthusiasm and not just from the point of view of performance, Willy Brandt would be more attractive than Helmut Schmidt could ever be. There simply are people who have greater party support than others. Schmidt does not represent a program as Brandt did at one time. And therefore the party will not be able to love him either.

SPIEGEL: Does he in fact have a program at all?

Brandt: Yes, I think he does.

SPIEGEL: What is the slogan?

Brandt: The slogan would be: Effectiveness, the greatest possible benefit, good relations with everyone, being better than anyone else.

SPIEGEL: That could be the program of any other party in Germany.

Brandt: Yes, it is a program any other party might have, provided that one takes away the Social Democratic values.

SPIEGEL: To what extent can the SPD move around--say, in the questions of nuclear energy and disarmament--without running the risk of a serious conflict with the chancellor and the government?

Brandt: I think both, the party as well as the government, are making a very serious mistake. Quite clearly the party through its party congress resolutions cannot prescribe government policy. It is a serious mistake to expect the party with all its resolutions to stay as close as possible to the possibilities of the government. That paralyzes the party.

On the other hand, there is also the ill feeling within the party that the resolutions really should also be put into effect. And as soon as possible at that. Both are wrong. The party and the government in their decisions cannot, always with a view to one another, put limits on themselves.

SPIEGEL: Is it in fact possible for a head of government who at the same time is the second chairman of his party to combine both these roles?

Brandt: He cannot combine both these roles. But as head of the government he must put up with the party going a different way or a way that goes further...

SPIEGEL: ...or in the opposite direction...

Brandt: ...or also having contrary ideas.

SPIEGEL: If then such important questions as disarmament and nuclear energy are at issue, could that cause the chancellor to resign?

Brandt: No. I think we really ought to free ourselves of the notion that the party is the chancellor's company. It cannot be that if it still is to think independently and not just put its stamp on what has already been thought out. If in such cases as you have just mentioned the party has different ideas from those of the chancellor, this of course will have its effect. But the party must also free itself of the idea that the chancellor simply is the party's executive officer. He cannot be that.

SPIEGEL: Are you not asking the voter to behave schizophrenically if, on the one hand, you ask him to vote for an SPD of reform and, on the other hand, offer him Helmut Schmidt as chancellor?

Brandt: I don't know whether one can call that schizophrenic. There is no question but that one is moving here in a field of tension. There are quite a few people today, young people, so-called greens [environmentalists], who wonder whether they really should vote at all, because they ask themselves this question: Who in fact is telling us how social development is to continue? As for the SPD, I too am bothered by the fact that bureaucrats and functionaries dominate the party and that there is no lively interest at all in discussing topics of the future.

SPIEGEL: Herbert Wehner is worried rather about things becoming too loose in the party. He warned in time for the party congress against an ideological reworking and "chipping" ["zerspanung"] of the SPD.

Brandt: Yes, against a chipping of the party. When he talked about an ideological reworking, he did not only mean the SPD but was talking in quite general terms. I think Wehner is right, but not in the sense that there was too much discussion but because the lack of a truly broad discussion time and again causes certain groups to withdraw to one-sided positions and to disparage anyone holding a different view as a deviationist.

SPIEGEL: Do you see points at issue in the SPD which could degenerate into ideological warfare?

Brandt: There was such a danger for quite a long time in the debate about nuclear energy. But the extreme positions for nuclear energy and against nuclear energy under all circumstances virtually do not exist in the party any longer. It is no longer within the SPD but outside the SPD that the subject may become an ideological one.

SPIEGEL: Where?

Brandt: Among the greens, who with their grand single-track way want to express all their distaste for this society by vetoing nuclear power. But in doing so--and this is a good thing--they have made the established parties clearly aware of being immersed in wanting more and more, and thus in being more and more destructive of human relations and natural resources. I believe that the greens must be taken very seriously, not as a party, because they have no future as a party, but as...

SPIEGEL: ...swallowers of votes?

Brandt: ...for one thing, as swallowers of votes; that is a very practical point of view. But I also would like to take them seriously in a positive way, because they have reminded the big parties of where these have been remiss. One more reason for engaging in open discussion with greens, and not only opportunistically with a view to voters and ability to govern!

SPIEGEL: Federal Chancellor Schmidt and Minister of Labor Ehrenberg want to fight the greens--being worried that tolerance toward this group may cost votes in the labor camp.

Brandt: I think it is sheer folly to simply take care of the greens by hitting them and saying they are political "idiots," idiots in the original meaning of the word--people with a single-track mind, loners. We must absorb whatever is being thought there and sometimes only vaguely felt and poorly articulated--there is a lot of future in it.

SPIEGEL: Thank you for this interview, Mr Brandt.

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CSO: 3103

SURVEY OF EXTREME RIGHTIST, NEO-NAZI GROUPS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 26 Nov 79 p 10

[Article by Hans Josef Horchen, head Land Office for the Protection of the Constitution in the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg: "The Turbid Identity With a Lost Riddle"]

[Text] The SPD Bundestag group anxiously registered the sudden rise of violent outrages committed by right extremist groups in the Federal Republic and the flood of publications glorifying the atrocities of the Third Reich. On 26 November the parliamentary group will hold a hearing on the topic neo-Nazism to obtain a complete record of the dangers of right extremist outrages and to search for ways to stop them. The hearing will be attended by experts from the Federal Criminal Police Bureau and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution as well as from the departments of justice, protection of youth, education and journalism. We are publishing hereafter an article by Hans Josef Horchen, head of the Land Office for the Protection of the Constitution in the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg, on the topic "Right Extremism in the Federal Republic of Germany 1979."

At the end of 1977 83 right extremist organizations were recorded, with a total membership of 17,800. This numerical record has barely changed since. There are even fewer organizations now, and total membership has declined, almost imperceptibly, to 17,600.

However, within this framework there has been a definite shift. Neo-Nazi groups have grown from 17 to 25, their membership from 900 to 1,300.

The NPD [National Democratic Party of Germany] continues clearly to be the strongest in terms of membership. Together with its youth organization JN [Young National Democrats] and the NHB [National Democratic Student Union] it has 10,000 members. Since 1969, when it boasted 28,000 members, the NPD itself has steadily lost ground.

Nor has there been any substantial shift in the numerical strength of right extreme journalism. The numbers of publications rose slightly, from 99 to 104, the copies printed weekly declined. In late 1977 189,000 copies were printed, now there are 178,000. Eighty-five of the 104 right extremist publications originate with right extremist organizations, 36 of them national democratic organizations: NPD--JN--NHB. The bulk of the estimated weekly printings of right extremist publications comes from independent publishers. Any shift there has been minor. With a weekly impression of 90,000 copies the DEUTSCHE NATIONAL-ZEITUNG continues to dominate the field. On the other hand the DEUTSCHE WOCHENZEITUNG (Schuetz, Kermayer, v.Thadden) has lost readers. It now prints only 25,000 copies. NATION EUROPA and MUT [Courage] are monthlies and print 8,000 and 9,000 copies respectively. About 20 other publications serve a readership limited exclusively to the right extremist camp.

Organized right extremism has shrunk to a hard core. Since 1971 the center of gravity has shifted from the National Democrats, first to the "New Right" which in turn has already been superseded, and since 1974 increasingly to neo-Nazi groups. This followed the decay of the NPD which last achieved election to a provincial assembly in 1969 (it had never succeeded in winning a seat in the Bundestag). Since 1971 the NPD has been compelled to cope with radical trends in its own ranks: First the "Resistance Action," largely initiated by the NPD leadership but repudiated by it just a few months after its establishment in October 1970; later the followers of the "New Right," mainly former young party members who quit the NPD in January 1972, and since then repeatedly the Young National Democrats who clamor for greater militancy, and from among whom young members of the neo-Nazi groups are recruited.

Senior officials of the NPD strive to keep the party alive as an organization because they hope that a changed general political situation might one day lead voters back to them. There is no strategy for better adjusting the program and the actions of the party to the present political climate. The NPD failed to analyze and therefore to note that its election successes in the second half of the 1960's were due largely to a climate of protest, not to NPD programs or policies. In some elections at Land level in northern Germany the NPD's share of the vote has now declined below that of the DKP. At local level also, in district assemblies, city and community councils, the NPD has steadily lost ground. At the end of 1977 it had a total of only 31 representatives left (1971: 426).

Neo-Nazi Groups and Actions

We must distinguish between the neo-Nazi groups and the extremist organizations of the old right. The NPD is nationalist but not completely Nazi, though party officials have repeatedly justified some aspects of national socialist rule in Germany.

The NPD adopted the attribute "democratic" in its plank. This was not entirely intended as a disguise, though the party's interpretation of democracy differs from the pluralist conception of democracy as stated in the constitution. The neo-Nazi groups, on the other hand, boast direct descent from national socialism. Not only do they incorporate the symbolic components of nazism and strive to reconstitute national socialist organizations; they are frankly and militantly antisemitic and despise democracy. On 30 March 1979, from prison where he was awaiting trial, Michael Kuehnen, up to now the most successful among the young militants of the neo-Nazi groups, addressed an open letter of protest to a "werewolf." He said: "That cannot be our approach. Instead--protected by the armistice agreements, we must fight and destroy the democrats with the weapons of democracy." He continued by citing his "well known contempt for this system and its servants" and his "loathing of the democratic method of false accusations." Kuehne was born in 1955.

Since 1976 young neo-Nazis, including juveniles, have increasingly decided the actions of the groups. In the spring of 1979 12 percent of the 200 members (among a total of about 1,300 followers) of these groups had core were less than 20 years old, and 42 percent were aged 20-30. Among 39 activists in northern Germany who were prosecuted in 1978 and 1979 as suspects involved in the execution or planning of serious crimes 23 percent were below 20 and 46 percent from 20-30 years old. None of them had any personal knowledge of national socialism. Still they are aping the appearance and mannerisms of the movement, attired in black pseudo uniforms and high boots, standing at attention with spread legs or strutting up and down outside the meeting hall--behavior they have seen in movies and documentaries. For many of these juveniles the exact placement of the holster is more important than the meaning of the planned operation.

Members of these groups tend to meet in bars, consume substantial amounts of alcohol and develop a gangster mentality which allows the slightest pretext to trigger vandalism or punch-ups. These groups of juvenile neo-Nazis enjoyed a kind of informal status especially from 1973-1976; later full operations developed from regular drinking bouts and the incidents arising in the course of these. Since then some militants have joined the groups and provided somewhat more planning, in some instances even the beginnings of a strategy.

Typical for this development is the Hamburg NS [national socialist] group. It has been around since 1974, its membership fluctuating. In spring 1975 the group was joined by then Bundeswehr Lieutenant Michael Kuehnen, a student at the Bundeswehr Academy. He developed initiatives which earned him a good deal of recognition by the summer of 1978. In fact some of the older generation of neo-Nazis already cast him in the role of organizer of a united neo-Nazi movement which they hoped to control through him--a quite unrealistic concept.

Kuehnen successively established an apparently harmless club, the "Hansa Leisure Club," several underground NSDAP [National Socialist German Workers Party] groups and subgroups such as "NSDAP--Hamburg Region," "SA Detachment 8 May," "SA Detachment I and II," "Hamburg Girls Union," and also an open organization called ANS [Action Front of National Socialists] which was designed to participate in the Hamburg city council elections with the slogan "readmission of the NSDAP." It failed, though, to gather the necessary signatures for launching a candidate.

Kuehnen founded a newspaper--produced and sold underground--entitled DER STURM. So far 12 issues have been printed. He also launched the NATIONALE NACHRICHTENDIENST, designed to be distributed openly--a single issue appeared in July 1978--to report neo-Nazi operations in a way acceptable to newspapers. The first issue of this news service had a report entitled "The History of the NS Movement Since 1945," dealing with the SPR [Socialist Reich Party], the "long night" of the national socialist movement in the 1960's, the establishment by Wolf-Dieter Eckart of the EDNS [Union of German National Socialists] and the establishment by then 18-year old Gerhard (Gary) Lauck of the NSDAP/AO [National Socialist Workers Party/Foreign Organization] in the United States. The DRP [German Reich Party] and the NPD were dismissed as national conservatives. The author does not consider them part of the national socialist movement. This combination of conspiracy and open action was a new tactical element introduced by Kuehnen to the neo-Nazi groups. From the publicity aspect it turned out to be exceptionally effective. With Kuehnen's guidance the ANS responded to Lauck's proposal for launching an "underground propaganda attack" for which the swastika, the "symbol of the movement" would serve well enough. Its mass distribution would suffice "to turn everything upside down." In 1977 the members of the Hamburg NS group carried out systematic paste and paint jobs which were subsequently publicized in DER STURM.

Kuehnen also exploited the greater publicity effect of open action. He deliberately informed press organs and reporters of impending operations: A march to a war memorial, the meeting to constitute the ANS or a ceremony on the occasion of the unveiling of a memorial tablet to Adolf Hitler. He demanded DM200 each for permission to attend the last mentioned event.

At no time did Kuehnen's neo-Nazi group in Hamburg have sufficient followers to properly pursue its stated goals. In addition the investigations arising from the many criminal offenses committed ultimately began to take their toll, despite initial difficulties in obtaining evidence. Nevertheless ANS "successes" did have some effect on groups in other regions, in particular Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony, where a similar group arose, the "Anti-Comintern Youth," which claimed to be nationalist and socialist.

The activist neo-Nazi groups and their predominantly young followers have continued a development which was initiated by the neo-Nazis of the older generation. Their emergence was also aided by the actions of the NSDAF/AO of Gary Rex Lauck from Lincoln (Nebraska). Lauck had flyers and small

posters printed in the United States, which--in addition to a swastika in a white circle on a red background--carried slogans such as "NSDAP Now," "Do Not Buy From Jews," "Jews--Get Out," "Germany Awaken!," and so on. Anyone interested could order them, and large quantities were introduced into Germany, in part via neighboring countries. From 1974-1976 they represented the chief material for the paste jobs of the NS groups. Lauck is using the magazine NS-KAMPFRUF which he has been publishing since 1973 to vent his militant antisemitism. It was the first magazine in the Federal Republic to carry the NS sovereign eagle emblem and frankly championing national socialist aims.

The vital prerequisite for the burgeoning of the neo-Nazi groups and their predominantly youthful followers, though, was the presence of initiatives and friends who--with gradually increasing frankness--justified and glorified national socialism while antisemitic trends grew more and more outspoken. The "German Citizen Initiative" set up by Manfred Roeder in November 1971 and the simultaneously established "Citizen and Farmer Initiative" (founder: Farmer and farm reporter Thies Christophersen) collected groups of like-minded friends whose meetings more and more openly pursued neo-Nazi tendencies. Roeder's BRIEF [Letters] and Christophersen's series "Critique" served as a cement for these groups, though their members remained largely inactive, being quite satisfied with this new glorification of national socialism and its Fuehrer.

Subsequently, in 1975, the Kritik-Verlag published the pamphlet "Die Auschwitz-Luege" [The Auschwitz Lie], featuring Thies Christophersen's reminiscences about his experiences in Auschwitz in 1944. Roeder wrote the foreword. In his 18th BRIEF (December 1973) Roeder explained to the German Citizens Initiative that "by tackling the Auschwitz topic we have crossed the Rubicon." In his 34th BRIEF, 2 years later, he called his "frank espousal of Adolf Hitler as the Fuehrer and example for our people" an action which had at last liberated him.

At a Hamburg meeting of friends in November 1974 Christophersen presented Gerhard Lauck from the U.S.A. to some 100 attendants. Lauck spoke on the topic "why we Americans still revere Adolf Hitler." Roeder first operated in Bensheim. Subsequently he moved to Schwarzenborn on the Knuell, where he had bought an estate which he began to make over into a "Reich" farm. Since spring 1978 he has lived abroad to evade a 6-month prison sentence. Christophersen is living in northern Schleswig-Holstein.

Others, such as Erwin Schoenborn and his "Combat Union of German Soldiers," (Frankfurt) or his "Action Community National Europe," (ANE: Nuremberg); Karl Jochheim-Arnim and his "National Front" (NF, Munich), Wilhelm Wuebbels (Bocholt), Curt Mueller (Mainz) and Karl Heinz Hoffman with his Military Sports Group (Heroldsberg), represent foci of neo-Nazi activism by groups which usually have few members. An exception is Hoffmann's Military Sports Group. Its outdoor exercises in combat dress and with weapons (first made harmless) and other military paraphernalia have furnished a favorite target

of movie and television reports at home and abroad. Hoffmann champions the leadership principle and makes himself and his group available as security guards at meetings. Some contacts do exist between some of these groups, but there is no common approach.

The situation is similar with respect to the attempt to reestablish the NSDAP in the Federal Republic (as called for by Lauck). Though there was to be an overall organization called "German Section" divided into regions, no more than contacts were established. Lauck's deputy Paul Otte (Braunschweig) quarreled with Lauck who appointed a new deputy. A "first postwar edition" of the VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER was published in spring 1978 as a "special edition honoring the 89th anniversary of our Fuehrer." It consisted of a single page and, under the heading "Balance Sheet 1977," faked the existence of a NSDAP/Construction Organization "on a broad base on occupied Reich territory." In the meantime Otte and Kuehnen are in prison pending trial. A home-made explosive device (pipe bomb) was found in Otte's home.

The bottom line of neo-Nazi group operations, their potential, danger and prospects at this time may be summarized as follows:

-- Since 1974 neo-Nazi groups have recorded an increasing following. The hard core of these groups was expanded by young activists who more and more set the tone in the most active groups.

-- Along with the growth of these groups and the hard core of neo-Nazis outrages in the Federal Republic have increased (paste and paint jobs, vandalism, threats).

-- The neo-Nazi groups have published more neo-Nazi writings which are being sold as occasional news magazines or leaflets. Among the titles are "The Brown Battalion," "The Reich," "The Black Corps," "The Attack," "The Fighter," "The Werewolf," and others.

-- There is no general neo-Nazi movement, neither in the shape of an overall organization nor of an ideological movement.

-- Contacts between the spokesmen have tended to result in conflicts and attempts to outdo one another in describing the potential of the respective group.

-- In late 1977 we noted the first attempts at setting up underground terrorist combat groups, influenced by the example of left extremist terrorists. The attempts were traced to a group whose members originated in Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg. However, they are neither so united nor so impenetrable as the left extremist terrorists.

-- Despite stagnating recruitment this development has tended to lend a greater significance to right extremism generally. Disregarding the adverse

consequences with respect to public opinion, especially abroad, the neo-Nazi groups sometimes raise problems for public safety.

Public Rejection

The public has repeatedly asked for the background to this development. Summary answers are either too glib or too self-serving. Such answers tend, for example, to allege a Hitler wave, demonstrated by the misuse of the concept of documentation with regard to the distribution of documents from the Nazi era. Others hold responsible all institutions involved in education, because they are said to fail adequately to deal with the Nazi era and its origins and effects. Sometimes vehement reproaches are leveled at the authorities, especially the administration of justice. They are accused of dragging their feet in the matter of prosecuting and punishing neo-Nazi machinations. At the same time public and private appearances by the old right extremists, that is the NPD, who are weaker now than at any time in the last 15 years, are increasingly countered by opposing demonstrations by --usually--left extremist groups. These latter merely serve to provide some spurious significance to the last remnants of this outmoded political ideology.

Now for some pertinent remarks: It is unrealistic to expect that right extremist or neo-Nazi modes of thought can be eradicated once and for all. They are latent and use the set pieces of Nazi ideology just because these draw the strongest public protest and, consequently, enjoy public attention. Those indulging in this kind of procedure are mostly of the postwar generation, born after 1945. Even Manfred Roeder was only 16 in 1945. The majority of them are therefore no "incorrigibles," no "former Nazis." The make-up of the 200 hard core members of the neo-Nazi groups differs profoundly from that of the followers of left extremism. Only 12 are women, only 12 percent secondary school and college students. The majority are blue and white collar workers.

It is precisely these young followers of the groups who find a turbid identity with a "lost rabble" when they see themselves depicted on the KB's [Communist League] so-called "wanted posters" with the inscription "Hansa Gang."

Recently the police had a lot of trouble to prevent marchers in an anti-fascist demonstration from storming the home of a locally known neo-Nazi who is all of 19 years old.

Scientists, mainly historians, are researching detailed aspects of Nazi rule; reporters follow them and publish summaries, possibly a Hitler biography. Starting attitude, thoroughness, differing emphases in the description outline differences. They are followed by discussions. New and hitherto unknown documents are published. The sequence of description and discussion is reflected in the illustrated press, where shadings tend to get blurred. We may call this the Hitler wave, but it certainly is no wave in the meaning that the Nazi ideology is about to make a come-back.

When it was noted in 1976 that neo-Nazi trends were showing up in the establishment of groups, we deliberated how effectively to counter this development. None of the groups or circles has an organizational structure capable of being effectively dissolved by the invocation of article 9 of the constitution and the law on clubs and associations. The only useful approach, therefore, is the investigation of offenses committed by the zealots of these groups and their eventual trial.

As matters stand some specific articles of the penal code affect either fully or partially right extremist neo-Nazi activists only:

- Article 86--the distribution of propaganda by anticonstitutional organizations,
- Article 86a--the use of symbols of anticonstitutional organizations,
- Article 130--incitement of the people,
- Article 131--incitement to racial hatred.

The penalties imposed by some courts are subject to criticism. Such criticism sometimes fails to distinguish first offenders from recidivists. Moreover it is often forgotten that many offenders are of an age where the wearing of a gun holster with the eagle emblem and the swastika may initially appear rather more of a provocation than a crime. Some of the young people who were at one time involved in group operations as quickly departed. The hard core of the groups, though, soon learns to expect prison sentences to follow new offenses, initially possibly with probation but later certainly without that option. Since 1978 this process is beginning to bite.

The media tends to devote special attention to neo-Nazi operations. Last March the Federal Prosecutor General's Office initiated proceedings because neo-Nazis had planned to kidnap the SPD chairman and the Federal Prosecutor General. Another trial dealt with plans for the Vehme murder of a "traitor." In the meantime the first trial has been abandoned. The internal affairs of this group are distinguished by big talk and rivalry. A similar situation prevails between groups in contact with one another. Nowadays a threat to security is rarely caused by consistent and considered plans, rather by single and brief bouts of activism. The neo-Nazi groups do not represent a danger to democracy and government because they have not found a wider following anywhere. Their political armament is limited if not superficial. No political or intellectual groundswell works for them. At best they are the detritus of the spirit of the age.

Aside from the NPD and the neo-Nazi groups right extremism is organized in another about 50 organizations, associations and groups which, with few exceptions, have very limited influence and significance, especially because some of these groups show very little activity.

Among the cultural and ideological societies the DKEG [German Cultural Heritage of the European Spirit] stands out by virtue of its about 1,300 members. In the course of recent months the society has split. For some members the organization, led by its president Karl-Guenter Stempel, judge at the Bavarian Supreme Court, was insufficiently political. They founded a German Cultural Union (DKG), associated with the "Society for Free Journalism e.V.[registered association]. The latter is domiciled in Neustadt on the Weinstrasse. It bestows the "Ulrich von Hutten Prize" and in fact champions a view of history consonant with the Nazi regime. It calls this view the "objective contemplation of history." The DKEG was adversely affected by the split. Nevertheless, in March 1979, its annual "days of culture" were staged in Lueneburg. Some members are also members of the NPD.

In recent years the DVU [German Peoples Union] of Dr Gerhard Frey has drawn some attention by federation-wide operations. With 4,500 members the DVU ranks next to the NPD as the strongest right extremist group, but its organizational life is little developed. In the last couple of years the DVU has organized "major demonstrations" by which Dr Frey promoted the nationalism of his newspaper, the DEUTSCHE NATIONAL-ZEITUNG, and launched spectacular verbal attacks on the Federal Government. Plans of more demonstrations in Munich in September and Darmstadt in December 1978 failed because no hall was available.

Two nationalist youth organizations with about 400 members each stand out among right extremist groups and societies: The Viking Youth e.V., established in 1952, and the "Union of Youth Loyal to the Fatherland e.V." (BHJ), established in 1962. Both groups are antidemocratic. The Viking Youth considers itself nationalist-federalist and continues on from the Norseland ideology of earlier nationalist youth clubs. The BHJ maintains close contacts to the politically committed "nurseries" of the DKEG, which have now joined the German Cultural Union. The current federal leader of the BHJ received the 1976 student youth prize of the DKEG. Neither of the youth organizations has many members in Hamburg.

No Danger to Democracy and Government

The right extremist forces are not on the march, although sometimes reports in the media make it seem so. The large majority of the public disapproves their political goals and clearly rejects decisionmaking processes without democratic mechanisms. That applies quite particularly to the young generation. Resolutely rejected are especially the ideological contexts of right extremist attitudes--racism, nationalism and the leadership principle. The effects of such political ideals are all too obvious now--all over the world.

CRITICISM MOUNTS AGAINST BAVARIAN HANDLING OF ASYLUM CASE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 28 Nov 79 p 3

[Report by Peter Schmalz from Munich: "Asylum Case--Baum Accused of Acting 'Insincerely and Hypocritically'"]

[Text] Strong criticism against the behavior of Federal Minister of the Interior Gerhart Baum was voiced at a meeting of the Bavarian Council of Ministers yesterday. In an official announcement following the meeting, it was stated that in light of the date when the matter of the Bavarian authorities' action[against two Czechoslovak refugees] had been made public and the time that had elapsed before it, it was "strongly suspected that the federal minister of the interior had once more been remiss in his duty" and had consciously failed to cooperate with Bavarian Minister of the Interior Tandler.

Following a chronological description pointing out that the federal authorities had been informed several times of the planned or implemented deportation, it is stated that in light of the involvement of the authorities under him, Baum's behavior could "only be described as insincere and hypocritical." It was the height of gall for a federal minister of the interior who had neglected his duties to use the election campaign to defame Bavaria, the Bavarian government and particularly the Bavarian minister-president.

The deportation is regretted for humanitarian and political reasons. Minister of the Interior Tandler has announced the transfer of some officials, including some at the Berchtesgaden Rural District Office.

The SPD in a plenary session this week will call for Tandler and his State Secretary Neubauer to be relieved of their posts. The FDP yesterday talked of a "ministry in a neglected state" but allowed that "judging by all that had become known so far" it was not possible to pin personal or political responsibility on the two Bavarian politicians. On the other hand, Strauss would be sure to "talk at least about a pigsty" if the event had occurred in a ministry headed by the SPD or FDP.

As far as Ludek Pachman, the president of the "Free Society for Promoting Friendship With the Peoples of Czechoslovakia," is concerned, the asylum

case is neither a Strauss affair nor a Tandler affair. Rather, differing and partly contradictory instructions had been issued by the authorities, and what was needed was a law universally prohibiting the deportation of refugees to the Eastern bloc.

Pachman had known about the case of Cernak and Zilka [the two Czechoslovak refugees who were deported] as early as February, but in light of some suspicious facts refrained from intervening. He suspected that CSSR intelligence had its finger in the pie. He regards it as quite impossible that--as the two persons seeking asylum claimed--a Czechoslovak citizen can obtain a tourist visa to Yugoslavia if he is not a party member and has made statements against the communist Party in his plant and has therefore been discharged without notice.

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CSIL: 3103

ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL SEES NEED FOR MANEUVERS, OFFICER TRAINING

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 29 Nov 79 p 2

[Report by Ruediger Moniac from Bonn: "Army Inspector Poeppel: Troops Need Major Maneuvers"]

[Text] The army must hold major exercises annually. With this statement the inspector of the army, Lt Gen Hans Poeppel, opposes all those people who because of the burdens on the population connected with military maneuvers are calling for them to be seriously curtailed.

In an interview in the just published issue of the journal WEHRTECHNIK, the general states: "Only in large-scale exercises is it possible to show realistic combat actions, complete with the resulting tasks imposed on command and troops." Furthermore, it is necessary to practice cooperation with the allies as well as air force action in support of ground forces.

In addition, Poeppel continues, every officer once or twice in his respective position--at the head of a battalion, brigade, division or corps--must have the opportunity to exercise his command. The general also made it clear that the bottlenecks in promotion and utilization, while being felt as a "malaise" by the professional military concerned, were being put up with "with a remarkably good attitude." He states that "there are concerns and discussions about this problem, but one cannot as yet speak of infringements of the readiness to do what is expected of one." The bottleneck in utilization, he says, can only be corrected by viewing it as outside the normal post-of-duty pyramid and creating special uses for the soldiers concerned--for instance in the territorial army and in the Bundeswehr schools.

As the most important tasks in the army the inspector named improvement in the training of noncommissioned officers, a strengthening of the realization of the purpose of their service among those subject to military service and a heightening of the effectiveness of the territorial army, which must take its place along the field army "with equal rights and equal respect."

Lt Gen Friedrich Obleser, the inspector of the air force, too, is concerned about the readiness for action of his formations. He states: "The readiness

of our soldiers involved in air defense to cope with their great responsibility cannot be extended ad infinitum." Negotiations were required with NATO to check whether the high demands concerning readiness for action were justified. On the other hand, he is satisfied with the future state of armament. He expresses the opinion that the "Alpha Jet, disparaged by so many," the light fighter plane provided for the support of the army, has been "turned into a useful tool" which can now be introduced as planned.

The inspector of the navy, Vice Admiral Guenter Luther, in the same journal states emphatically that in order to make it less expensive to build the six Type 122 frigates now under construction immediate approval should be given to building another two.

8790

CSO: 3103

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THIRD QUARTER OF 1979

West Berlin DIW WOCHENBERICHT in German 22 Nov 79 pp 485-490

[Text] Adjusted by working day and season the real gross national product rose by 0.5 percent in the quarter under review; the standard of the comparable quarter of the previous year was again exceeded by at least 4 percent. The slight rise by comparison to the previous quarter underlines the strength of the expansive forces which characterized developments in the third quarter, because the performance of the previous quarter was affected by the need to make good the weather-related losses in the early part of the year and therefore particularly strong. When we eliminate these influences, we arrive at the verdict that the rate of economic growth has continued almost unchanged.

In the period under review also the rise of industrial and construction output was crucial to the rate of growth. Output was sensibly greater especially in building and civil engineering. Production expanded well above average also in the raw material and production goods industries and in the industries manufacturing consumer goods, while the growth in the industries producing investment goods came to a halt. It is to be assumed that growth weakened in other industries, and in retail trade the net product actually declined.

In the summer quarter the rate of inflation continued almost unchanged in all sectors. In mid-year the rise in the value-added tax rate gave an additional boost. At the same time import prices still ranked first by far, due mainly to the continued increase in raw material prices. The terms of trade again worsened sharply; the deflation factor (price index of the gross national product) again rose more slowly than the price index for the total domestic disposition of goods.

The still strong expansion of equipment investments benefited import goods in particular. The growth of domestic turnover, on the other hand, was relatively minor, especially because deliveries of the machine construction industry stagnated. The electrical engineering industry was again able to increase sales. The total rate of price rises has shown little change:

Imports got moderately more expensive; domestic price rose more by comparison, but at barely greater speed than before.

Construction investments expanded more strongly than expected in the period under review. In view of the large stock of order and the shortage of manpower in the construction sector it may be assumed that in many cases vacations were shifted to the latter part of the year. As a result output in building and civil engineering rose quite exceptionally in July and August in particular. In general real construction investments, adjusted by season and price, achieved a level corresponding to that of late 1972, up to now the pinnacle of construction investment activity. This result was achieved with a labor force which is nearly 25 percent lower than that of 1972. Commercial construction expanded well above average, housing construction less than average. Inflation continued strong; construction prices exceeded last year's levels by nearly 10 percent.

Inventory movement was once again affected by speculation and--as in the previous quarter--extremely great; the stock ratio rose once again. Though raw material imports rose no further, the level is far above current demand so that stocks grew once more. It may be assumed that much of the output of the iron and steel industry (production here was much expanded) also went to stockpiling.

Private consumption* remained below the level achieved in the previous quarter. This affected the retail trade in particular. It is likely, though, that the very definite decline at the beginning of the quarter was due to the fact that many purchases--more than initially assumed--had been anticipated with a view to the imminent rise in the value-added tax rate. Worst hit again was the vehicle trade, but similarly affected were furniture, textile and clothing retailers. Demand for fuel, cameras and sports equipment remained exceptionally strong.

After a jump at the beginning of the quarter, caused by the rise in the rate of the value-added tax, prices of goods for private consumption increased only slightly. Industrially produced goods and services continued to get a little more expensive, but prices of seasonal goods declined to the availability of cheap fresh fruit. In August/September prices of liquid fuels softened slightly but are still double those of last year. Gasoline, however, continued to get more expensive; prices here were 16 percent (about DM0.15) higher than the year before.

* The most important indicator for the short-term ascertainment of nominal private consumption is the turnover index of the retail trade (turnover values at prevailing prices (1970:100)). This index, published by the Federal Office of Statistics, is frequently and often substantially amended from the time of the respective first publication, so that it is not possible at an early stage to make reasonably confident claims about the actual development. The estimates of private consumption for the respective quarter under review may therefore be quite off, especially because there is a virtually complete lack of data on demand not met by the retail trade.

Real exports expanded as much as ever, though this time the expansion of service exports predominated. Especially transfers of capital earnings but also payments for foreign transport services rose at an accelerated rate. Goods deliveries, on the other hand, showed merely a slight rise. Within this group the volume of products by the consumer goods industries rose more, that of the investment goods industries less. Especially serious was the decline of deliveries to the United States; here the downturn in the economy had a particularly strong effect. Export prices rose at a slightly faster rate.

The rate of growth of real imports has just about halved; this applies both to goods and services. While more semi-finished and finished goods were imported, raw material imports have kept to about the same levels. The price rise in import goods speeded up once more. Prices were about 12 percent above last year's levels. While the inflation slowed down with respect to finished products, it took another jump for raw materials, due mainly to the sharp rise in the price of crude oil and oil products.

Corresponding to economic developments the situation on the labor market continued to improve. The figures of gainfully employed persons rose at the same rate as before, the unemployment rate again declined. At the end of the quarter under review there were 737,000 unemployed, the lowest incidence this year and at any time since the fall of 1974. In the construction industry nearly 50 percent of all firms reported obstacles to production caused by the lack of manpower. Cuts in working hours due to contractually agreed extensions of vacations (affecting in particular the man hours worked in summer), were frequently balanced by increased overtime so that the actual hours worked did not rise any less than the manpower employed.

The increase in wage unit costs was very slight. These costs exerted very little pressure on profits. The fact that profits nevertheless hardly rose in the quarter under review is due mainly to the fact that the firms have not yet been able to pass on all the costs arising from higher import prices.

Outlook

Many signs indicate that the economic upsurge climaxed in the third quarter. Though the annual shift of vacation dates in the various federal Laender makes it harder to arrive at a short-term analysis of the summer months, we are bound to note that the receipt of orders by industry has declined significantly in the average of the quarter, both from domestic customers and--even more so--from abroad. A quite considerable effect here was exercised by the dwindling demand for cars and the ebbing of speculative orders in the raw material sector. Still, stocks of orders in the processing industries continue very large--in the third quarter they were 16 percent above 1978. We may therefore confidently expect some more moderate growth of production in the coming months. The real turnover of capital goods will rise to an above average extent. Equally due to large stocks of orders the construction industry will increase its output within the scope of available capacities and make a relatively slight contribution to overall growth. In view

of the high prices of oil and oil-related products it remains to be seen whether private consumption will provide another stimulus. First reports from the retail trade indicate an improvement in purchasing inclination. As the receipt of orders shows, exports will continue to lose importance in the coming months, because we must more presume more economic decline in nearly all major partner countries. In all likelihood the real gross national product of the last quarter will once more exceed last year's value by about 4 percent.

11698

CSO: 3103

CONSERVATIVES GET POST IN USSR-FINNISH SOCIETY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 24 Oct 79 p 8

[Article: "Even Conservatives Coming Into Leadership of USSR-Finnish Society"]

[Text] After many years of pursuing this goal the Conservative Party has finally placed a representative in the leadership of the USSR-Finnish Society. The new leadership of the society will be elected at a meeting of representatives to be held 1 week from now. The Conservative Party will obtain one seat in the central leadership of the society, which will be expanded to 50 members at the meeting of representatives. Indeed, Taistoite Communists forcefully opposed the granting of a seat to the Conservative Party.

The USSR-Finnish Society is currently controlled by the leftwing and the Center Party. The chairman of the society is Counselor of State Martti Miettunen (Center Party). He will be reelected as chairman.

In addition to Miettunen there are 40 members in the central leadership: 14 Communists or People's Democrats, 12 Social Democrats, eight Center Party members, four Swedish Peoples Party members, one Finnish Workers Party member, and one nonaligned member of the leftwing.

The central leadership will now be expanded by 10 members so that more cultural representatives can be included in the leadership of the society. At the same time a path is opening up for the Conservative Party to become a member of the leadership.

Mentioned as Conservative Party candidates are, among others, Erkki Huurtamo, governor of Kymi Province, Diet member Martti Ursin and Matti Hokkanen, Jyrki Talonen, chairman of the Ikaaliste Section of the USSR-Finnish Society, and Editor Pekka Sitari from Joensuu. It has also been noted that the new Conservative Party Chairman Ilkka Suominen has worked in the USSR-Finnish Society in Nakkila.

In the newspaper TIEDONANTAJA Taistoite Communists have announced that the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] Politburo has unanimously decided that a member

of the Conservative Party will not be elected to a leadership position in the USSR-Finnish Society. The majority Communists are offended by such writing "since the SKP Politburo cannot decide on issues of the USSR-Finnish Society". It is expected that the majority Communists will follow the entry of the Conservative Party into the USSR-Finnish Society from the side without visably opposing it.

Social Democratic Party Pursuing Leadership of Council

Negotiations have been conducted among the parties with respect to places and individuals in leadership organs of the USSR-Finnish Society, but the final distribution of seats and the fate of the Conservative Party will not be resolved until 2-4 November at the meeting of representatives to be held in the Helsinki House of Culture.

Positions in the society are very desirable because of their foreign policy value. The work of the USSR-Finnish Society is valued highly in the Soviet Union.

The Social Democrats are now pursuing the chairmanship spot in the USSR-Finnish Society Council "since the Center Party holds the chairmanship of the society and the Communists hold the general secretary position". The council of the society has been led by Councillor of State Vaino Kaukonen (nonaligned) for more than 20 years. He may possibly be replaced by Deputy Finance Minister Pirkko Tyolajarvi (Social Democrat) or Representative Olavi Hurri (Social Democrat). Both now have seats in the leadership of the society.

10576

CSO: 3107

GOVERNMENT AGREES ON ANTI-INFLATION PLAN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Oct 79 p 7

[Article: "Government Began Negotiations on Implementation, Inflation Program Approved"]

[Text] In the near future the government will begin negotiations with commercial and industrial organizations, financial institutions, and municipal associations on the implementation of an anti-inflation program approved on Wednesday.

At an extraordinary session on Wednesday the government approved a five-point inflation program, which has been under negotiation in the government for a full week.

The second part of the inflation program, which is composed of state construction investments to be postponed, remained unresolved. The amount to be expended on these projects is 500 million markkas.

The government is striving to make price supervision and price competitiveness more effective on the basis of the price supervision legislation in effect. The government is holding the commerce and industry administration responsible for negotiating with industrial and commercial organizations for pushing this issue through.

The purpose is to tighten up the principles of pricing in the statutes dealing with price supervision.

Also the goal is to increase the checking and research activities of price officials particularly in areas in which it is expected that there will be a pressure on prices. Examinations of the post-reporting procedure will also be increased and, if needed, its capacity will be expanded.

To promote price competition it is intended to increase the observing of prices and supervision over price recording. According to a decision of the Industry and Commerce Administration price recording will be applied in all necessary consumer goods.

Cartels Are of Concern

The government is also concerned that "cartels and other forms of limiting competition as well as various signs of economic centralization have become more prevalent in recent years."

The government considers that the legislation for promoting competition aimed at limiting and controlling cartels has turned out to be deficient.

For this reason, the government intends to give an immediate explanation of possibilities for reforming the law to promote economic competition.

Housing Construction Has Heated Up

To restrain the overheating of housing construction the government presupposes that increased construction expenditures, which could cause a possible overheating in the area of construction, will not be approved in housing production funded by the state.

In practice it means that the housing administration will reject petitions for some larger than the original amounts granted because of increased prices. Thus the construction of the more expensive projects as far as 1,000-1,500 housing units are concerned will be postponed. This procedure, for its part, will help to keep construction expenditures at a reasonable level, states the government.

In the negotiations being conducted with the financial institutions the government is striving to achieve a situation in which the proportion of credits granted of all the credits granted by the state will be large particularly during the first half of next year.

Investment Reserves to Be Used

In its negotiations the government is encouraging the industrial and commercial organizations to make greater use of voluntary investment reserves and transfer expected investments to the latter part of next year.

The Finance Ministry had established as its goal the accumulation of approximately 500 million markkas from enterprises as a reserve, but this amount was left out of the government's decision.

The goal of the government is to get the central industrial and commercial organizations to recommend their enterprises to use reserves.

The government will continue negotiations on those means by which enterprises will be persuaded to place funds obtained from profits in closed accounts of the Bank of Finland.

It is in the decisionmaking power of the government to determine whether reserves can be more than 50 percent of profits for a fiscal period. The

highest amount will be 80 percent. The government can also decide on special tax reductions.

According to the investment reserve law enterprises can have an investment reserve, which can be 30 percent of profits for a fiscal period at the most. The reserve is a valid deduction in municipal as well as state taxes. The tax is paid after the reserve is taken out. The Bank of Finland will pay interest on reserves in closed accounts.

As a fifth point the government intends to negotiate with municipal associations on limiting the increase in municipal payments next year to correspond with the increase in expenditures at the most.

In addition, the government intends to clarify the possibilities for rescheduling municipal investments together with the central association. The goal is to postpone investments until the latter part of next year and possibly until the beginning of the following year.

The effects of the government's anti-inflation program are timed for next year and with the assistance of the program the government will attempt to influence labor market organizations so that they would contribute to carrying out the government's economic policy.

In the justification of its decisions the government makes reference to that uncertainty which next year's income solution will create for combatting inflation.

Estimates Are Uncertain

In short-term economic development the government sees many traits which point to a rate of inflation higher than the 7.5 percent predicted for next year.

In the section defending its anti-inflation program the government or the Finance Ministry points out that next year's inflation estimate includes factors of uncertainty simply for the reason that income policy solutions are not yet known.

According to the government income distribution will "comparatively speaking" change to the benefit of the private sector. "This after a weak year with respect to the profitability of many is in itself justified and even otherwise a phenomenon traditionally connected with an improving economic situation."

According to the government a significant change of the income distribution in this direction can considerably increase pressures for increasing labor expenditures, wholesale prices, and other expenditures.

The government considers that the loose money markets during the current year have been a factor which has helped to accelerate inflation. The rapid increase in import prices has also had the same effect.

The rapid growth of production and demand has resulted in price increases in the construction area, in which prices have definitely increased at a more rapid rate than the consumer price index.

According to the government the existence of price pressures is also evidenced by the fact that the basic price index of the domestic markets has in recent months increased at a rate significantly faster than the cost-of-living index.

The government notes in its justification of its inflation program that the central goal of its economic policy is to keep inflation from accelerating. According to the government success is a necessary condition for dealing with the employment situation.

Growth Will Continue -- 1981 To Be a Weak Year

According to the government raising the foreign value of the markka by a total of 3 percent and the decision to postpone expenditures make up a portion of the anti-inflationary actions.

The government believes that economic growth will continue at least during the first half of next year, but it will definitely slow down after that. The government considers economic prospects for the year 1981 to be poor.

During the current year total production has increased rapidly and exceeds the 7-percent mark.

The government also notes that international inflation has accelerated considerably this year as a result of the sharp increase in world market prices for crude oil and certain metals.

According to the government prices in OECD-countries will increase at an annual rate of 12 percent. In Finland the increase in prices has not accelerated significantly from last year, but price pressures have, however, increased and expectations of inflation have become stronger, considers the government.

10576

CSO: 3107

BRIEFS

DEFENSE TENET OUTMODED--"The understanding of our officer corps with respect to the military defense of Lapland is perturbingly outmoded," stated Professor Raimo Vayrynen at a disarmament week seminar of the Committee of One Hundred in Helsinki. According to Vayrynen even among the generals it has become customary to calculate that one defender corresponds to three aggressors. "This concept is too reminiscent of the old saying that one Finn is worth 10 Russians." By this method of calculation the officers have come to the conclusion that 700,000 Finns are able to defend themselves against an aggressor army of 2.1 million men. "Thus we are able to equate ourselves with NATO and the Warsaw Pact," stated Vayrynen. He also made the allegation that the evaluation of the Second Parliamentary Defense Committee concerning the military and political situation of the Nordic Cap is incorrect. "The building materials have been wrong." According to Vayrynen the misleading evaluation has thus been used as a justification for this military policy. "Many politicians have a military general complex and are not able to adopt a critical attitude toward the information received," complained Vayrynen. City Director Erkki Tuomioja (Social Democrat) hopes that the evaluation of the Third Parliamentary Defense Committee will be more extensive. "The traditional strategic thinking of the previous committee no longer holds true." [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Oct 79 p 12] 10576

FRANCE

BRIEFS

'FREE' RADIOS MEETING--The leaders of the extreme left movements of several European countries met twice in recent weeks, in Brussels and Rome, to plan a joint strategy on the development of "free" radio broadcasts. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 10 Dec 79 p 59]

CSO: 3100

AUTHORITIES REFUSE PERMIT FOR NPN DEMONSTRATION

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 24 Nov 79 p 3

[Text] The mayor of the Hague was right to refuse to give a permit to the National Party of the Netherlands for a demonstration which it wanted to hold today. The decision was made by the chairman of the legal department of the town council in response to a request from the National Party of the Netherlands for a temporary repeal of the demonstration ban which Mayor Schols of the Hague had imposed on the said organization.

A couple of hundred demonstrations are being held in the Hague each year, and since 1975 there has not been a single instance in which a demonstration permit has been refused, but it was clear from the very start that the above-mentioned demonstration by the NPN was no routine case.

The above statement was made by J. G. de Vries Robbe, attorney, on behalf of the mayor in a report on the investigation and deliberations, on the basis of which the mayor decided to refuse granting the demonstration permit.

According to de Vries Robbe, it was not so much the text of the request for a permit to demonstrate in which the NPN proposed to demonstrate for strict compliance with the immigration regulations that was the reason for the lengthy consideration, as the lack of knowledge of the NPN and its background.

The discriminating content of the NPN periodical DE HOLLANDSE NIEUWE and of a pamphlet ascribed to the same organization, provided justification for the assumption that disruption of the public order and offences might be feared to result from a demonstration by the NPN. The rights and good reputation of inhabitants of the Hague of foreign origin and others could be infringed by the slogans of demonstrating members of the NPN, and the municipal council cannot be responsible for that.

Never before have so many objections been raised against a permit not yet granted. Numerous organizations, such as resistance fighters, Surinamese, young members of the Labor Party, and women have been up in arms against the issue of a permit to the NPN. According to the spokesman for the mayor, seeing that the demonstration by the Dutch People's Union at Soest had just ended, it was to be expected that counterdemonstrations from different quarters could follow.

Against the background of these considerations, D. J. de Brauw, attorney, explained the legal arguments for the refusal to issue the demonstration permit. In all legal decisions and international treaties, such as the Constitution and the Rome Treaty, in which the freedom to demonstrate has been laid down, the possibility of prohibition has been expressly left open in cases where a demonstration is likely to result in offences, violations of the rights of third parties and disruption of the public order, de Brauw said.

Defense NPN

On behalf of the NPN, R. W. Boot pointed out that the NPN does not intend to make discriminating propaganda. It is possible that a number of NPN members think differently on this, but the NPN does not want to become a second People's Union.

R. W. Boot denied that the discriminating pamphlet, which he described as gross and in bad taste, originates in the NPN, although it carries the same post office box number as the NPN and has been written on its note paper. As to the contents of the periodical, he said that the founder and chairman of the NPN, Van der Linden, who also is editor of the periodical, has, indeed, made rash statements on earlier occasions.

According to the statement which followed immediately after the meeting, R. W. Boot predicted that, despite the prohibition, a number of NPN members would still be gathering in the Hague on Saturday afternoon in an unspecified area. He could give no information on the nature of the gathering.

7262
CSO: 3105

PVDA NOT LEFTIST ENOUGH, SAY YOUNG MEMBERS

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 26 Nov 79 p 3

[Text] The way in which the opposition is conducted by the parliamentary group of the Labor Party is aimed too much at a possible future cooperation with the Christian Democratic Appeal. The official party line--efforts towards a leftist majority--thus is weakened. A fundamental change in the economic order can only be brought about through a cooperation among leftist parties: the Labor Party, the Political Party of Radicals, the Pacifist Socialist Party, and the Communist Party of the Netherlands. The Democrats '66 do not belong to this group because of their position on the energy issue, the nuclear armaments issue, and socioeconomic changes. The Labor Party, therefore, must dissociate itself from the Democrats '66.

This is the content of a resolution adopted this past weekend by a large majority of the youth organization of the Labor Party at a 2-day congress at Elst.

The young members, moreover, blame the Labor Party for the fact that no contacts with the Communist Party of the Netherlands have been established. They want to change this state of affairs by organizing a public debate between the Labor Party and the Communist Party of the Netherlands.

Other wishes of the young members of the Labor Party are:

1. Active and passive voting rights for all young people from the age of sixteen.
2. The Association of Minors must be given access to all tea houses.
3. The endeavor to abolish the army has the effect that there can be no military service for women.
4. At all schools, school committees must be set up which decide on all school matters. One half of the members must be students.

5. Social compulsory service for young people is absolutely rejected.

The congress finally decided to cooperate with the German youth organizations SHB (studenten)[Social Democratic University (Student) Association], SUSO (Socialist Youth), and Die Falken in an action against the modernization of nuclear weapons.

7262

CSO: 3105

INTERVIEW WITH ROTTERDAM STRIKE LEADER FLIP SCHULTS

Rotterdam NIEUWSBLAD in Dutch 12 Sep 79 p 5

[Interview with Flip Schults by Hans Soeters]

[Text] Roosendaal--As he sits here in the sobering cold light of the television lights, he gives an impression of fatigue. At such moments the 2-week -old harbor strike shows on him; 15 tiring days that he, as one of the three leaders of the action committee behind the Rotterdam harbor strike, has gotten through with practically no sleep. Since the famous 22 August, the day the Rotterdam harbor went down, Flip Schults has been up and about. A man with an apparently inexhaustible energy. But he admits honestly, "During the past 2 weeks I have worked just as hard as in a whole year under my boss. So, if I could go back to work tomorrow, that would be great!"

But he is one of the strike leaders in the dock-CAO [collective labor agreement] conflict, and a man who says, "I am really only a spokesman; it is not me that determines what happens, but the thousands of dock workers. And whatever they want, we act accordingly." And so, as long as the majority of the dock workers refuse to resume work, Flip Schults continues, in his well-known way, to try to keep the ranks closed; he intersperses his speeches with cutting attacks on his direct opponents; gets the laughs on his side with a single remark, and in that way finds over and over again the right tone to give a somewhat bored group a fighting spirit. He plays the masses in a way that must call forth something like admiration from his worst enemy.

Commuters

And last evening the strike leader went into action again; he traveled to Roosendaal to visit a number of trade union chamber members who sympathize with the action committee. In a meeting room in the Guild House, a sort of municipal building, he spoke nonstop for an hour and a half on the why and wherefore of the strike and why precisely they, the 54 in the audience, could play such an important part in spite of the distance of a good 60 kilometers from Rotterdam. "You commuters make up 70 percent of the

workers on the Rotterdam docks, that is some 7,000 to 8,000 men. The strike is thus certainly not the business of the Rotterdammers alone. We Rotterdammers don't decide it; *you* have to decide it..."

Flip Schults, speaking in a small auditorium, before a small group of people, who at first, listening in a somewhat bored way, give the impression of having come to the annual meeting of the local billiards club. Along the wall opposite the entrance, a long green table with four other gentlemen behind it, staring straight ahead in somber silence. In the corner, near the bar, a waiter in sober black, arms crossed, looking surreptitiously around. After only half an hour, when Flip Schults has had his say, the waiter goes into action, but the number of glasses of beer, to judge by the somewhat chagrined expression on his face, must have been on the disappointing side.

Flip Schults, facing a small number of listeners, a quite different Flip Schults from the man who urges the masses on the crowded Afrikaanderplein every morning to stick together, at least. Now he expresses himself more softly, almost deliberately, sometimes even more or less good-naturedly. He gropes for examples to convince the men before him; while steadily talking he makes side allusions to the strike of 1970, but always comes back to the final objective of his mission: to persuade the commuters that they, too, must take an active part in the strike. "It is precisely to you that this strike is so important. I get home on my bicycle in half an hour, but it takes you an hour and a half--you do 60 hours for 360 guilders a week..." An appeal that strikes home.

Communist

Flip Schults, a convinced communist for some 27 years now. A remark that he amplifies with, "I have worked 25 years on the docks, a thing that I got a gold pin for from the SHV [expansion unknown], but I turned it back in." He talks as a dock worker, about his own experiences, for example about the time when he went to the doctor with back troubles. "I had been in the pit 13 years then. But the doctor said, 'How can you have back trouble? Aren't you a checker?' But what I mean is, that's how healthy it is on the docks." And, as the easy-going tone in his voice dies out, "We have worked through the whole pleurisy winter; yes, you could get a little cold-weather bonus, but it was not even enough to buy a mug of coffee with, for that costs something like 65 [Dutch] cents now."

And at the moment when he pulls out the union stop and the employers he raises his voice. "At the top they are shocked at what happens on the docks; that is why they strut around on the TV, getting lots of broadcast time, while we are turned away. Why? Because we haven't got any title, of course. But take Pieters, who says, 'They'll come around, on their knees if need be.' That is, he doesn't say it that way, but that's what he means. Even if we die of starvation. They regard us as greyhounds that chase a mechanical rabbit."

Old Rubbish

Talking that way, Flip Schults is at his best--chooses the right words effortlessly, and always finds exactly the right moment to harp on the union and employers string. "Sure, the union holds Maas-Rijn in front of it, to show that everything is not just right. And while it is true that Maas-Rijn is not doing well, there are other firms that are, but they don't do anything for us, either. The unions deny us as old rubbish. We are not admitted. And why? Because can't eat properly with a knife and fork. But we do represent the thousands of workers from the docks. I venture to say here that I am not anti-union, but I am against a union that lets its own people collapse and then stands by laughing like crazy. A union must be an instrument of the workers."

He comes back over and over to getting the commuters in action. "It is really a bad thing, a very bad thing, that in our action committee of 1978 there were only one or two commuters, and they don't come from farther away than Hoogvliet or Spijkenisse. But it is precisely the commuters that must concern themselves more actively with the dock strike. So come to the Afrikaanderplein; the fare will be refunded. You are sacred to us. So it applies to you, too, that in the worst cases, when somebody really gets into difficulties, an appeal can be made to the action committee. We haven't got much money, some 60,000 guilders, but you will get an answer in 24 to 48 hours."

Vote

Then Flip Schults finds it has been all right. Certainly, when a tentative vote by show of hands makes it clear that the majority of the commuters are in favor of carrying out the strike. Payment for the days on strike and 28.50 guilders extra starting 1 January is the demand here in the little Roosendaal auditorium, too. Schults says in conclusion, "We will reach decisions with people that understand the docks, that know what goes on there. We won't talk with a bunch of stuffed shirts; we don't sit down at the bargaining table with just anybody. We are fighting against torpidity in the employers and the unions. But we don't want to ruin the union, for the members are the union. We won't bury any union, just some of the leaders..."

For Flip Schults that is what it is about. While there is still some chatting in front of the rustic house fronts in the Damstraat, which is now shrouded in darkness, he is on the way back to Rotterdam, where he will hold a consultation with the other members of the action committee. Tired or not, whether he gets any sleep or not; his energy appears inexhaustible when he addresses the crowd on the Afrikaanderplein again next morning: "Men, there is no way back. We are deciding not just for now, for this moment, but also for 1981 and 1982. So, we are going ahead..."

BRIEFS

SPANISH NAVY ACQUIRING SHIPS--It was learned in Madrid, from a source close to naval authorities, that Spain is launching a wide ranging renewal and strengthening plan for its navy. The plan envisages the building of two 15,000 ton aircraft carriers. One of the two aircraft carriers, which has the markings "PA-11", is already under construction and it should be operational in 1984. In addition to the aircraft carriers, Spain will build three 3,500 tons missile launching frigates of the "FFG" class, eight 1,400 ton corvettes, and four 1,200 ton conventional submarines of the French "Agosta" class. The first of these submarines will go into service in 1981. Madrid will also reinforce its amphibious capability and it will receive two assault helicopter carriers from the United States in 1980--the "Frances Marion" and the "Paul Revere" which are 17,000 tons each. These ships can carry a total cargo of 414 crewmen and 1,650 marines. In addition, Spain plans to export war ships built in its shipyards. Two corvettes will go on a commercial promotion cruise to Latin America in January. [Text] [Porto O PRIMEIRO DE JANEIRO in Portuguese 30 Nov 79 p 2 WA]

CSO: 3101

BRIEFS

VOLVO INCREASES EXPORTS--Goteborg, Sweden--The Swedish automobile company, though moving towards a sales record, expects that, next year, in view of the uncertain international energy supplies, it will have marketing difficulties again. Nevertheless, the current year will conclude with a sales volume of 23 to 24 billion Kroner at present, bringing the enterprise, for the first time, a profit of over 1 billion Kroner before reserves and taxes. Therefore, according to its president, Pehr Gyllenhammar, Volvo intends to adhere to its highly ambitious investment plan without regard to future imponderables--a plan which foresees expenditures of 1 billion Kroner annually until 1984 for the development of new models. According to the report for the third quarter of 1979 just submitted, gross profits for January through September have reached 861 million Kroner, an increase over the corresponding period last year of no less than 72.9 percent. Above all, a 27 percent increase in exports and a rise in domestic sales of about 18 percent contributed to this profitable development. In concrete terms, Volvo sold 233,000 cars in the first three quarters (versus 190,000 in the entire previous year's time), as well as 23,000 (versus 20,500) trucks and vans. On the other hand, Gyllenhammar has had to admit that the export of cars has begun to flatten out, so that a less favorable outcome must probably be expected in the coming year. [Text] [Frankfurt/Main] FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Nov 79 p 157 9415

CSO: 3103

PROVINCE BY PROVINCE ANALYSIS OF ELECTION RESULTS

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 18-25 Oct 79 p 5

[Text] Numerous analyses, evaluation and interpretation of the results of and the distribution of votes in the elections have filled the pages of the dailies and other publications in the days following the election. Members of our political parties are particularly busy these days computing the percentage of their party's votes in the general total and comparing the new figures with earlier ones. Most of them come up with figures signifying an increase ranging from 200 to 500 percent. Oddly enough, even the political parties which did not participate [in the 14 October by-elections] are reporting sizable gains.

Tables showing each party's share in the total of votes cast in the last election and the number of votes each party polled on 14 October and in an earlier election are valuable documents because they afford a comparative study, but more significantly, they also show how each party ranks in voter opinion. Thus, it becomes possible to assess whether a given party is a veritable contender for power, or how much success it had in influencing the voting masses.

HURRIYET brought together a group of experts in political and social sciences fields and its own staff specialists to make an assessment of the results province by province and to prepare a "report card" for each political party. The study group also evaluated the role of nonpolitical factors, wherever such a role was detected, in the outcome of the elections.

Technical note: In the preparation of the tables for our "Election Analysis by Province" series, the number of votes cast for each party on 14 October was compared with the corresponding figure in the 1977 general elections, and not with the results of the 1973 by-elections, in the belief that the 1973 results represented a trend too far back in the past to be of value in a comparison today. The Rate Increase Formula used in the computation of the increase or decrease in the percent of total vote was

$$\frac{x_2 - x_1}{x_1} .$$

ERZURUM

(a) SEÇMEN SAYISI	(b) 1977 YILI GÖRE ARTIS VEYA AZALIS ORANI (%)	(c) KATILMA ORANI (%)	(d) 1977 YILI GÖRE KATILMADA ARTIS VEYA AZALIS (%)
275.158	- 15	74	- 15
(e) PARTİNİN ADI	(f) 1979'DA ALDIĞI OY HİKLARI	(g) 1979'DA ALDIĞI OYUN ORANI (%)	(h) 1977 YILI GÖRE OYLARINDAKİ ARTIS VEYA AZALIS (%)
CGP	(1) 2,606	1.2	- 30
SDP	(2) 859	0.4	-
CHP	(3) 28,829	14.0	- 49
MSP	(4) 35,767	17.6	- 8
AP	(5) 101,700	49.9	- 5
TBP	(6) -	-	-
TİP	(7) 895	0.5	-
MHP	(8) 32,992	15.8	+ 3
TSİP	(9) 776	0.3	-
KİMSİZ	(10) -	-	-

***Key:**

- | | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|--------|
| a. Number of voters | 1. Republican Reliance Party | [RRP] |
| b. Increase or decrease over 1977
(In percent) | 2. Social Revolution Party | [SRP] |
| c. Rate of participation | 3. Republican People's Party | [RPP] |
| d. Increase or decrease over 1977
(In percent) | 4. National Salvation Party | [NSP] |
| e. Name of party | 5. Justice Party | [JP] |
| f. Number of votes received in
1979 | 6. Turkish Unity Party | [TUP] |
| g. Percentage of votes received
in 1979 | 7. Turkish Labor Party | [TLP] |
| h. Increase or decrease in the
votes received by the party
as compared to 1977 (In percent) | 8. Nationalist Action Party | [NAP] |
| | 9. Turkish Socialist Workers
Party | [TSWP] |
| | 10. Independents | |

[*Please use same key for other tables also.]

Erzurum

RPP Loses Senatorial Seat to JP

Erzurum divided its three senatorial seats among the JP, RPP and NSP in the earlier election, but this time it sent two of the JP's and one of the NSP's candidates to the senate. The major development in the latest election was the drop in the number of voters and the rate of participation. Although Erzurum is one of the provinces with a rapidly increasing population, it became apparent that there has been a 15-percent drop in the number of registered voters over the past 2 years. In the 1977 election, 76 percent of the province's 325,100 voters went to the polls. This year, only 74 percent of the voters turned out.

The party which suffered the biggest loss in Erzurum was the RPP, followed by the RRP, NSP and the JP, even though two of the JP candidates were elected. The RPP polled 49 percent fewer votes than it had in 1977. That put the RPP behind the NSP, which had only an 8-percent loss, and turned over the third senate seat to the JP. Leftist parties received only 1.2 percent of the total votes cast in Erzurum. Apparently, the RPP could not have elected a senator even with all the leftist votes in its column.

In the past year, Erzurum, as many other provinces, was beset by commodity shortages. Vegetable oil, liquid fuel, cubed sugar and iron shortages were particularly severe. Moreover, the incumbent RPP senator, Hilmi Nalbantoglu, having made a poor showing in the primary, was not even on the RPP's list of candidates.

The only party which improved its standing in Erzurum was the NAP. It registered a 3-percent increase in the votes-received column. The NAP has a large organization in Erzurum. The number of votes cast for its candidate Rifki Yazici, a teacher, was slightly less than the NSP's winning candidate Lutfi Dogan's.

To sum up, RPP voters' refusal to cast their votes for their party's candidate worked in favor of the JP.

Mus [Table on following page]

All Parties Improved in Votes-Received Column

Ismail Ilhan, an independent and the incumbent senator from Mus, ran for re-election, but lost his seat to the NSP. Ilhan, who had been elected to the senate with nearly 40,000 votes and had taken part in many marches and protest demonstrations during his senate term, received a mere 1,753.

Mus was one of the provinces where both the voter participation rate and the number of voters dropped in 1979. Reportedly, the groups which urged the voters to boycott the election made no inroads in Mus, and yet, the voter participation rate was 34 percent below the 1977 level.

MUS

(a) SEÇMEN SAYISI	(b) 1977 YI GORE ARTIS VEYA AZALIS ORANI (%)	(c) KATILMA ORANI (%)	(d) 1977 YI GORE KATILMADA ARTIS VEYA AZALIS (%)
75.814	-29	65	-34
PARTININ ADI	(f) 1979'DA ALDIGI OY MİKTARI	(g) 1979'DA ALDIGI OYUN ORANI (%)	(h) 1977 YI GORE OYI ARINDAKI ARTIS VEYA AZALIS (%)
CGP	(1) -	-	-
SDP	(2) -	-	-
CHP	(3) 13,474	24.6	+ 11,4
MSP	(4) 19,207	35.0	+ 27
AP	(5) 17,512	32.0	+ 16
TRP	(6) 244	0.4	-
IPP	(7) 152	0.3	-
MHP	(8) 1,857	3.3	- 37
ISIP	(9) 532	0.9	-
BAGIMSIZ	(10) 1,753	3.2	- 9

All the parties that participated in the election polled more votes than they had in the 1977 election. The only losers were the independent candidates. At the top of the list of the parties which increased their votes comes the NAP with a nearly ninefold increase over 1977. It is followed by the NSP with a 27-percent increase, the JP with a 16 percent, and the RPP with a 11.4 percent.

Lutfi Dogan of the NSP, the senator elect in Mus, also campaigned in Erzurum on behalf of his party's candidate Iemail Arslan, a teacher. Dogan visited virtually every village in the province and arranged prayer sessions where er he went. Even though all the parties scored gains in the Mus election, Lutfi Dogan's campaign tour and the support he received from a number of religiously influential organizations and institutions in the area helped the NSP candidate Arslan to unseat the independent incumbent.

ERZINCAN

(a) SEÇMEN SAYISI	(b) 1977 YI GÖRÜ ARILAN VEYA AZALAN ORAN (%)	(c) KATILMA ORANI (%)	(d) 1977 YI GÖRÜ KATILIMDA ARILAN VEYA AZALAN (%)
100.588	- 27	81	- 14
PARTİNİN ADI	(f) 1979'DA ALDIĞI OY MİKTARI	(g) 1979'DA ALDIĞI OYUN ORANI (%)	(h) 1977 YI GÖRÜ OY ALINDAKİ ARILAN VEYA AZALAN (%)
CGP	(1) 719	0.8	- 27
SDP	(2) 605	0.7	-
CHP	(3) 28,218	34.5	- 36
MSP	(4) 2,898	3.7	- 49
AP	(5) 33,913	41.7	+ 26
TUP	(6) 453	0.5	+ 25
DP	(7) 391	0.4	-
NPİ	(8) 13,164	16.7	- 27
İMP	(9) 394	0.4	-
BASİMSİZ	(10) -	-	-

Erzincan

RPP Backslides, JP Moves Forward, Gets Senate Seat

In Erzincan, where the RPP lost its senate seat to the JP, voter participation increased, but there was a 27-percent drop in the number of voters. Even with the higher rate of participation, the number of votes cast in Erzincan in the last election was 15,000 fewer than it was in 1977.

The NSP, with a 49-percent drop in the number of votes it polled, was the biggest loser. The NSP was followed by the RPP with a 36-percent drop which resulted in the RPP's loss of its senatorial seat to the JP. The NAP and the RRP are also on the list of parties which received fewer--27 percent per--votes than they had in 1977.

Meanwhile, the JP and the TUP registered considerable gains in Erzincan. The JP's votes went up 26 percent, and the TUP polled an impressive 35 percent more than it had in 1977. The combined total of the votes cast for leftist parties was 2 percent of the general total.

In Erzincan, there has been a severe shortage of cubed sugar, which happens to be the type of sweetener the local populace likes to use in tea. Orhan Ozen, a lawyer, replaced Niyazi Unsal, the incumbent senator, on the RPP slate, following the latter's defeat in the primary. Most of the questions directed at Ozen during his campaign tour in Erzincan concerned the half-finished construction projects. The questioners wanted to know why the construction which the NSP cabinet minister had begun was halted by the government.

To sum up, the decline in the RPP's votes, as the JP strengthened its position, placed the Erzincan senatorial seat in the JP column.

MARDİN			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977 ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Katılım oranı (%)	(d) 1977 ye göre artış veya azalış
185.033	-22.7	65.8	-14.1
PARTİNİN ADI	(f) 1979 da aldığı oy miktarı	(e) 1979 da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(g) 1977 ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 302	0.2	-97.7
SDP	(2) 329	0.3	—
MP	(3) 25,486	20.9	-34.6
MSP	(4) 21,042	17.2	-50.7
AP	(5) 33,626	27.7	+10.6
TBP	(6) —	—	—
TIP	(7) 430	0.4	—
MHP	(8) 13	0.1	-48
TSIP	(9) 16,661	13.6	—
BAGIMSIZ	(10) 23,948	19.6	-64.2

Mardin

Some of the 'Expectations' in Mardin Did Not Materialize

In Mardin, the relationship between the forces "outside the system" and the political parties which support the existing regime swings like a pendulum between solidarity and rivalry. This phenomenon was expected to produce fluctuations in the voting trend in Mardin in a more pronounced manner than elsewhere. It did not happen, the outcome of the election was the same as the earlier election's, Mardin's two seats in the senate was divided between the JP and the RPP. There was another prediction that did not come true.

The independent candidate, Mehmet Talat Seyhan, who had the backing of the independent minister of public works [in the Ecevit cabinet], Serafettin Elci, was, contrary to expectations, beaten.

Mardin is another of our provinces where the number of voters has dropped. So has the rate of voter participation which was not high to begin with. The boycott calls allegedly had something to do with the decline in voter participation.

The 10-percent increase in the votes cast for the JP is interpreted as a voter reaction to the illegal terrorist actions in Mardin, the underdeveloped condition of the province, and the pre-election efforts to get several public works projects started in the area. The RPP suffered a 35-percent loss, but the RPP was not the only loser, the NAP, RRP and the NSP lost votes also.

Leading the factors contributing to the RPP's losses is, reportedly, the absence of the incumbent senator M. Ali Arikan's name on the RPP slate. Arikan failed to win a slot for himself on the RPP list when he lost the primary. A desire to "abolish the urbanites' hegemony in the RPP" is cited as the reason for Arikan's defeat. He was replaced by Cemil Ceen, whose name went to the top of the RPP slate, but Ceen failed to draw the urban vote. Another feature of the election in Mardin was the large number of votes cast for leftist parties. Leftist votes account for 14 percent of the total. Most of those votes were cast for the TSWP, whose candidate Mahmut Oral, a teacher, ran as an independent.

In conclusion, the single seat the RPP is holding on to in Mardin is now threatened by the decline in the party's vote and by the increase in the leftist vote.

Agri [Table on following page]

Kufrevi Wins Comfortably

The province's single seat in the Senate remained in the JP column. The ethnic characteristic of the region was the overriding consideration in the RPP's selection of Dr M. Naci Kutlay as its Agri candidate. Dr Kutlay, a former ILP member, had been tried and convicted of propagating Kurdism. He succeeded in raising the RPP votes by 68 percent, but it that was not enough to beat the JP candidate Kasim Kufrevi, the traditional authority figure in the region, who helped his party double its votes.

Both the number of voters and the voter participation rate dropped significantly in Agri. The rate of participation was still above the national average nevertheless.

The parties with the largest losses were the RRP, with a 92-percent loss, and the NAP, whose losses came to 88 percent. Meanwhile, the NSP scored a major upset. Having doubled its votes, it climbed to the position of the third largest party in Agri.

The major factors in the outcome of the election in Agri are listed as the lack of progress in the woolen yarn factory project started by the RPP government, and the failure to put an end to the prolonged bottled-gas shortage. Those two factors may have had a share in the JP's victory, but the incumbent senator Kufrevi's undisputed prestige and his influence in all aspects of the political life in the region were without a question a bigger factor in the outcome of the election.

AGRI			
(A) Seçmen sayısı	(B) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(C) Katılma oranı (%)	(D) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış
110,307 (E)	-17	76	-13
PARTİNİN ADI	(F) 1979'da aldığı oy miktarı	(G) 1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(H) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CCP	(1) 784	0.9	-92
CHP	(2) 363	0.4	-
CHP	(3) 19,768	24.3	+67
MHP	(4) 18,777	23.1	+211
MHP	(5) 39,766	49.0	+98
CHP	(6) -	-	-
CHP	(7) 480	0.6	-
MHP	(8) 680	0.8	-88
CHP	(9) 432	0.5	-
CHP/MHP	(10) -	-	-

Aydın [Table on following page]

JP Strengthens Position

The JP had no difficulty to speak of in retaining the National Assembly seat vacated by Mutlu Menderes. The JP candidate Selahattin Acar, whose campaign was distinguished by his tours on muleback, helped the JP to retain all its votes and win some more, 9 percent more.

Aydın, however, joined the provinces where both the number of voters and voter participation are on the decline. The latter is still above the national average nonetheless.

Two more parties, in addition to the JP, recorded an increase in the number-of-votes-poll column. The RRP increased its votes by 24 percent, and the NAP by 16 percent. On the other hand, the RPP, whose candidate was Ziya Postacı, a pharmacist, lost 24 percent of its votes. The other losing party was the NSP which polled 14 percent less than it had in 1977. Leftist votes in Aydin were a little over 2 percent of the total vote.

Aydin, as many other provinces in the Aegean region, is beset by a number of commodity shortages. Efforts of the TARIS [Agricultural Sales Cooperatives Union of the Aegean Region] and the TANSA [expansion unknown] to ease one of the shortages by shipping large amounts of cooking oil to Aydin in the pre-election days were described by the opposition as "election investments." Aydin has always been a JP stronghold, but the personality of the JP candidate Selahattin Acer was also an undeniable factor in the party's victory. If Acer lives up to the promises he made to his constituents, we should expect to see him in the midst of many fights in the upcoming parliamentary session.

AYDIN			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977 ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Katılma oranı (%)	(d) 1977 ye göre artış veya azalış
314.307 (a)	-21 (b)	77 (c)	-10 (d)
PARTİNİN ADI	(e) 1979 da aldığı oy miktarı	(f) 1979 da alınan oyun oranı (%)	(g) 1977 ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 4,003	1.6	+ 24
SDP	(2) 1,605	0.7	—
CHP	(3) 74,808	30.9	-24
MSP	(4) 6,062	2.5	-14
AP	(5) 143,025	59.2	+ 9
TBP	(6) —	—	—
TIP	(7) 1,320	0.5	—
MHP	(8) 8,437	3.4	+ 16
TSİP	(9) 1,949	0.8	—
BAĞIMSIZ	(10) —	—	—

Manisa

JP Votes Fluctuate

Manisa voted for both a deputy and a senator and elected the JP's candidates for both vacancies, just as it had in the earlier election. Even though many signs of a pro-RPP trend were observed in earlier elections, the RPP came out of the 14 October voting badly bruised.

MANISA			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977 ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Katılma oranı (%)	(d) 1977 ye göre artış veya azalış
435,800	-7	72	H

(e) MİLLETVEKİLİ

PARTİNİN ADI	(f) 1979 da aldığı oy miktarı	(g) 1979 da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(h) 1977 ye göre artış veya azalış
CGP	(1) 4,852	1.5	+ 26
SDP	(2) 2,064	0.7	
CHP	(3) 87,708	28.3	
MSP	(4) 17,414	5.6	H
AP	(5) 178,695	57.3	+ 1
TBP	(6) 1,340	0.4	
TİP	(7) 2,481	0.6	
MHP	(8) 14,584	4.6	
İSİP	(9) 1,714	0.5	
BAGIMSIZ	(10) —		

SENATÖR

CGP	(1) 5,215	1.7	
SDP	(2) 2,248	0.7	
CHP	(3) 86,477	28.8	38
MSP	(4) 16,161	5.3	- 14
AP	(5) 172,500	57.0	- 2
TBP	(6) 1,425	0.5	
TİP	(7) 2,495	0.8	+ 52
MHP	(8) 13,484	4.5	- 0.8
İSİP	(9) 1,761	0.6	
BAGIMSIZ	(10) —		

The number of voters decreased in Manisa which, according to the State Planning Organization, is one of the fastest growing provinces where the population has been increasing at an annual rate of 5 percent. There was a drop in the voter turnout also.

The RPP's hackelide was more pronounced in the senate voting which indicates that some people voted for the RPP in the National Assembly election, but switched to another party's candidate in the senatorial election. The RPP's vote dropped considerably in both elections, but the RPP was not alone, the NSP lost votes also. Its losses came to 14.5 percent in senate elections and 8 percent in the assembly elections. The NSP candidate for the senate was a mufti [an interpreter of religious laws] and the assembly candidate was a lawyer. As for the NAP, it received more votes than it had earlier in the assembly election and suffered only a minor loss in the senate election. The JP came out of both elections as the victorious party, even though there was a marked fluctuation in its votes. In terms of plurality, it was far ahead of other parties, but it received fewer votes, as compared to 1977, in the senate election and its gain in the assembly election was a mere 1 percent which, it is said, the JP owes to the effective campaign run by its candidate Suleyman Caglar, a former senator. Leftist votes constituted about 2.5 percent of the total in both elections.

To sum up, the JP was not seriously challenged at any time in its bid to hold on to its assembly seat vacated by the death of JP Deputy Atif Akin and to retain the senatorial seat vacated by the death of JP Senator Ruhi Tunakan.

Yozgat [Table on following page]

Voting Trend Reversed

Yozgat has been known as an "NAP fortress." The results of the recent election bore out the propriety of the epithet. The RPP and the NSP lost their senate seats to the JP and the NAP. The two senatorial seats of Yozgat were once shared by the RPP and the JP. Later, the JP lost its seat to the NSP, but retrieved it on 14 October. The RPP, in the meanwhile, turned over its seat to the NAP. The NAP's showing in Yozgat was dramatic, to say the least. In terms of the numerical superiority of votes, the NAP was far ahead of all the other parties which made it the premier party of Yozgat. Henceforth, Yozgat will be represented in the senate by two new names, both lawyers, Unal Allioglu of the JP and Servet Bora of the NAP.

The number of registered voters showed a drop in Yozgat, as it did in many other central Anatolian provinces, but voter participation in Yozgat was a record high. The 80-percent turnout represents a 17-percent increase over 1977. As for voter participation by political party, there was not much of a difference between 1977 and 1979 figures. The drop recorded by several parties in the number of votes they received was not because some of their supporters stayed at home, but apparently because they voted for another party on 14 October.

YOZGAT

(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Katılma oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış
166,663	-23	80	+ 17
PARTİNİN ADI	(e) 1979'da aldığı oy miktarı	(f) 1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(g) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 1,779	1.2	-47
SDP	(2) 809	0.5	—
CHP	(3) 33,096	21.9	-33
NSP	(4) 19,625	13.0	-16
AP	(5) 45,441	30.0	-6
İBP	(6) 901	0.6	-7
TUP	(7) —	—	—
MHP	(8) 47,225	31.2	+ 25
İSİP	(9) 1,149	0.8	—
BAGIMSIZ	(10) —	—	—

The hard-fought election campaign in Yozgat began long before the primary. Suleyman Engin, the incumbent NSP senator, dropped out of the race. The NSP selected Yasin Hatiboglu to replace him. However, Hatiboglu, a member of the party's central organization, was considered an "unfamiliar" face in Yozgat, and even though he occasionally addressed directly at the people of Yozgat in his televised campaign speeches [presumably as the spokesman of the NSP], Yozgat continued to look upon him as an outsider. Meanwhile, the RPP organization was going through an "old versus new" struggle. Prof Dr Celal Sungur, fondly nicknamed Celal, The Crazy, by the local populace, was a popular figure in Yozgat, but not in the circles in favor of renovation. The spokesman for renovation prevailed and Sakir Keceli's name was placed at the top of the RPP list. Keceli is from Bogazliyan and was considered a shoo-in in his hometown district. Veli Uyar, a former RPP senator, could make only the second slot on the list. Meanwhile, in the NAP camp, a victorious showing was considered more or less a certainty in Yozgat. The organization's confidence encouraged a number of former politicians to seek a place on the party's list, but the top slot went to Servet Bora, a lawyer, who, in terms of personal behavior, was not any tamer than the RPP's Sungur. Ismet Kapisiz, a veteran politician, got the second slot.

The distribution of votes by party presented a picture totally unlike the 1977's. The RPP suffered the biggest setback, followed by the RPP with a 33-percent drop in votes. Another big loser was the NSP. The TUP and the

JP also lost votes, but the figures were low. The NAP increased its strength by 25 percent. Leftist votes came to 3 percent of the total. The TLP, turning the cultural characteristics of Yozgat to its advantage, collected 30 percent of the votes cast for leftist parties.

ÇANAKKALE			
(a) Secmen sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Nahiyela oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış
204.481 (e)	-6	76	-6
PARTİNİN ADI	(f) 1979'da aldığı oy miktarı	(g) 1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(h) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 2,625	1.7	
SDP	(2) 11.51	0.7	
CHP	(3) 47,188	30.2	-31
MSP	(4) 6,619	4.4	-23
AP	(5) 92.263	59.0	+5
TRP	(6) 724	0.4	+24
TIP	(7) 833	0.5	
MHP	(8) 3,524	2.2	-9
ISIP	(9) 990	0.6	-
BAGIMSIZ	(10)		

Canakkale

Had the RPP Lost 1,000 More Votes . . .

The RPP paid the price for the country's numerous unresolved economic and social problems, from anarchy to the rising cost of living. RPP supporters punished their party by staying away from the polls, not only in Canakkale, but in many other provinces. One of Canakkale's two senatorial seats went to the JP while one remained in RPP hands, but the RPP people in Canakkale say, it will be a long time before they recover from the anxiety of the election night.

Both the number of voters and voter participation dropped by 6 percent in Canakkale. Most of that 6-percent drop was in the RPP's votes. The RPP was

the second-rated party in Canakkale in 1977 also. There would have been no call for anxiety on the election night had the RPP supporters in Canakkale been half-way confident that the vote distribution pattern of 1977 would repeat itself, giving one of the two seats to their party. As it turned out, because a 31-percent of the RPP voters stayed home, the party won the senate seat by only 1,000 votes. The JP, meanwhile, was enjoying a 5-percent increase in its votes. There was talk that had Lapseki Mayor Zekiye Gulsen, formerly a JP deputy, not lost in the primary, the JP would comfortably have won the second senate seat also.

The losers in Canakkale were the NSP and the NAP, both of which received what can be described as token support.

Listed among the factors contributing to the RPP's losses in Canakkale are the involvement of Canakkale Mayor Resat Tabak's son in anarchic incidents, and the street names scandal [municipal assembly's naming a street after the mayor's son]. Same reasons are cited for the low percentage of the leftist vote.

Konya [Table on following page]

Votes Shifted Between Two Parties

The outcome of the voting in Konya was a foregone conclusion, but that did not stop many of the parties from predicting an upset in their favor. They were wrong, the change in the voting trend was not significant enough to alter the traditional pattern. The JP won the assembly seat comfortably and is sending Prof Saban Karatas to the National Assembly. While the voter participation was up in Konya, the number of registered voters had decreased. Figures show that there were 50,000 fewer valid votes in Konya. Coincidentally, the number of votes the RPP lost in Konya is also 50,000.

The only change that the 14 October election brought to the political picture was in the ranking of the two leading parties in the province. The RPP, which had received around 148,000 votes in 1977, lost 35 percent of them, ending up with about 94,000 votes and dropping to the second place. The 1977 election had put the JP behind the RPP, but in the 14 October 1979 election, where the Democratic Party which, in 1977, had polled 27,000 votes, was not in the running, the JP jumped to the first place. The JP's 204,000 votes represented an increase of more than 50 percent over its 1977 total of 132,000 votes.

The NSP which, for some unexplained reason, had designated Konya its "citadel," had seemed confident of beating the RPP and the JP and winning the assembly seat at stake in Konya. However, the returns indicate that the NSP, represented in the race by the former governor of Konya Oktay Baser, suffered a 30-percent vote loss. As for the NAP, it not only could not poll a sufficient number of votes to win the assembly seat, it also failed to hold on to its traditional votes. The returns show that the NAP lost 20 percent of the votes normally cast for it. Apparently, the JP was the only party which could increase its strength in Konya.

A simple mathematical exercise will show that the JP's gains in Konya are not comprised of only the 27,000 former Democratic Party votes. When we add up the losses of the RPP, NAP and the NSP, we may discover which parties' votes the JP stole in Konya where, as we noted earlier, the number of voters has declined since 1977.

KONYA			
(a) Seyirlerin Sayısı	(b) 1977 ye göre artışı veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Kazanılan Oran (%)	(d) 1977 ye göre artış veya azalış
592.662	-16	71	+8
(e) PARTİNİN ADI	(f) 1979 da aldığı oy miktarı	(g) 1979 da aldığı oyların oranı (%)	(h) 1977 ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 7,772	1.8	-61
SDP	(2) 2,450	0.6	—
CHP	(3) 94,692	22.5	-35
MSP	(4) 64,708	15.4	-30
AP	(5) 204,169	48.6	+54
TBP	(6) 1,247	0.4	—
TIP	(7) 2,124	1.5	—
MHP	(8) 39,999	9.5	-20
TSIP	(9) 1,905	0.5	—
BAĞIMSIZ	(10)	—	—

Istanbul [Table on following page]

The Strongest Citadel Crumbles

The factors that shaped the outcome of the elections in Istanbul are many in variety, as well as number. They range from intricate political theories to crass street politics, from the television's persuasive effect on voters to the cooking oil shortage, from the candidates of nonexistent parties to the independent candidates supported by the illegal Turkish Communist Party [TCP]. Istanbul is where the RPP, which had declared the province its strongest citadel, suffered its worst defeat. Istanbul is where the NSP, which had vowed to get the sixth senate seat, leaving no more than four seats to the JP, was proven to be way off the mark.

İSTANBUL

(a) Secmen sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Kalıma oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış
2.178.836	-19.8	56.8	+ 1
PARTİNİN ADI	1979'da aldığı oy miktarı	1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 38.734	3.1	+ 152
SDP	(2) 12,803	1.2	--
CHP	(3) 480,366	38.0	-46
MSP	(4) 101,078	9.0	+ 5.6
AP	(5) 504,785	41.0	+ 16
TBP	(6) 21,416	2.0	--
TİP	(7) 10,313	1.0	--
MHP	(8) 36.77	3.0	-10.8
İSİP	(9) 4.301	0.3	
BAĞIMSIZ	(10) 21.398	2.0	+ 6391

[In a later installment, HURRIYET made the following correction in the Istanbul table.]

Correction and Explanation

The number of votes, which formed the basis of our election analysis by province, were the preliminary and unofficial figures reported by news agencies. Those were the figures fed into the computer. The differentiation between those figures and the official returns announced later after the usual recount was not significant enough to affect the computation or the result, or the analyses thereof. However, in the case of the Istanbul table, there was also a typographical error in the NAP figures. We apologize for the mistake and correct the said figures as follow:

Number of votes received in 1979 : 44,854
 Percentage of votes received in 1979 : 4.0
 Increase over 1977 votes (in percent) : +9

Whether we call them midterm elections, or senate [one-third] renewal elections, the 14 October voting evinced an unprecedented shift in Istanbul's voting pattern. There was also a 20-percent drop in the number of eligible voters. To put it in another way, out of 100 Istanbul residents who voted in 1977, only 20 were eligible to vote in 1979. Be that as it may, Istanbul voters were apparently more enthusiastic than ever about going to the polls. The rate of participation was higher. However, even with the increase, the rate of participation remained below the national average.

Winners

The returns indicate that the RRP was the biggest winner in Istanbul in 1979. The RRP's list of candidates, led by Retired General Faruk Guventurk, received 150 percent more votes than it had in 1977. The RRP surpassed even the NAP which is a popular force in Istanbul. The JP, with a 16-percent increase, ranks second among the parties which increased their strength. Last on that list is the NSP with a modest 6-percent increase. There is no way to put in percentage figures the gains of the independent candidates, but Istanbul voters, who heretofore have consistently shunned independents, this time cast 21,000 votes for the independent candidates who represented a wide variety of political philosophies. Those 21,000 votes constitute a surprisingly large increase, and the biggest portion of those votes was cast for a woman overtly supported by the illegal, underground TCP.

Losers

The date 14 October 1979 will go down to history as the day the RPP suffered a tremendous defeat at the polls in Istanbul. The party which enjoyed the support of nearly 900,000 voters in 1977 was able to receive a little over 480,000 votes 2 years later. The RPP entered the elections in Istanbul with a list of candidates that included several people who had been once vetoed [presumably by the party organization] and several others who, by publicly arguing over their ranking on the list, had damaged one another's chances more than their opponents'. No wonder the RPP received even fewer votes than it had in 1973. The RPP's losses in Istanbul may well be interpreted as a reaction to government policies responsible for the shortages and the crises felt nationwide, but with greater intensity in Istanbul. Another loser in Istanbul was the NAP. It polled only 3 percent of the votes cast, which represents a loss of nearly 11 percent.

Leftist Votes

The confidence manifest in the preselection predictions of the leftist parties was neither justified nor contradicted by the results of the voting in Istanbul. More than 6 percent of the valid votes in Istanbul was cast for either leftist parties or independent candidates advocating leftist programs. None of the leftist parties or candidates have been tested in an earlier election; consequently, we are unable to judge if they won or lost support. However, assuming that some of the votes the leftists received

were the RPP's, we can explain why the RPP lost the fifth senate seat it was so sure of winning. When we look at the distribution of votes among leftist parties, we see that most of the votes went to Aybar-Bicakci team's SRP which proposed a "domestic socialism" model. Actually, the TUP received more votes than the SRP but, because the voting public has been trying to identify the TUP with one religious group or another ever since the party was formed, it is difficult to put a leftist label on all the TUP votes. The third place in the leftist camp goes to the TLP, and the fourth to the TSWP, which so far has proposed nothing that is fundamentally different from the TLP's philosophy. Meanwhile, Onger, the independent candidate supported by the TCP, polled as many votes as all the leftist parties did together.

To sum up, the returns demonstrate that in Istanbul votes have undergone a complete redistribution over the past 2 years. The primary beneficiary of the new arrangement is the JP, which ended up with five senate seats. Then comes the NSP which increased its votes sufficiently to win a seat in the senate. The RPP, despite the four seats it won, is the biggest loser in the Istanbul election.

Tokat [Table on following page]

Seats Split Between Two Parties, Positions Reversed

Here is another citadel that changed hands. Tokat, where the RPP traditionally receives one-half of the votes, became a JP realm overnight. The JP's success did not stem from an extraordinarily large RPP loss, the party simply increased its strength on its own. Tokat's two senate seats, which had been occupied by the RPP's Zihni Betil and the JP's Cevdet Aykan, were once again divided between the two parties, but this time, the number one seat went to the JP's candidate Osman Cetin and the number two seat to the RPP's Metin Somuncuoglu. The RPP would have had to relinquish the second seat to the JP also had the JP received 4,000 more votes.

Tokat was another of our provinces where the number of voters went down, but the voter participation rate went up, and in Tokat's case, with a 15-percent increase over the last election, the participation rate reached a record level. Several parties experienced vote losses nevertheless. The RPP's loss came to 56 percent, the RPP's 54 percent. Another loser was the NSP.

Meanwhile, the JP's votes increased by 15 percent. The TUP's pre-election assertions on the radio and television that it will win a senatorial seat in Tokat did not materialize, but the TUP made an impressive showing in Tokat. The 60-percent increase in the number of votes it polled was a big gain, but the TUP hardly posed a threat to the two major parties. If there was a threat, it came from the NAP, which strengthened its position well enough to topple the NSP from its number three position in Tokat. Leftist votes in Tokat constitute nearly 10 percent of the total, but we must note that the leftist votes include TUP votes also which, as indicated earlier, are not totally leftist.

According to our information, a certain governmental action may have played the major role in the shaping of the voting trend and eventually the outcome of the election in Tokat. We were told that the government delayed the announcement of the base price for wheat, and then, when it paid the premium, the money went to the "grain market," instead of the producer. For whatever reason, Tokat, which entered the election as an RPP stronghold, came out of it as a JP stronghold.

TOKAT			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Kadınlar oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış
199.848	-12.4	90	+ 14.6
PARTİNİN ADI	(e) 1979'da aldığı oy miktarı	(f) 1979'da aldığı oy oranı (%)	(g) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 2,371	1.2	-55.8
SDP	(2) 1,020	0.5	
CHP	(3) 43,414	21.7	-53.7
MSP	(4) 20,395	10.2	-11.9
AP	(5) 79,432	39.7	+ 14.4
TRP	(6) 16,373	8.2	+ 59.7
THP	(7) 1,035	0.5	
MHP	(8) 33,159	16.7	+ 40.0
İSP	(9) 1,268	0.6	
BAGIMSIZ	(10) 1,074	0.5	-16.4

Amasya [Table on following page]

Veterans Versus Newcomers

In Amasya, the JP won back all the votes it had lost to the RPP in 1973. The political equilibrium in Amasya was upset in the assembly elections of 1973 in favor of the RPP. In 1979, the tilt was in the direction of the JP which, therefore, retains its senate seat. Amasya's representative in the senate will be Nevzat Sener, a former deputy, and not the incumbent, Macit Zeren, who lost in the primary.

In 1977, when the RPP entered the elections as Amasya's premier party, there were apparently more voters on the rolls. This year, the rolls were shorter, but the rate of voter participation was higher.

The RPP did better in Amasya this time, but its popular vote failed to reach a meaningful level. The RPP and the NSP lost about an equal percentage of their votes. The RPP campaign before the primary was marked by a serious veterans-versus-newcomers struggle. RPP members of the Gumushacikoyu County prevailed in that struggle and placed their man at the top of the RPP's list of candidates. He was one of their local sons, Zafer Ozakca, comptroller of revenues at the Ministry of Finance. However, the JP candidate, Nevzat Sener, also a local son, was, unlike Ozakca, known throughout Amasya. The race among Ozakca, Sener and the NSP candidate Zafer Soyak, whom the party selected from among its headquarters group, ended in the defeat of the RPP and the NSP. Ozakca and Soyak, as if their failure to win the senate seat was not enough, also cost their respective parties over 40 percent of their votes. The NAP was on the losing side also. It still ranks fourth in Amasya, but its votes dropped by 30 percent. The leftist vote came to 4 percent of the total.

AMASYA			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Katılma oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış
145.116 (c)	-12	78.6	+1
PARTİNİN ADI	(f) 1979'da aldığı oy miktarı	(g) 1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(h) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 1,981	1.7	+13
SDP	(2) 778	0.7	
CHP	(3) 37,839	33.1	-47
NSP	(4) 6,447	4.6	-44
AP	(5) 57,467	50.0	+16
FBP	(6) 1,765	1.5	
HP	(7) 883	0.8	+56
MHP	(8) 6,202	5.4	-30
İSP	(9) 797	0.7	
BAGIMSIZ	(10)		

Kars

RPP Citadel Nearly Collapsed

While the votes shifted quite a bit, the distribution of the province's senatorial seats remained the same as before. Kars, where a variety of groups showed up in the preselection days to campaign for a boycott, has always been a staunch RPP supporter, but this time, the party had a close call. It came out of the election with only half of the votes it customarily gets in Kars. Nonetheless, the vote differentiation between the RPP and the JP was large enough to enable the RPP to hold on to the second seat. The final result was again two for the RPP and one for the JP.

There was a 30-percent drop in the number of registered voters. The rate of participation was very low. Some believe that the groups which campaigned for a boycott of the election may have had something to do with it. It may well be that the 37-percent drop in participation partly resulted from the boycott calls.

The new vote distribution, which almost robbed the RPP of its senate seat, made the TLP the biggest winner in Kars. Although the TLP votes are still pretty small in number, they represent a nearly twofold increase. Meanwhile, the JP votes, while they are behind the RPP's in terms of percent of the total, nevertheless represent a large increase in strength. In the earlier election, the JP votes were 19 percent of the total, but they constituted nearly 35 percent in the last election. Leftist parties also improved their standing, as evidenced in the ninefold increase in their votes.

KARS			
(a) Secmen sayisi	(b) 1977 ye gore artis veya azalis oran (%)	(c) Katilma oran (%)	(d) 1977 ye gore artis veya azalis
226.810	-30	58	-37
PARTININ ADI	(e) 1979 da aldig oy miktar	(f) 1979 da aldis oran (%)	(g) 1977 ye gore artis azalis (%)
CGP	(1) 2,166	1.6	-15
SDP	(2) 1,836	1.4	
CHP	(3) 52,892	40.1	-52
MSP	(4) 7,281	5.6	-65
AP	(5) 45,656	34.7	+ 18
TLP	(6) 1,324	1.0	
THP	(7) 1,837	1.4	+ 93
MHP	(8) 15,048	11.4	-14
ISHP	(9) 3,551	2.7	
BAGCISIZ	(10)		

The RPP lost nearly 52 percent of its votes. The NSP did even worse. Its 65-percent loss removed the NSP from its position as the third largest party in Kars. The new occupant of the third place is the NAP. However, the NAP's promotion to the third place is not the result of an increase in the number of votes it received. On the contrary, the NAP lost close to 14-percent of its votes. Also on the list of losers was the RRP which registered a 15-percent loss.

To sum up, for the lack of 4,000 votes, the JP lost the second senate seat in Kars to the RPP. Kars had an eventful campaign. Salim Dursunoglu, the original JP candidate, was killed. For a while, it appeared that Salim Dursunoglu's brother Halim Dursunoglu not only will get elected himself, but also take Yusuf Ziya Ayrim with him into the senate. As things turned out, the RPP, with a margin of 4,000 votes, was able to elect Halis Soylu, a surgeon, as well as the incumbent Sirri Atalay.

VAN			
(a) Secmen sayisi	(b) 1977 ye gore artis veya azalis oran (%)	(c) Kaldirma oran (%)	(d) 1977 ye gore artis veya azalis
124 585	-18	68	12
PARTININ ADI	(f) 1979 da aldigi oy miktar	(g) 1979 da aldigi oyun oran (%)	(h) 1977 ye gore artis azalis (%)
CGP	(1) 17.694	23.2	+ 28
SDP	(2) 334	0.4	
CHP	(3) 15.433	18.2	32
MSP	(4) 19.011	22.4	20
AP	(5) 26.542	31.3	+ 48
TBP	(6)		
TIP	(7)		
MHP	(8) 1.137	1.3	6
ISIP	(9) 2.271	2.7	
BAGIMSIZ	(10)		

Van

An Empire Collapsed

The hardest battle fought in Van was between a veteran politician and a former prime minister. Kinyas Kartal, a prominent figure and a political

leader in the area who, age-wise, is the oldest member of the National Assembly, campaigned for the JP candidate Fevzi Kartal who happens to be his nephew, while Ferit Melen [a former prime minister] campaigned for the RPP. It was one of the most colorful election campaigns Van has had for many years. The party which was able to increase its votes more, that is, the JP, was the winner. When the votes were counted, it became apparent that the RPP, which was the party of the incumbent senator, had lost the seat to the JP.

There were fewer voters in Van this year. The rate of participation was also down, but it was still around the national average. On the RPP side, Ruchan Isik, one of the young and upcoming stars of the party, conducted an effective campaign with the aid of the RPP brass, including Ecevit. Isik's criticism of the opposition parties and the opposition parties' replies made the campaign a very exciting time for the people of Van. Be that as it may, the RPP came out of the election with a 32-percent loss. JP Deputy Kinyas Kartal, who campaigned, not for himself, but for his nephew, a brand new lawyer, mobilized all his material and moral resources and took on Ferit Melen and the 30-year-old RPP empire. The elder Kinyas conducted a colorful campaign, made all the more colorful by his sparkling wit. It looked like a two-party race from the beginning and ended with the JP increasing its votes by 48 percent and the RPP trailing it with only a 28-percent gain. However, the vote count showed that the JP candidate Fevzi Kartal's real rival was not the RPP's Melen, but the NSP's Kazan. Had the NSP held on to all the votes it had in 1977, the senate seat would have been Kazan's, but the NSP lost 20 percent of its votes and joined the RPP and the NAP on the list of losers. The NAP has never been strong in Van and its 65-percent loss diminished whatever support it had.

The leftist vote in Van comes to 4 percent. Most of the leftist votes were cast for the TSWP.

The recent shift in the nationwide voting trend was also apparent in Van where it brought Melen's long years in the senate to an end and sent another eagle ["Kartal" means eagle] to the parliament.

Edirne [Table on following page]

Voters Deviate From Traditional Choices

As our colleague Hasan Pulur reported during his tour of the election provinces, the chant of "beige . . . beige" was the favorite slogan of the JP supporters in Edirne. It will stand as the Edirne JP's humorous contribution to our political history. RPP supporters' contribution was the

[*The word was "beg," pronounced "bash," but spelled by the reporter the way Edirne people pronounced it. "Beg" means five and refers to the five vacant assembly seats.]

the election results which will be remembered as the best evidence that we have reached a point where "the trends in the rural sector" can move an election to an unexpected direction. For many years now, political parties have referred to certain parts of the country as their "citadel," where "no one else can get a single vote." This election demonstrated that voters can no longer be counted on to vote for their traditional choices.

There were fewer voters in Edirne, but the rate of voter participation was up. As a matter of fact, it was higher than the national average. Consequently, the number of votes cast in the last election was not more or less than the number of votes cast in 1977. In 1977, the RPP received 54 percent of the votes in Edirne, which made it the province's premier party. The JP was in the second position with 40 percent of the votes. The RPP's plurality was close to 20,000 votes.

The figures received in many provinces indicate that a significant number of RPP supporters did not go to the polls. In Edirne, however, when we add up the votes cast for all parties, we get a figure only 7,000 less than the corresponding figure for 1977, which included all RPP votes. In the light of this fact, we may conclude that one-half of those 20,000 voters who voted for the RPP in 1977, but did not vote for it in 1979, cast their votes for the JP. When we add to this 10,000 the votes in the "votes lost" column of the other parties, we have a figure close to 15,000 which corresponds to the increase in the JP vote. Obviously, one-half of the RPP voters who did not vote for the RPP on 14 October, did not vote at all.

EDİRNE			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Katılma oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış
131.349	-8.2	76.8	+ 3
PARTİNİN ADI	(e) 1979'da aldığı oy miktarı	(f) 1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(g) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 2.083	1.5	+ 17.5
SDP	(2) 787	0.6	-
CHP	(3) 55.366	42.1	-25.9
MSP	(4) 1.702	1.3	-43.0
AP	(5) 68,220	51.9	+ 24.5
TRP	(6) -	-	-
HP	(7) 405	0.3	-
MHP	(8) 1,476	1.1	-22
İSİP	(9) 525	0.4	-
BAĞIMSIZ	(10) 302	0.2	-

Why the RPP lost so many votes is a more important question than why so many more voters supported the JP. We find the answer in an article by an Edirne journalist. The following passage puts forth many of the reasons commonly agreed on.

"The central factor in the RPP's defeat in Edirne is the sunflower issue. The fuel oil shortage may be cited as another leading factor. Recurrent shortages in many food items and basic consumer goods did not help either. Originally, the government urged sunflower growers to shift to rapeseed farming on grounds that the latter plant requires less work, costs less and yields more. Later on, shortly before the rapeseed harvest was due, the government banned rapeseed cultivation and sales. Farmers, who had already abandoned their sunflower crop, found themselves in a very difficult position. Sunflower growers, who constitute the majority of the producers in and around Edirne, are the people who defeated the RPP. Meanwhile, people of Edirne had their share of anarchic incidents. The developments at the Edirne Engineering and Architecture Academy and at the Edirne Educational Institute which resulted in fatalities were eye-openers. Another factor in the Thracian farmers' disillusionment with the government was the low level of the base price of wheat. Thracian farmers sold their crops to merchants willing to pay the base price and did not go to the State Soil Products Office. A month before the elections, the government raised the base price for wheat and offered an additional premium for sunflower; by then, however, it was too late to win back the producers."

The outcome of the elections did not change the distribution of Edirne's senatorial seats. The seat vacated by one JP man was filled with another JP man, but the new voting trend must have unnerved the RPP parliamentarians still in office.

Hakkari [Table on following page]

All Parties Recorded Losses

Contrary to the expectation of some circles, the change that was observed in the voter trend after 1973 hadn't reversed itself during the intervening years. The JP received nearly 10,000 of the 25,000 valid votes cast in Hakkari and installed its own man in the RPP's senate seat. There were 10,000 fewer voters Hakkari this time. Hakkari has a small number of voters to begin with; therefore, the 20-percent drop in the rolls is a serious development.

The political balance was already upset in the 1977 election when the RPP, which had won a senate seat in 1973, could poll only 36 percent of the vote, while the JP received 43 percent. In the latest election, the RPP ended up with about 34 percent and the JP with 40 percent.

The RPP and the JP were not the only losers, all the other parties lost also, and considerably. In fact, the JP leads the list of losers with

43 percent, followed by the RPP with a loss of 42 percent. The NAP did not run. The NSP lost 43 percent and the RRP 35 percent. Leftist parties garnered 7 percent of the total votes cast in Hakkari.

HAKKARI			
(a) Seçmen Sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Katılma oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış
41.295	-20	60	-23
PARTİNİN ADI	(f) 1979'da aldığı oy miktarı	(g) 1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(h) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 169	0.6	-35
SDP	(2) 109	0.4	-
CHP	(3) 8,473	34.0	-42
MSP	(4) 4,584	18.4	-38
AP	(5) 9,829	39.5	-43
İBP	(6) -	-	-
İTP	(7) 158	0.6	-
MHP	(8) -	-	-
İSİP	(9) 1,587	6.4	-
BAGIMSIZ	(10) -	-	-

Despite a loss of 43 percent, the JP continues to be an influential party in Hakkari. Its strength obviously has not diminished much since 1977; otherwise it could not have sent its candidate Abdulhaluk Ozdinc to the senate to replace the RPP incumbent Naci Cidal.

Kutahya [Table on following page]

RPP Voters Stayed Home

The results of the voting in Kutahya demonstrated that when an incumbent switches parties, it does not necessarily follow that the voting pattern will change. Kutahya started out as a Democratic Party stronghold, but later became a JP province. Its representative in the senate, Osman Albayrak, was a JP member when Kutahya voters elected him in 1973. Albayrak later switched to the NAP, but Kutahya voters were unaffected by the switch. Although there was a drop in the JP's votes, apparently a large number of

voters still believed in the party, because the JP received enough votes to repeat its 1977 performance and send two senators to Ankara.

KÜTAHYA			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Katılım oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış
220.166 (e)	-13	75	-1
PARTİNİN ADI	(f) 1979'da aldığı oy miktarı	(g) 1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(h) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 3.695	2.2	-0.3
SDP	(2) -	-	-
CHP	(3) 33.098	15.6	-26
MSP	(4) 14.959	8.8	-11
AP	(5) 103.590	61.2	12
TBP	(6) 1.073	0.6	-
TİP	(7) 1.025	0.6	-
MHP	(8) 10.888	6.4	-1.1
TSİP	(9) 851	0.5	-
BAĞIMSIZ	(10) -	-	-

The RPP's status in Kutahya until the last elections can best be described with a favorite phrase of sports fans: it may be defeated, but it is not crushed. On 14 October, however, the RPP suffered a crushing defeat. Even though the government's Roads to Villages and Village Electrification projects were widely implemented in Kutahya, the RPP lost one-fourth of its vote.

Fevzi Ergun, the first name on the JP's list of candidates, used to be the head of the party's provincial organization. He was well known in the area, and so was the second candidate on the list, Mehmet Emin Alanyalı. Alanyalı was a widely known personality even before he was dismissed by the former minister [not specified which minister] from his position as the director general of the Social Insurances Institution.

All the parties, except the two major ones, strengthened their positions in Kutahya. The NSP increased its votes by 11 percent, the NAP by 15 percent. A JP senator's mid-term switch to the NAP, apparently, did not change the

voting pattern significantly enough to give the NAP enough votes to keep its senator in office. The leftist vote in Kutahya is around 2 percent, which is not a significant level. The minute drop in the number of registered voters was just about cancelled by the increase in the rate of voter participation. Given this fact, one tends to believe that many RPP voters preferred to stay at home on 14 October, and in the meanwhile, other parties failed in their efforts to change the distribution of votes in their favor.

Balıkesir

Voters, Deprived of Their Favorite Park, Reject RPP

Balıkesir was untouched by anarchy until a few years ago when rightists and leftists established control on the opposite sides of the rail line that cuts through the city. Nightlife in Balıkesir came to an abrupt end. For 2 years now, people have been afraid to visit the Atatürk Park, a favorite recreational spot of every Balıkesir resident. Election results reflect the new situation in Balıkesir. All the parties, except two, increased their strength. The exceptions were the JP, which neither lost nor gained, and the RPP, which lost 38 percent of its votes.

Both the number of voters and the participation rate dropped, which would have made an across-the-board decline in votes understandable, but the RPP was the only party with a serious loss. It had received 37 percent of the votes in 1977, in 1979, it had to be content with 27 percent--a loss of 38 percent. By contrast, the JP lost a mere 2,000 votes. The social upheaval was, indeed, a factor, but there were other reasons also.

BALIKESİR			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Katılma oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
428,466	-9	75	-4
PARTİNİN ADI	(e) 1979'da aldığı oy miktar	(f) 1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(g) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 6,906	2.1	+ 13
SDP	(2) 2,358	0.7	-
CHP	(3) 84,317	26.6	-38
MSP	(4) 18,296	5.7	+ 5
AP	(5) 186,416	58.8	-1
İRP	(6) 1,557	0.5	-
İRP	(7) 1,908	0.6	-
MHP	(8) 12,173	4.1	+ 31
İSİP	(9) 1,465	0.5	-
BAĞIMSIZ	(10) -	-	-

The primary was preceded by an out-and-out battle among the contenders for a place on the RPP slate. Nejat Sarlıcalı was the RPP incumbent in the senate. Finding jobs for their constituents is one of the conventional obligations of a Turkish parliamentarian. Apparently, the incumbent RPP senator alienated a number of people by ignoring that obligation. Several groups in the RPP organization were critical of Senator Sarlıcalı's style of living in Ayvalık, and particularly of his yacht. However, Sarlıcalı, an experienced politician and parliamentarian, overcame the opposition, and with some effort won the primary. The days leading to the primary were not exactly uneventful in the JP camp either. JP Deputy İlhan Aytekin, who is also a member of the JP General Administrative Board and an influential figure in the party, reportedly waged a campaign against the party's former senators. The campaign seems to have achieved its end because the top two slots on the party's list of candidates went to M. Sükrü Cavdaroglu and Cemal Organ, both former deputies. Another former deputy, Ahmet İhsan Kırımlı, could make only the third place from the top, which dimmed his hopes of getting into the senate. Contributing to Kırımlı's frustration were the reports about the optimism in the RPP camp. These reports painted such a glowing picture of the RPP's chances that the JP organization decided it would be unreasonable to go after all three of Balıkesir's senatorial seats. As things turned out, the RPP lost close to 50,000 votes, but since the RPP's losses were not countered by a high-percentage increase in the JP's votes, the JP had to settle for two of the three senatorial seats.

Isparta [Table on following page]

NAP Takes Third Place

No other party than the JP could have hoped to gain anything in Isparta, Demirel's hometown. Mustafa Gülcügil, who has represented Isparta in the senate for years, was reelected as expected, but something else happened in Isparta and that was not expected. The drop in the number of voters and the rate of participation was reflected in the declining figures in the "votes cast" columns of the RPP, RRP, NSP, TLP and the İUP. The NAP's column, however, showed a 117-percent increase.

Political participation has always been at a high level in Isparta, more than likely because it is Demirel's hometown. The provincial JP organization under the leadership of Sevkettin Demirel, has consistently increased its strength, even in the face of occasionally serious threats from the RPP. However, in the 14 October election, the JP suffered a serious vote loss. So did the RPP, even though it had successfully increased its votes over the years. The RPP's losses came to 50 percent. As for the NSP, it had not made any serious endeavors in Isparta, but it had a reasonably effective organization in Isparta proper and in the outlying counties. All the same, it lost one out of every four votes it had polled in 1977.

The only party with a gain was the NAP. Had Isparta voters been electing National Assembly members also on 14 October, the NAP, which polled only 3,000 votes in 1977, would have won the fourth assembly seat. Its success on 14 October made the NAP the third largest party in Isparta.

Thanks to the wide margin between the JP's votes and those of the other parties, the 14 percent drop in the JP votes did not matter. Gulcugil's place in the senate was never threatened.

ISPARTA			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Kadında oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
142,311	-12	70	-7
PARTİNİN ADI	(f) 1979'da aldığı oy miktarı	(g) 1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(h) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 1,398	1.4	-9
SDP	(2) 692	0.7	-
CHP	(3) 11,963	12	-52
MSP	(4) 3,587	3.6	-23
AP	(5) 72,085	72.6	-14
TRP	(6) 482	0.4	-98
TPP	(7) 387	0.4	-92
MHP	(8) 8,137	8.2	+117
İSP	(9) 502	0.5	-
BAĞIMSIZ	(10) -	-	-

Samsun [Table on the following page]

JP Successfully Defends Its Citadel

According to the State Planning Organization, Samsun is one of the "fastest developing provinces." Its population has increased steadily over the years. Its growing population adds no less than 20,000 new voters annually to Samsun's rolls. Over the past 2 years, however, around 75,000 people apparently dropped out of the rolls. Taken with the sizable decline in the rate of voter participation, the shrinking rolls in Samsun loom as a serious problem.

The decline in those two categories hurt only one party, the RPP. All others, with the exception of the RPP which suffered some losses, improved their standing. The major winner was the JP, which not only held on to its two seats, but also won one of the RPP's two seats.

The Samsun primary was not exactly a fiercely fought battle. Both the JP and the RPP incumbents--Refet Rendeci from Of and Bahri Comert from Bafra, respectively--failed in their attempt to get on the list. The RPP's second senator Ziya Gokalp Mulayim, who is from Ceyhan, decided to try his luck in Hatay this time. On the JP side, Dogan Kitapli, a former deputy, and Saban Demirag, the incumbent senator, won the first and second slots. The third place on the list went to Celal Aslan, a former prosecutor, but the JP did not think that Aslan would have a chance of getting into the senate if the 1977 pattern repeated itself. Meanwhile on the RPP side, Muharrem Bartin, the governor of Rize, won the top position on the list. He was followed by Emir Sumer, a veterinary doctor, who was, at the time, given a good chance of getting elected.

SAMSUN			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Katılma oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
388,543 (e)	-16	70.9	-2
PARTİNİN ADI	(f) 1979'da aldığı oy miktar	(g) 1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(h) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 4,404	1.5	-20.8
SDP	(2) 1,785	0.6	-
CHP	(3) 71,312	25.6	-46.0
MSP	(4) 25,490	9.0	+ 27.7
AP	(5) 151,833	55.5	+ 6.8
TRP	(6) -	-	-
TOP	(7) 1,734	0.6	+ 98
MHP	(8) 14,489	5.2	+ 20
ISIP	(9) 1,602	0.6	-
BAGIMSIZ	(10) 3,439	1.2	+ 67

When the votes were in, it became apparent that the RPP had lost one-half of its votes. What it had received was enough to elect only one senator. On the other hand, the 7-percent increase in its votes enabled the JP to send a third senator to Ankara. The NSP did well also, but not well enough to win one of the seats as NSP leaders had hoped to. JP votes, even without the 7-percent increase, were sufficient in number to keep the party's two seats

in the JP column. Another party which did well in Samsun was the NAP, but again not well enough to win a seat. The TLP, meanwhile, had doubled its votes. Leftist votes remained at 2 percent, nonetheless.

Samsun had been through all the shortages and had experienced all the problems common to large urban areas. None of the investments in the city which, when completed, would have eased the plight of the fixed income groups, had reached the operational stage. Outside the city, the facilities, which were expected to resolve the unemployment problem, were still unfinished. Construction of the cement factory in Ladik was proceeding at snail's pace. The sugar factory at Carsamba were partially complete when, for a lack of funds, construction had to be halted.

Those were the factors that helped the JP keep its citadel in Samsun from collapsing. The party demonstrated its rising strength by winning three of Samsun's four senate seats.

HATAY			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Katılma oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
299,175 (a)	-19	72	-1
PARTİNİN ADI	(b) 1979'da aldığı oy miktarı	(c) 1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 1,574	0.7	-35
SDP	(2) 914	0.4	-
CHP	(3) 89,224	41.3	-40
MSP	(4) 11,618	5.3	-15
AP	(5) 84,012	30.8	-9
TRP	(6) 796	0.3	-32
HP	(7) 1,135	0.5	+132
MHP	(8) 22,081	10.2	-10
TSIP	(9) 3,333	1.4	-
BAĞIMSIZ	(10) 1,380	0.6	-

Hatay

RPP Fails in Bid, NSP Loses Votes

You may recall that Ecevit opened the RPP's election campaign in Hatay. You may also recall that Hatay was selected for the honors because the RPP believed the party was very strong in Hatay. It was strong, indeed, and

frankly, the RPP was expecting to win both of the senate seats, instead of sharing them with the JP, as it had in 1973. The RPP's self-confidence was proven to be exaggerated, the JP won one of the seats.

The RPP had polled close to 150,000 votes in Hatay in 1977, but it realized on 14 October that one-half of those votes were gone. The 90,000 votes it received gave the party only one senate seat.

The primary in Hatay was one of the more animated ones. Ziya Gokalp Mulayim, the incumbent senator from Samsun, had decided to try his luck in Hatay, which is closer to his hometown Tarsus. Mulayim is a nationally known figure, and he had the full backing of the RPP organization, but he lost the primary. He was not the only disappointed candidate. Former JP deputy Talat Koseoglu lost also. Mulayim may have lost because the RPP people in Hatay did not know much about him, but in Koseoglu's case, the exact opposite may be the contributing factor. His reputation as a mischief maker in the JP organization allegedly was the primary reason why the voters in Hatay went with Mustafa Deliveli. The JP entered the 14 October election with Deliveli at the top of its list of candidates, and the RPP with Mehmet Sonmez, an educator, at the top of its list. Early returns were so encouraging that the RPP began thinking of the second senatorial seat in Hatay as a distinct possibility. The second-ranking candidate on the list, Dr Atif Seyfittinoglu, had to wait until the last vote was counted to find out if he was elected or not.

The final result of the election was not what the RPP had anticipated. The party received only 40 percent of the votes. The NSP had 15 percent and the JP 30 percent, a slight increase from the last time in the JP's case. Voters who did not go to the polls numbered more than the extra votes the JP received. Obviously, some of the RPP, NSP and NAP voters were among the stay-at-homes.

The percent value of the leftist votes cast in Hatay was above the average of other provinces. Among the leftist parties, which together polled a 3-percent of the votes, the TLP increased its votes by 132 percent. The TLP candidate in Hatay was Suleyman Galioglu, a lawyer.

The RPP's hopes of making a giant stride in Hatay were crushed. The outcome of the 1979 election was not any different from the outcome of the earlier one.

Artvin [Table on following page]

Voter, Participation, Vote Figures Drop, RPP Loses One Seat

All the figures in the Artvin election were smaller than the 1977 figures, that is to say, there were fewer voters, fewer people voted and every party received fewer votes. The RPP ended up with one less senate seat from Artvin. That seat went to the JP, and Rasim Gezmiş, a former governor, whose unpaid hotel bills had given him nationwide exposure, became a senator.

The number of registered voters in Artvin dropped 20 percent, and 11 percent fewer voters went to the polls on 14 October 1979. What these two figures mean is that 20,000 fewer votes were cast in Artvin. The RPP, which lost around 13,000 votes, was not the biggest loser, that designation belongs to the NAP, which lost 54 percent of its votes. Next comes the NSP with a 54-percent loss. The smallest percentage figure in the losses column belongs to the JP, which ended up with the largest number of votes. It was a repeat performance for the JP. It also had the largest number of votes in Artvin in 1977.

ARTVIN			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Katılım oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
95,195 (e)	-20	63 (g)	-11 (h)
PARTİLERİN ADLARI	(f) 1979'da aldığı oy miktarı	1979'da alınan oy oranı (%)	1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CHP	(1) -	-	-
SDP	(2) 477	0.8	-
CHP	(3) 24,202	40.1	-36
NSP	(4) 2,268	3.7	-54
NAP	(5) 31,496	52.2	-19
JP	(6) 435	0.7	-
JP	(7) 341	0.5	-
MSDP	(8) 713	1.1	-64
USDP	(9) 324	0.5	-
BAĞIMSIZ	(10) -	-	-

All the developments that have taken place in Artvin since 1973, particularly the events of the recent months, described as "feudalism of thugs," had little effect on the JP-oriented voting trend that had emerged years ago. Another thing we must note about the Artvin election is the leftist vote. A number of leftist parties and organizations are said to be very influential in Artvin, but the leftist vote was only 3 percent of the total. Distributed among the leftist parties which participated in the election, it comes to less than 1 percent.

Rize

Mataraci Incident Drove JP Members Closer

"Mataraci was a JP member for years. He got up and joined the RPP just like that. The RPP shouldn't expect to get more votes than it has." This comment by a voter in Rize tells it all. That is really what happened in Rize. Mataraci's resignation from the JP, in effect, helped the JP take the senate seat from the RPP. The number of voters was down in Rize, but the voter participation figure did not change. Even so, the RPP, which was able to poll 32 percent of the votes in 1977, lost 32 percent of what it had, and the RPP incumbent, Talat Dogan, was replaced by the JP's Sukru Meto, an economist.

RIZE			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977 ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Katkı oranı (%)	(d) 1977 ye göre artış azalış (%)
151,050 (e)	-16	69	+1
PARTİNİN ADİ	(f) 1979 da aldığı oy miktarı	(g) 1979 da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(h) 1977 ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 1,533	1.4	-29
SDP	(2) 739	0.7	-
CHP	(3) 26,723	25.8	-32
MSP	(4) 12,996	12.5	-14
AP	(5) 55,425	53.4	-1
TBP	(6) -	-	-
TİP	(7) 761	0.7	-
MHP	(8) 5,303	5.1	-28
İSİP	(9) 374	0.3	-
HAKIMSIZ	(10) -	-	-

The list of parties which lost a certain percentage of their votes is a long one because all the parties are on it. At the top of the list is the RPP with a loss of 32 percent. It is followed by the RRP, NAP and the NSP. The JP lost some votes also, but its losses amounted to a mere 1 percent. As a result, the JP ended up with the largest slice of the votes and jumped to the first place in Rize.

Leftist votes came to about 2 percent.

A voter in Rize, when asked about the major factors that shaped the outcome of the election, said:

"There is one reason why the JP increased its strength in Rize, and that is Tuncay Mataraci. He was the JP's banner carrier in Rize for years, but he left the party and became a cabinet minister in the Ecevit government. That made the JP supporters in Rize embrace their party with even intenser loyalty."

BURDUR			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Kalanlar oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
108,622	-8	90.6	-1.2
PARTİNİN ADİ	(e) 1979'da aldığı oy miktarı	(f) 1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(g) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 1,395	1.8	-9.4
SDP	(2) 502	0.6	-
CHP	(3) 22,598	28.8	-34.2
MSDP	(4) 2,933	3.7	-50.2
MHP	(5) 40,409	51.6	+ 8.2
TRP	(6) 500	0.6	-
İP	(7) 395	0.5	-
DMSP	(8) 8,989	11.4	+ 55.6
İSİP	(9) 567	0.7	-
BAGIMSIZ	(10) -	-	-

Burdur

NAP Got What NSP Lost, Kirbasli Was the JP's Magnet

In 1973, Burdur sent the RPP's Ekrem Kobay to the senate, but this year, the JP's Faik Kirbasli is going. The trend in Burdur had already turned against the RPP in 1977. Even had the RPP succeeded in reversing the trend, Burdur's representative in the senate would have changed. The primary had already put Osman Aykul in Kobay's place on the list of candidates. At the end, it mattered little who was on the list because the RPP, having lost 34 percent of its votes, was in no position to claim the senate seat.

Voter participation was high in Burdur, but still below the level observed in earlier elections.

Parties which came out of the election at the losing end are led by the NSP with a 50-percent loss. In contrast, the NAP had close to 56 percent increase in its votes. The RPP, which lost over 34 percent, is followed by the ARP whose losses were smaller. The leftist vote in Burdur was in the neighborhood of 2.5 percent.

The major factor that shaped the outcome and enabled the JP to increase its votes by 10 percent was, reportedly, the JP candidate Faik Kirbasli, a former deputy and a popular figure. Former senator Kubay's defeat in the primary, his being replaced by Osman Aykul on the RPP list are also cited among the political factors which shaped the election's outcome. It is also pointed out that there has not been a single investment in Burdur in the past several years and that Burdur counties have been severely hit by basic commodity shortages. Apparently, these political and nonpolitical events, along with the new voting trend that emerged sometime between 1973 and 77, resulted in the RPP's loss of the senate seat to the JP.

ANTALYA			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Katılım oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
308,258 (a)	-9	77	+1
PARTİNİN ADI	(e) 1979'da aldığı oy miktarı	(f) 1979'da alınan oy oranı (%)	(g) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 2,922	1.2	-31.7
SDP	(2) 1,428	0.6	-
CHP	(3) 53,431	23.0	-39.0
MSP	(4) 6,193	2.6	-22.0
AP	(5) 153,392	66.0	+10.0
TRP	(6) 1,423	0.6	-
TIP	(7) 1,189	0.5	-
MHP	(8) 7,682	3.2	-29.5
TSIP	(9) 1,308	0.5	-
BAGIMSIZ	(10) 3,083	1.3	+22.90

Antalya

RPP's So-Called Victory Gives Both Seats to JP

Antalya residents know Attorney Gurkut Acar very well. If there was anyone left in Antalya who did not know of Acar, by now he, too, must have heard

of him. Attorney Acar is the administrator of an extraordinary party organization. He managed the Antalya election which handed over the RPP's senatorial seat to the JP on a silver platter. He was capable of making more effective strategic and tactical decisions than the party's administrators, including the chairman. A statement Acar issued on the eve of elections and the 40-percent loss the RPP suffered in Antalya as a direct result of his management have convinced us that Attorney Acar must be all that he is said to be and more some.

In Turkey's rapidly developing provinces, it is only natural for national policies to have a more potent influence than traditional ties on voter behavior. However, these traditional ties are not totally severed yet and local dynamics are still a major factor in politics. JP and RPP cadres in many of our developed provinces exerted efforts and took steps to turn the election results in their favor. Initiatives of a similar nature were taken by several other parties whose membership includes radical leftists. The RPP's Antalya organization, on the other hand, perhaps motivated by the belief that voters in Antalya are more interested in general political developments than local dynamics, decided that the "call to unity" agreement between Ecevit and Demirel was an event of such significance that, if debated provincewide, will surely influence Antalya voters' ultimate choice. The organization prepared statements on the matter and sent them off to the press.

There were fewer voters in Antalya this year, but the drop was not as bad as the decline in some other provinces. Besides, the rate of voter participation was up, which offset some of the loss and put the drop in the general total of the votes cast in Antalya at 20,000. Combined losses of the parties, which received less than they had in 1979, came to 40,000. Of that figure, 14,000 went to the JP. Out of the remaining 26,000, 6,000 were cast for leftist parties and 3,000 for independents. A reasonable conclusion based on these figures would be that some of the voters who supported the RPP in the earlier election stayed home this year, and some others dropped from the rolls. Even then, we end up with a number of unaccounted-for votes. Therefore, we must concede that some of the RPP supporters voted for the JP on 14 October.

The RPP was only one of the parties which lost in Antalya. The RRP, NSP and the NAP also suffered serious losses, but these parties did not have much support to begin with; consequently, their losses did not make a difference in their status. The Acar-led RPP organization, on the other hand, lost more than 40 percent of its votes, it lost a senate seat also.

What would have happened if the 14 October voting was a parliamentary election, instead of a by-election? Out of the seven seats Antalya is entitled to in the parliament, the JP would have had the first, second, fourth and fifth seats--a total of five--and the RPP would have been left with the third and the seventh--a total of two. If the JP had polled another 1,000 votes, the distribution of seats would have been six JP and one RPP.

The outcome of the Antalya election stands as a telling illustration of what happens when an individual with a superior knowledge of national politics operates on the provincial level and organizes the masses around ideals. We believe there is no need to look for another reason for the RPP's loss of its seat to the JP. The score in Antalya is 2-0.

BİTLİS			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Katılma oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
63.840	-17.4	72.1	-12.6
PARTİNİN ADI	(e) 1979'da aldığı oy miktarı	(f) 1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(g) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 11.423	25.3	+ 2372
SDP	(2) 165	0.4	-
CHP	(3) 8.381	19.4	-21.4
MSP	(4) 8,085	17.9	-52.4
AP	(5) 15,751	34.7	-26.3
TRP	(6) -	-	-
DP	(7) 142	0.3	-
MHP	(8) 548	1.2	+ 197
İSP	(9) 546	1.2	-
BAGIMSIZ	(10) -	-	-

Bitlis

NAP Increases Votes

The senate seat from Bitlis was the JP's and it remained in JP hands. Judging from the nationwide contest, one may naturally think that the election in Bitlis was also a JP-RPP race which ended with a JP victory. That was not the situation in Bitlis. The race was between the JP and the RRP and the loser was the RRP candidate, Orhan Kurumoglu.

Bitlis was another of our provinces with a declining voter and participation figures. The RRP, even though its candidate was not elected, received more votes than it had in the earlier election. The NAP was able to strengthen

its position also. Outside of these two parties, all the parties that participated in the election suffered losses: The RPP 21 percent, the NSP 52 percent and the JP 26 percent. Meanwhile, the NAP vote went up 197 percent, but the RRP did even better. the increase in the RPP vote was 2,372 percent. The RPP candidate, Kurumoglu, who had once withdrawn from politics, but had changed his mind later, found himself facing a number of schemes. Nonetheless, he did far better than the RPP's and the NSP's candidates, and came close to outpolling the JP candidate. Had the RRP received an additional 4,000 votes, Kurumoglu, and not Sedat Ozcan, the JP candidate, would now be the Bitlis senator. The JP, its votes down by 6,000 from the 21,000 it had received in 1977, was nonetheless able to hold on to the seat it had won all the way back in 1973. Leftist votes in Bitlis came to somewhat less than 2 percent.

Siirt			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Katılım oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
124516 (e)	-24	55	-8
PARTİNİN ADI	(f) 1979'da aldığı oy miktar	(g) 1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(h) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 525	0.7	-
SDP	(2) 435	0.6	-
CHP	(3) 10.218	13.8	-46
MSP	(4) 30.167	43.6	+16
AP	(5) 17.400	25.1	-15
TRP	(6) 188	0.2	-
HP	(7) 148	0.2	-
MHP	(8) 473	0.8	-0.8
İSP	(9) 9.248	13.4	-
BAGIMSIZ	(10) -	-	-

Siirt

All Except NSP Lost

Not all the senate seats relinquished by the RPP went to the JP. In Siirt, the NSP ended up with the seat formerly occupied by the RPP senator Sureyya Oner. This time, the RPP candidate was Cevdet Aydin, a lawyer, and he was beaten by another lawyer, the NSP candidate Idris Arikon. It was hardly an upset because the NSP was Siirt's strongest party in the 1977 elections also.

The steep drop in the number of voters, coupled with the decline in the rate of participation, resulted in smaller figures in the "votes received" columns of all the parties, with the exception of the NSP. The RPP lost 46 percent, the JP 15 percent and the NAP 33 percent, but the NSP raised its votes by 16 percent and won the senate seat.

When asked for some information on the NSP senator-elect, a Siirt politician said that Attorney Arikan was basically a leftist. Certain traditional forces, and interestingly enough, a number of organizations, allegedly joined the NSP in the campaign for Arikan. Their efforts produced a plurality of nearly 13,000 for the NSP candidate over his nearest rival, the JP candidate, and put the RPP in a precarious situation. The RPP received only 1,000 more votes than the TSWP, which was making its first try in Siirt. The TSWP, represented in the election by Doan Oguzer, a teacher, loomed as a contender for the RPP's third-ranked-party status in Siirt. Leftist parties, including the TSWP, polled 15 percent of the vote. Any one of those leftist parties, should it receive the entire 15 percent, can become the third-ranked party in Siirt.

Mugla [Table on following page]

Voters Increase, Participation Drops

Mugla's four seats in the National Assembly were split evenly in 1977 between the JP and the RPP. At the beginning, the RPP was not very optimistic about its chances in Mugla where the election was for the province's one empty seat in the assembly. The developments in the JP camp during the primary, however, brightened the RPP's hopes. As a matter of fact, the RPP's predictions of a 3-2 result from the voting for the five vacant seats in the National Assembly were based on its renewed hopes of winning in Mugla and Edirne.

Regardless of the encouraging developments, the RPP knew that its chances of winning Mugla was slight and the results of the voting in Mugla show that "slight" was an accurate description of the RPP hopes. Mugla voters, whose number had increased since the last election, cast 24 percent fewer votes for the RPP. The JP came out of the election with its votes up by 7 percent. The RPP, which was represented by the chairperson of its women's auxiliary, Gulzade Olcay, also polled more than it had in the earlier election. The losers, in addition to the RPP, were the NAP and the NSP. The NAP's minute loss was further dwarfed by the NSP's loss of 24 percent.

The leftist vote came to slightly over 2 percent.

The JP candidate, Unat Demir, a former deputy from Mugla, was returned to the assembly by a comfortable margin.

The JP's votes were twice as many as the RPP's and more than the total of the votes cast for the rest of the parties that participated in the election in Muğla.

MUĞLA			
(a) Seçmen sayısı	(b) 1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%)	(c) Katılma oranı (%)	(d) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
290.759	+ 31	55	-30
PARTİNİN ADI	(f) 1979'da aldığı oy miktarı	(g) 1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%)	(h) 1977'ye göre artış azalış (%)
CGP	(1) 2.954	1.8	+ 46
SDP	(2) 921	0.6	-
CHP	(3) 55.825	34.7	-24
MSP	(4) 2.734	1.7	-29
AP	(5) 92.560	57.8	+ 7
TBP	(6) 691	0.4	-
TİP	(7) 907	0.5	-
MHP	(8) 2.903	1.8	-1
İSİP	(9) 687	0.4	-
BAĞIMSIZ	(10) -	-	-

General Assessment [Tables on following page]

This is where we wrap up our series on the 14 October senate renewal and assembly by-elections held in 29 of our provinces. Methodology expects us to use the election results in these 29 provinces to make nationwide generalizations, and that is what several press organs have been doing recently. The problem is those 29 provinces have not been selected by a process of sampling, neither have they been picked at random. The results received in those provinces are good for one thing only, and that is, to forecast what may happen in the next election in the same provinces. By the same token, when combined with the analyzer's foresight and interpretive ability, they may shed light on the nationwide situation.

In that context, we may make the following generalizations:

Senate

Assembly

SENATO

25 ilin seçmen sayısı (1)	1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%) (2)	Katılma oranı (%) (3)	1977'ye göre artış azalış (%) (4)
6,818,586	-16.9	71.6	-7.3
PARTİNİN ADI	1979'da aldığı oy miktarı (5)	1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%) (6)	1977'ye göre artış azalış (%) (7)
CGP	(1) 112,920	3.10	+ 850.3
SDP	(2) 32,779	0.57	-
CHP	(3) 1,204,660	26.65	-28.9
MSDP	(4) 435,582	12.23	-10.7
AP	(5) 2,172,341	45.7	+ 6.2
TRP	(6) 51,079	0.76	-0.9
İRP	(7) 29,004	0.53	+ 11.4
NIHP	(8) 305,933	6.83	+ 118.1
İSDP	(9) 56,590	2.05	-
BAGIMSIZ	(10) 56,377	1.14	+ 342.8

MİLLETVEKİLİ

5 ilin seçmen sayısı (2)	1977'ye göre artış veya azalış oranı (%) (3)	Katılma oranı (%) (4)	1977'ye göre artış azalış (%) (5)
1,763,167	-4.04	70.36	-7.4
PARTİNİN ADI	1979'da aldığı oy miktarı (6)	1979'da aldığı oyun oranı (%) (7)	1977'ye göre artış azalış (%) (8)
CGP	(1) 21,664	1.64	+ 14.5
SDP	(2) 8,027	0.64	-
CHP	(3) 368,399	31.70	-27.78
MSDP	(4) 92,620	5.30	-24.8
AP	(5) 686,699	54.96	+ 19.1
TRP	(6) 3,278	0.24	-
İRP	(7) 7,237	0.68	-
NIHP	(8) 67,399	4.08	-4.0
İSDP	(9) 6,780	0.52	-
BAGIMSIZ	(10) 320	0.04	-

Key:

1. Total number of voters in 25 provinces
 2. Total number of voters in five provinces
- [Please use original key for other items]

1. There is an unusually large drop in the number of registered voters. Either there was a serious impropriety in the conduct of the 1977 voter registration drive or, even though a curfew was in effect when it was conducted, all the voters could not be reached. News reports after the drive indicated that, indeed, some districts could not be canvassed. Visitors were registered wherever they were at the time of registration. Reports indicate not all those records have been forwarded to the voter's legal address.

2. The rate of voter participation dropped considerably. We agree that voting is only one form of political participation. The voting public can also make its political choice known by joining a political party, by attending political meetings and in many other ways. Since many indicators of political participation painted a discouraging picture, the high rate of voter participation was a welcome sign. The recent decline in the participation in elections can be interpreted as a sign of "cooling," a loss of interest. And that is something that should concern all political parties.

3. Two sectors--leftist parties and the NAP--which are within the system, but outside the center-left and center-right, fell short of their expectations. Even so, the NAP doubled its votes, and leftist parties received around 4 percent of the votes. Meanwhile, two center parties--the JP and the RPP--garnered 72 percent of the votes. A large portion, 80 percent, of the votes outside of the ones cast for center parties went to rightwing parties, and 20 percent went to leftwing parties. Had those votes been distributed evenly and had they comprised 30 percent of the grand total, we could have concluded that when European nations were at a comparable development level, their voters also preferred radical ideas. In our country, however, it may be too early yet to talk of extreme polarization in the political field.

4. One of the center parties--the RPP--came out of the election with a loss. The other--the JP--contrary to its assertions, did not record an impressive increase in its votes. When we even out its wins and losses, we'll come out with a 6-percent win for the JP, but the party's increase and decrease series (with a 2-percent margin of error) does not deviate from zero. On the other hand, the RPP's losses (with all margins of error) deviates from zero, that is, the RPP's losses are serious.

5. The voter attitude in the senate election is different from the voter attitude in the assembly election. It signifies that personality, regional leadership and even religious ties [are still important factors] and wins and losses are still determined by provincewide political developments, such as the efficiency, or the lack thereof, of political organizations, as well as general, nationwide policies.

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